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Abstract 
The effect of corporate diversification on behaviour of business towards 
stakeholder demands and social concerns has been overlook, especially in 
product diversification both related and unrelated diversification. This study 
investigates the relationship between corporate diversification (CD) (i.e. related, 
unrelated and international diversification) and Corporate Social Performance 
(CSP) in Indonesian listed companies. It explores the moderating effect of 
corporate governance (CG) (e.g. independent commissioner and ownership 
concentration) on the correlation between corporate diversification and CSP.  
This study takes 203 listed companies from the Indonesian Stock Exchange as 
the sample. It applied company annual report, Indonesian Capital Market 
Directory and Osiris database as sourced of data. Moreover, content analysis 
based on 80 indicators of Global Report Initiative is used to measure CSP, while 
multiple regression with one-year lag dependent variables is used as the primary 
data analysis. The result of multi regression analysis shows that related and 
unrelated diversification produced different outcomes whereby related 
diversification is negatively correlated with CSP. Unrelated diversification, 
conversely, reveals a positive relationship with CSP. Moreover, unrelated 
diversification is more positively correlated to CSP than the related CD, while 
international diversification also has a positive relationship with CSP. 
Furthermore, an independent commissioner could strengthen the CD-CSP 
relationship with regards to unrelated and international diversification. 
Conversely, ownership concentration could weaken the CD and CSP relationship 
for related diversification.  
In conclusion, this study contributes to theoretical development (i.e. it explains 
the link between product diversification, international diversification and CSP in 
emerging economies setting. It extends previous studies by considering the role 
of CG as a moderator, and uses content analysis based on GRI indicators in 
measuring CSP). Additionally, it has managerial implications, including a 
manager needs to consider CD and carefully manage the demands of an 
extensive range of stakeholders to increase CSP. Second, in order to maximise 
the impact of corporate diversification strategy on CSP, a manager has to think 
sensibly, based on the CG dimensions in the company, such as the number of 
independent commissioners and ownership concentration. Third, this study 
provides input to managers who run their businesses in emerging economies that 
have some differences with developed economies, for instance local rules, 
regulations and governmental control. Fourth, it also has an impact on the 
economy of Indonesia. For example, the government should establish regulations 
suitable for several types of industry and encourage the listed companies to 
implement good CG. Finally, limitations and further research directions are 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1  OVERVIEW OF STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Diversification suggests a company that has several different businesses in 
a given sector and which differs in terms of industry or product, market and 
resources (Hill, Jones and Schilling, 2015; Knecht, 2014; Barney and Hesterly, 
2012; Johnson, Scholes and Whittington, 2008; Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). 
Industry diversification describes a company which adopts a diversification 
strategy by having multiple businesses based on a type of product or industry. 
Moreover, product or industry diversification itself can be classified into related 
and unrelated diversification (Hashai, 2015; Oh, Sohl and Rugman, 2015; Su and 
Tsang, 2015; Zahavi and Lavie, 2013; Chang, Oh, Jung and Lee, 2012; Chen 
and Yu, 2012; Palepu, 1985). Therefore, Chen and Yu (2012) define related 
diversification as a company‘s  strategy in relation to diversifying its business into 
two or more businesses that are associated with similar products, or sharing 
intangible assets. In contrast, they define unrelated diversification as a 
company‘s strategy in extending its business into different business areas, where 
no physical or knowledge resources are shared. 
Furthermore, market diversification is described as a diversification strategy 
that comprises multiple businesses based on different market characteristics, 
such as consumer needs, cross elasticity and geographical area (Pitts and 
Hopkins, 1982). In terms of market, according to Pitts and Hopkins (1982), the 
geographical market is more popular in relation to describing market 
diversification than other factors and therefore, it has been applied in some 
recent studies. Previous researchers, such as Ma et al. (2016); Krapl (2015); 
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Kang (2013); Majocchi and Strange (2012) used international diversification to 
describe geographical market diversification, which refers to a company which 
has operated in multiple regions or countries, whereas other researchers used 
global diversification to explain international diversification (Gao and Chou, 2015; 
C olak, 2010; Doukas and Kan, 2006). Accordingly, a company could adopt an 
international diversification strategy by means of export or by using foreign 
subsidiaries (Majocchi and Strange, 2012). 
  Furthermore, diversification is associated with different resources and is 
embedded in product diversification (Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). Additionally, other 
authors, such as Knecht (2014); Castañer and Kavadis (2013); Zahavi and Lavie 
(2013); Chen and Yu (2012) also define diversification as the extent of company 
business with regards to similar skills, intangible assets or resources (related 
diversification), and which have no similar resources (unrelated diversification).  
Diversification is a significant strategy in relation to creating a competitive 
advantage or surviving against the competition (Kang, 2013; Purkayastha, 
Manolova and Edelman, 2012; Montgomery, 1994; Rumelt, 1974). Moreover, 
diversification strategy has other benefits, for instance creating synergy and 
market power (Purkayastha et al., 2012; Montgomery, 1994), risk reduction 
(Purkayastha et al., 2012; Martin and Sayrak, 2003), and internal capital market 
efficiency (Erdorf, Hartmann-Wendels, Heinrichs and Matz, 2013; Purkayastha et 
al., 2012; Martin and Sayrak, 2003). Therefore, diversification strategy is 
expected to improve company performance and create value for stakeholders 
(Purkayastha et al., 2012; Barney, 2011; Thompson, Strickland and Gamble, 
2007; Montgomery, 1994). Alternatively, diversification also has several costs 
that arise due to asymmetric information (Chen and Yu, 2012; Martin and Sayrak, 
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2003; Berger and Ofek, 1995), co-ordination (Chen and Yu, 2012) and agency 
problems (Su and Tsang, 2015; Ataullah, Davidson, Le and Wood, 2014; Martin 
and Sayrak, 2003). Accordingly, the asymmetric information and agency 
problems result in internal co-ordination costs (Su and Tsang, 2015). Hence, both 
the benefit and cost of diversification may have an impact on the performance of 
a company (Chen and Yu, 2012; George and Kabir, 2012; Purkayastha et al., 
2012; Palich, Cardinal and Miller, 2000; Montgomery, 1994).  
Many studies have been conducted to investigate the effect of 
diversification on performance (Kang, 2013; Markides and Williamson, 1994). 
However, the studies only focused on a company‘s financial performance, which 
has several limitations, such as frequent failure to represent long-term 
performance and the survival of the business (Harrison and Wicks, 2013; Kaplan 
and Norton, 1996) and emphasises maximising shareholder‘s wealth (Barney, 
2011). One alternative to financial performance as a measure, which deals with 
multiple stakeholders and useful predictors of long-term performance and 
viability, is Corporate Social Performance (CSP) (Kang, 2013; Kacperczyk, 
2009). CSP relates to the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
According to (Aguilera-Caracuel, Guerrero-Villegas, Vidal-Salazar and Delgado-
Márquez, 2015), CSP measures the level of implementation and success of 
practising CSR. Nowadays, CSP has become a vital component of overall 
performance (Brammer, Pavelin and Porter, 2006).  
According to Kang (2013), the relationship between corporate 
diversification and CSP not only provides an understanding of CSP as a 
complementary measurement of a company‘s performance, but also provides an 
argument that diversified businesses will have a beneficial impact on the welfare 
20 
 
of stakeholders. However, research on the relationship between corporate 
diversification and CSP has been overlooked. J. Kang (2013) emphasises that 
empirical evidence concerning the relationship between these variables is limited, 
especially for related and unrelated diversification. To the best of the researcher‘s 
knowledge, only limited studies have investigated the relationship between 
corporate diversification and CSP, such as Attig, Boubakri, El Ghoul and 
Guedhami (2016); Ma et al. (2016); Aguilera-Caracuel et al. (2015); Kang (2013); 
Brammer et al. (2006); Strike, Gao and Bansal (2006); Christmann (2004); 
Dooley and Fryxell (1999). However, most of these studies have focused on the 
relationship between international diversification and CSP. Only Kang (2013); 
Dooley and Fryxell (1999); Simerly (1997) have investigated the relationship 
between product diversification and CSP. However, Simerly (1997) did not 
differentiate between product diversification in related and unrelated 
diversification. Conversely, Dooley and Fryxell (1999) used related and unrelated 
diversification to reflect specific types of industry diversification, although they 
only used environmental performance as a CSP measurement and applied a uni-
dimensional indicator. Hence, it is onlyKang (2013), who applied related and 
unrelated types of industry diversification and used multi-dimensional indicators 
to measure CSP. Therefore, empirical evidence of the relationship between 
corporate diversification and CSP is limited, and a study which investigates this 
relationship is valuable.  
 Furthermore, several studies have investigated the determinant of CSP. 
Researchers such as Hafsi and Turgut (2013); Khan, Muttakin and Siddiqui 
(2013); Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) believe that corporate governance is an 
influencing factor with regards to CSP. Corporate governance (CG), is defined as 
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a set of mechanisms used to manage relationships among stakeholders and to 
determine and control the strategic direction and performance of the organisation 
(Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson, 2011). Furthermore, it should be noted that CSR 
and CSP are influenced by the choices, motives and values of those who are 
involved in formulating and taking decisions in the organisation(Khan et al., 
2013). Therefore, some researchers argue that internal corporate mechanisms, 
for example board composition (Cuadrado-Ballesteros, Rodríguez-Ariza and 
García-Sánchez, 2015; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Khan et al., 2013) and ownership 
structure (Ducassy and Montandrau, 2015; Dam and Scholtens, 2013; Khan et 
al., 2013), are considered important determinants of CSR and CSP.   
Several previous authors have investigated the direct impact of board 
composition and ownership structure on CSP, particularly board independence 
and ownership concentration (Ducassy and Montandrau, 2015; Jizi, Salama, 
Dixon and Stratling, 2014; Lahouel, Peretti and Autissier, 2014; Dam and 
Scholtens, 2013; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Khan et al., 2013; Dam and Scholtens, 
2012; Walls, Berrone and Phan, 2012; Zhang, 2012; Oh, Chang and Martynov, 
2011; Li and Zhang, 2010). Further studies have investigated board 
independence and ownership concentration as a moderating effect on the 
relationship between CSP and several variables, such as managerial 
entrenchment, earnings management and family businesses (Cuadrado-
Ballesteros et al., 2015; Choi, Lee and Park, 2013; McGuire, Dow and Ibrahim, 
2012; Surroca and Tribó, 2008). Arguably, CG relates to CSP and it may possibly 
affect the correlation between corporate diversification and CSP. However, a 
study on the effect of CG (e.g., board composition and ownership structure) in 
relation to the corporate diversification-CSP relationship has not been 
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investigated yet (Lien and Li, 2013; George and Kabir, 2012; Chen and Ho, 2000; 
Lins and Servaes, 1999).  
Moreover, Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) assert that good corporate 
governance (CG) improves a company‘s relationship with  stakeholders. Thus, 
the researcher argues that CG may have an association with corporate 
diversification and corporate performance. Accordingly, a company with high CG 
will have a better relationship with stakeholders, which is important in 
implementing corporate diversification strategy. Hence, the author argues that the 
impact of diversification strategy on CSP may be greater in a company which 
practises enhanced CG. In other words, CG could influence the link between 
corporate diversification and CSP. Therefore, this study aims to examine the 
relationship between corporate diversification and CSP with CG as a moderating 
variable.  
Prior studies examining the relationship between corporate diversification-
CSP and corporate governance-CSP have been conducted in developed market 
settings, such as the US and UK (Kang, 2013; Brammer et al., 2006; Simerly, 
1997); nevertheless, it remains neglected in emerging economies. According to 
Reimann, Rauer and Kaufmann (2015), every country has differentiations in local 
rules, regulations and governmental control, which lead to different CSR 
requirements. Most economies in emerging countries suffer from these weak 
institutions (Ma et al., 2016); consequently, they have low local labour rights or 
poor working standards. This condition leads to lower requirements concerning 
CSR in emerging economies than in developed economies (Reimann et al., 
2015; Yang and Rivers, 2009). Arguably, it will lead to a lower level of CSP, due 
to the implementation and success of practising CSR. Therefore, the result of a 
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study into the relationship between corporate diversification and CSP in emerging 
economies could differ from that of developed economies. Moreover, the unique 
characteristics of a company in emerging economies, such as family dominance, 
could result in the failure of corporate governance mechanisms to increase CSP 
(Khan et al., 2013).  
For example, Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015) established that the role of 
the independent director is disappearing in family owned companies. Moreover, 
shared ownership generally centres on the founder or family as the controlling 
shareholder and manager in emerging economies (Mangantar and Ali, 2015; 
International Finance Corporation, 2014; Utama and Utama, 2014; Claessens 
and Yurtoglu, 2013; Globerman, Peng and Shapiro, 2011; Claessens and 
Djankov, 2002). Hence, the role of ownership concentration could also have a 
different effect on the corporate diversification-CSP relationship in emerging 
economies. In addition, several studies have been conducted in developed 
countries (Kang, 2013; Brammer et al., 2006; Simerly, 1997); however, emerging 
economies such as Indonesia continue to overlook research on these topics. 
Accordingly, the researcher argues that an opportunity exists to investigate the 
relationship between corporate diversification, corporate governance and CSP in 
emerging economies. 
The term ‗emerging economies‘ is used to characterise less developed 
economies (Daniela-Neonila and Roxana-Manuela, 2014). Criterion to classify 
countries into emerging economies remains contentious. According to Ghemawat 
and Altman (2016), the World Bank defines emerging countries as low- and 
middle-income countries, which have a purchasing power parity-adjusted Gross 
National Income (GNI) of less than $12,736,2. The United Nations Development 
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Programme (UNDP) uses their Human Development Index (HDI), comprised of 
per capita income, educational attainment and life expectancy, to classify 
countries without ―very high‖ HDI and those below 0.8 (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2015) (on a 0 to 1 scale). Based on World Bank and 
UNDP criterion, Indonesia is classified as emerging economy. 
Moreover, Daniela-Neonila and Roxana-Manuela (2014) assert that 
Indonesia has also been classified as an emerging country in an exclusive group, 
in conjunction with Next Eleven (Egypt, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Iran, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Nigeria, Philippines, Turkey, South Korea, and Vietnam), based on the 
size of population and Gross National Product (GDP). An additional group is 
CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa). This 
group is classified based on young populations. 
Therefore, this study investigates the relationship between corporate 
diversification, both product diversification and international diversification, on 
CSP in an emerging economy, by means of using Indonesian companies. This 
study also investigates the role of corporate governance on the relationship 
between corporate diversification and CSP. Corporate governance mechanisms, 
particularly independent commissioner and ownership concentration are used as 
part of board composition and ownership structure. Figure 1.1 depicts the 
research framework 
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Figure 1.1 Research Framework  
 
1.2 Research Aims and Research Questions 
The aims of this research are to investigate the relationship between 
corporate diversification (both product and market) and CSP; and to examine the 
role of corporate governance in the relationship between corporate diversification 
and CSP in listed companies in Indonesia. Moreover, the primary aims of this 
study consist of the following four research questions: 
1. What is the relationship between product diversification and CSP? 
2. What is the relationship between international diversification and CSP? 
3. What is the relationship between corporate diversification and CSP via 
independent commissioner as a moderating variable? 
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4. What is the relationship between corporate diversification and CSP by 
means of ownership concentration as a moderating variable? 
1.3 Contributions of the Study 
 
There are four theoretical contributions and four policy implications with 
respect to this study. First, this study has contributed the following four theoretical 
development, which can be seen below. 
1. This study has explained the link between product diversification and 
CSP. Based on the literature review of 45 previous studies on corporate 
diversification and corporate performance between 1995 and 2016, only 
nine empirical studies investigated the relationship between corporate 
diversification and CSP as corporate performance. These include Attig et 
al. (2016); Ma et al. (2016); Aguilera-Caracuel et al. (2015); Kang (2013); 
Brammer et al. (2006); Strike et al. (2006); Christmann (2004); Dooley 
and Fryxell (1999); (Simerly, 1997). Other studies focused on financial 
performance from accounting or market perspectives. Furthermore, most 
of the studies related to the corporate diversification-CSP relationship 
focused on the correlation between international diversification and CSP.  
To the best of the researcher‘s knowledge, only Kang (2013); Dooley and 
Fryxell (1999); Simerly (1997) have investigated the relationship between 
product diversification and CSP. However, Simerly (1997) did not 
differentiate between product diversification in related and unrelated 
diversification. In contrast, Dooley and Fryxell (1999) used related and 
unrelated diversification to reflect specific types of industry diversification; 
however, they only used environmental performance as a CSP 
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measurement and they employed a uni-dimensional indicator. 
Accordingly, only Kang (2013) applied related and unrelated types of 
industry diversification and employed multi-dimensional indicators to 
measure CSP. Therefore, it may be concluded that research on the 
relationship between corporate diversification and CSP remains limited, 
particularly regarding the link between product diversification and CSP. 
This study has addressed this gap. 
2. This study has introduced the moderating role of CG with respect to the 
corporate diversification-CSP relationship. Several authors investigated 
the direct and positive impact of CG mechanisms, such as ownership and 
board of directors on CSP (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Jizi et al., 
2014; Lahouel et al., 2014; Dam and Scholtens, 2013; Hafsi and Turgut, 
2013; Khan et al., 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Dam and 
Scholtens, 2012; Walls et al., 2012; Zhang, 2012). Some authors also 
investigated the CG mechanism as a moderating effect on the relationship 
between CSP and other variables, for instance managerial entrenchment, 
earnings management and family businesses (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et 
al., 2015; Choi et al., 2013; McGuire et al., 2012; Surroca and Tribó, 
2008).  
Moreover, several prior studies have investigated the role of corporate 
governance on the corporate diversification-financial performance 
relationship (Lien and Li, 2013; George and Kabir, 2012; Chen and Ho, 
2000; Lins and Servaes, 1999). However, investigation of the moderating 
effect of CG on corporate diversification-CSP is still lacking. Accordingly, 
this study has contributed to extend previous studies which addressed the 
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relationship between corporate diversification and CSP, by using CG as a 
moderating variable.  
3. Moreover, most of the previous studies examining the relationship 
between corporate diversification-CSP and corporate governance-CSP 
were conducted in a developed market setting, such as the US and 
UK(Kang, 2013; Brammer et al., 2006; Simerly, 1997) and thus, are still 
required in developing economies. According to Reimann et al. (2015), 
every country has differentiations in local rules, regulations and 
governmental controls, which lead to different requirements concerning 
CSR. Most emerging economies suffer from weak institutions (Ma et al., 
2016), for example low local labour rights or poor working conditions. This 
situation leads to lower requirements regarding CSR in emerging 
economies than in developed economies (Reimann et al., 2015; Yang and 
Rivers, 2009). Therefore, the result of a study into the relationship 
between corporate diversification and CSP in a developing economy 
could be different to a developed economy. Furthermore, the unique 
characteristics of a company in an emerging economy, for instance family 
dominance, could result in the failure of corporate governance 
mechanisms to increase CSR (Khan et al., 2013). Accordingly, the 
researcher argues that this study has contributed to explaining the link 
between these three variables in the context of an emerging country.   
4. In terms of CSP indicators, most of the previous studies on CSP and CSR 
used KLD indicators, particularly regarding the corporate diversification-
CSP relationship. From the literature review, it is only Ma et al. (2016); 
Brammer et al. (2006) that use other indicators with respect to CSP, such 
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as EIRIS. However, no research has used GRI guidelines to measure 
CSP indicators. Meanwhile, according to Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. 
(2015); Bouten, Everaert, Van Liedekerke, De Moor and Christiaens 
(2011), GRI guidelines could be an adequate standard in relation to CSR 
achievement which reflect the CSP, particularly performance indicators 
pertaining to GRI. Therefore, the researcher argues that this study has 
contributed to developing a CSP measurement based on GRI guidelines. 
Second, the study suggests four policy implications, as follows: (1) a 
company must be careful in making decisions about its diversification strategy, 
for instance related/unrelated or international diversification. These diversification 
strategies have an impact on CSP. Accordingly, to increase CSP, a company 
must consider a diversification strategy, such as international diversification, 
which has a positive relationship with CSP; (2) CG has a significant moderating 
impact on the diversification-CSP relationship. Consequently, in order to 
maximise the impact of corporate diversification strategy on CSP, a manager has 
to think sensibly, based on the CG dimensions in the company, such as the 
number of independent commissioners and ownership concentration; (3) This 
study provides input to managers who run their businesses in emerging 
economies that have some differences with developed economies, for instance 
local rules, regulations and governmental control. (4) This study provides input for 
governments to create programmes or regulations which increase the willingness 
of companies to deal with issues connected with social responsibility. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis comprises eight chapters. 
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Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to the study, problem statements, 
research aims and questions, significance of the study and structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 describes the study from the Indonesian context: geography and 
demography, economic conditions, listed companies on the Indonesian capital 
market, diversification, CSR and CG. Chapter 3 illustrates the theory which 
relates to corporate diversification, company performance and CG. Diversification 
strategy consists of the definition of corporate diversification, motives for 
diversification, benefit and cost of diversification, industry diversification, 
international diversification and measurement of diversification. Company 
performance consists of a definition of company performance, financial and non-
financial performance, CSP, dimensions of CSP, CSP measurement and CSP 
disclosure measurement. CG entails a definition of CG and the mechanisms 
related to CG.     
Chapter 4 is a literature review of the relationship between corporate 
diversification and CSP and moreover, the role of CG in corporate diversification-
CSP relationships. This chapter also describes key themes in previous studies 
and academic gaps that can be addressed as contributions. The final part of this 
chapter is hypothesis development for corporate diversification and the CSP 
relationship, in addition to the role of corporate governance in this relationship. 
Chapter 5 clarifies the methodology used in this study. This chapter begins 
by explaining the population and sample of this study. This part is followed by 
data collection processes and sources of data. The subsequent part explains the 
definition of variables and their measurement for dependent, independent, 
moderating and control variable. The remaining part is data analysis, which 
consists of descriptive statistical analysis, regression analysis, content analysis 
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and additional analysis. Furthermore, in developed countries various agencies 
have calculated the CSP (e.g., KLD, EIRIS and INOVES), although no agency 
has yet developed a CSP measurement in relation to emerging countries. Hence, 
this study employed content analysis to build a CSP measurement based on GRI 
indicators.  
Chapter 6 presents the results and discussion. The former consists of 
descriptive statistical analysis, summary statistics and multiple regressions. The 
results of the multiple regression are divided into regression results for the 
relationship between corporate diversification and CSP, the moderating effect of 
CG on the corporate diversification-CSP relationship, a summary and additional 
analysis of robustness. The discussion, which addresses all the research 
questions, is divided into relationships between corporate diversification and CSP 
and the moderating effect of CG on the corporate diversification-CSP 
relationship. Chapter 7 summarises the key findings, identifies research 
contributions, including theoretical perspectives and managerial implications, and 
outlines the limitations and options for future research. 
1.5 Summary 
Overall, this study aims to examine the relationship between corporate 
diversification and CSP and to investigate the role of CG as a moderating 
variable in Indonesian listed companies. It contributes to theoretical development 
(e.g. using CSP as the performance variable and analysing the moderating effect 
of CG on the corporate diversification-CSP relationship) and implications for 
management and policy makers (e.g. a new insight into an emerging country, 
such as Indonesia). 
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CHAPTER 2 ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION, 
CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
IN INDONESIA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the economic conditions, corporate diversification, 
CSR, CSP and CG in Indonesia. It highlights some economic indicators, such as 
gross domestic product (GDP), global competitive index (GCI), and gives an 
overview of the industry in Indonesia. Some companies in Indonesia have 
employed corporate strategies, such as diversification; therefore, an overview of 
diversification strategy and the types of diversification in Indonesia are discussed. 
The chapter offers an overview of CSR and CSP in Indonesia. Finally, it 
describes how CG has been implemented in the country.  
2.2 Economic conditions of Indonesia 
Indonesia is an emerging country in Southeast Asia (World Investment 
Report, 2015). Over the last four years, its GDP has grown by approximately 6% 
annually. The country has attracted foreign direct investment (FDI) in various 
sectors (e.g. hotel, manufacturing and service sectors) and its economic 
indicators (e.g. GDP per capita, GCI and FDI) have all improved in recent years 
(Sentana, 2013; World Investment  Report, 2012; Shwab and Sala-i-Martin, 
2012). Moreover, Indonesia‘s competitiveness index has a satisfactory position 
internationally, especially in Southeast Asia. Table 2.1 confirms Indonesia‘s 
current position based on the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 2012-2013. 
Although its position dropped four places to 50 in 2012-2013, Indonesia remains 
in the top 50 of the GCI and fifth in the ASEAN region. Accordingly, the 
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researcher argues that Indonesia is a promising country for investment in the 
ASEAN region, which may become a competitive advantage.  
Table 2.1 Global Competitiveness Index 
No Country 2011-2012 2012-2013 
1 Singapore 2 2 
2 Malaysia 21 25 
3 Brunei Darussalam 28 28 
4 Thailand 39 38 
5 Indonesia 46 50 
6 Philippines 75 65 
7 Vietnam 65 75 
Source:  Shwab and Sala-i-Martin (2012) 
Table 2.2 shows GDP per capita of ASEAN Countries from 2008-2014. 
Indonesia‘s increased from $2,172 in 2008 to $3,623 in 2013, although it dropped 
slightly again to $3,534 in 2014. The increase in GDP per capita implies that the 
purchasing power of Indonesian people increased, and this may affect business 
by increasing demand. Indeed, business will have an opportunity to produce 
more products and services. 
Table 2.2 GDP per capita of ASEAN Countries 2008-2014 (US $) 
COUNTRY 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Singapore 34,465  35,274  41,987  46,241  54,578  55,980  56,319 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
37,414  27,390  31,008  40,301  41,809  39,152  36,607 
Malaysia 8,399  7,236  8,691  9,977  10,508  10,628  10,804 
Thailand 3,993  3,838  4,614  4,972  5,449  5,741  5,445 
Indonesia 2,172  2,273  2,952  3,495 3,700  3,623 3,534 
Philippines 1,925  1,836  2,140  2,370 2,606  2,788  2,865 
Vietnam 1,070  1,130  1,224  1,407 1,755  1,909  2,053 
Cambodia 743  735  783  879  948  1,010  1.081 
Laos 900  948  1,147  1,301 1,446  1,700  1,693 
Myanmar n.a n.a n.a n.a 1,421  1,107 1,269 
Source: OECD (2015) 
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Another indicator of economic development is FDI. Indonesia‘s increased by 
23.8% in the first quarter of 2013 (Sentana, 2013). Finally, Indonesia‘s debt 
ranking increased to investment level Baaa3 in 2011, based on Moody‘s rating 
(Martini, Tjakraatmadja, Anggoro, Pritasari and Hutapea, 2012). This means that 
Indonesia is an investment-grade country; a prospective country for investment, 
as recommended by Moody‘s. 
The business sector in Indonesia has developed over recent years. 
According to the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) fact book, the number of 
listed companies has increased gradually. For example, there were 472 
companies in 2013 and 494 companies in 2014 (Indonesian Stock Exchange, 
2015). IDX also classifies the listed companies according to the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange Industrial Classification (JASICA). JASICA is beneficial as an 
investment decision-making tool for the IDX participants. This industrial 
classification also calculates sectorial indices as an indicator of industrial group 
performance (Indonesian Stock Exchange, 2015).  
The sector groups in JASICA are classified as primary, secondary and 
tertiary, based on the primary economic activities of each company. First, the 
primary sector comprises the extractive industry, including agriculture and mining. 
The secondary sector, manufacturing, can be divided into three types of industry: 
basic industry and chemicals, miscellaneous industry and consumer goods. 
Finally, the tertiary sector is the service sector. This includes many enterprises, 
such as property, real estate and construction, infrastructure, utilities and 
transport, finance and trade, services and the investment industry. Table 2.3 
reveals the number of IDX listed companies from 2010 to 2014, showing a 
gradual increase. The principal group is trade, service and investment 
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companies. In conclusion, Indonesia has good economic conditions for 
investment among the ASEAN countries.   
Table 2.3 Number of Listed Companies in IDX 
No Industry Number of Firms Listed 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 Agriculture 15 18 17 20 21 
2 Mining 29 31 36 40 41 
3 Basic Industry and Chemicals 58 61 59 60 65 
4 Miscellaneous Industry 40 40 40 40 40 
5 Consumer Goods 33 33 36 37 37 
6 Property, Real Estate and 
Building Construction 48 49 53 54 54 
7 Infrastructure, Utilities and 
Transport 34 39 42 47 52 
8 Finance 71 72 74 77 86 
9 Trade, Services and Investment 92 97  102   108   110 
   420   440   459   483   506 
Source: adapted from Indonesian Stock Exchange (2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 
2011) 
 
 
2.3 Diversification in Indonesia 
 
Several IDX listed companies have implemented a diversification strategy. 
They are considering this because they want to play a major role in the national 
economy (Humarseno and Chalid, 2013). Accordingly, diversification strategy has 
become an alternative strategy for Indonesian companies in dealing with 
business competition. Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2003) have examined 
the diversification strategy in East Asian companies, analysing over 10,000 firm-
years of data in economies including Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. In Indonesia, they 
ascertained 117 multi-segment and 133 single-segment companies. Similarly, 
Akben Selçuk (2015) investigated the association between corporate 
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diversification and the value of companies in nine emerging countries: Brazil, 
Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand and 
Turkey. In this case, 249 Indonesian companies were analysed: 100 diversified 
businesses and 149 single-segment companies. Humarseno and Chalid (2013) 
also examined the link between business diversification and financial 
performance in listed companies in Indonesian. Consequently, these studies 
have noted that some Indonesian companies have diversified their business. The 
diversification information was revealed in the companies‘ annual reports, 
particularly in audited financial report sections. For example, one diversified 
company, PT Krakatau Steel, has several product segments, including steel 
products, real estate and hotel, engineering and construction, port service 
provision and other services (Steel, 2013). This confirms that diversification 
strategy has already been implemented in Indonesian companies.  
 
2.4 CSP and CSR in Indonesia 
 
According to Aguilera-Caracuel et al. (2015, p. 322), CSP reflects the degree 
of success and implementation of CSR practice as a response to stakeholders‘ 
demands. Therefore, CSP in the Indonesian context is related to implementation 
of CSR. CSR in Indonesia is primarily triggered by the government rather than 
the willingness of the company or private sector (Park, Song, Choe and Baik, 
2015). The government introduced regulations for obligatory CSR in 2007, such 
as Indonesian Investment Law No. 25 Article 15 and Indonesian Corporate Law 
No. 40 Article 74 on Limited Liability Companies. Owing to these laws, Indonesia 
has become the first country to introduce a mandatory element in CSR (Park et 
al., 2015; Taufiqurrahman, 2013; Rosser and Edwin, 2010). According to 
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Waagstein (2011, p. 457), Indonesia has mandatory and customary norms for 
work safety, labour rights, limited welfare, countering corruption, environmental 
protection and consumer protection. Furthermore, these regulations also provide 
boundaries for companies pertaining to what they can or cannot do. However, 
these regulations are regularly problematic in their implementation; thus, some 
authors, e.g. Waagstein (2011); Wan, Hoskisson, Short and Yiu (2011) argue that 
weak law enforcement mechanisms were presented in the implementation. For 
example, they highlight the unavailability of judicial mechanisms to hold corporate 
responsibility, the prevalence of corruption, and furthermore, legal uncertainty 
due to overlapping norms on social and environmental issues; all undermine 
implementation in Indonesia (Waagstein, 2011, p. 457). 
Article 74 of the Indonesian Corporate Law of 2007 consists of four points:  
(1) Companies doing business in the field of and/or in relation to natural 
resources must put into practice Environmental and Social 
Responsibility. (2) The Environmental and Social Responsibility 
contemplated in paragraph 1 constitutes an obligation of the Company 
which shall be budgeted for and calculated as a cost of the Company 
performance of which shall be with due attention to decency and 
fairness. (3) Companies who do not put their obligation into practice as 
contemplated in paragraph 1 shall be liable to sanctions in accordance 
with the provisions of legislative regulations. (4) Further provisions 
regarding Environmental and Social Responsibility shall be stipulated by 
Government Regulation. (Waagstein, 2011, pp. 460-461) 
 
Although this law has contributed to the institutionalisation of CSR as a business 
norm, it did not provide detailed information concerning CSR programmes in 
Indonesian companies (Park et al., 2015; Waagstein, 2011). Moreover, according 
to Waagstein (2011), Article 74 leaves several pragmatic and conceptual 
questions, such as the lack of clarification on how to determine which 
corporations are connected with natural resources in such a way that they should 
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be duty bearers. Hence, it failed to provide any implementation mechanism, with 
little clarity on how the article should be implemented and monitored.  
Hence, the various issues above should be examined and elaborated in 
government regulations intended to implement Law No. 40. as without 
clarification, this law is simply inspirational in character and unenforceable 
(Taufiqurrahman, 2013; Waagstein, 2011; Rosser and Edwin, 2010). 
Unfortunately, it required five years to issue government regulation No.47/2012 
on CSR. This regulation consists of nine articles. Ideally, it should clarify the 
ambiguity of the concept of mandatory CSR and reinforce the concepts 
expressed in Article 74 points (1) and (2). However, it is uncertain and does not 
offer guidance on how to implement mandatory CSR. The nature of the CSR 
regulation has become increasingly imprecise (Edi, 2014; Taufiqurrahman, 2013). 
Even though government regulation No.47/2012 has a few weaknesses, the 
government encourages listed companies to follow well-meaning sustainable 
development and environmental rules, and, the Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry has introduced a programme for appraising the performance of 
companies (KemenLH, 2015).   
This company performance appraisal programme, Program Penilaian 
Peringkat Kinerja Perusahaan (PROPER), has several aims, including (i) 
encouraging companies to follow government rules by means of incentive and 
disincentive programmes, and (ii) motivating high performance companies to 
implement cleaner production programmes. PROPER is a primary programme in 
controlling, monitoring and supervising companies regarding environmental 
issues, such as the handling of B3 toxic waste. PROPER awards aim to 
encourage companies to follow the rules of sustainable development and 
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environmental excellence. According to Khoirunnisa, Napitupulu and Tavip (2015, 
p. 2); Kementrian Lingkungan Hidup (2012, pp. 9-10):  
The ratings of business performances and/or activities are made of: a) Gold 
is for businesses and/or activities that have consistently demonstrated 
environmental excellence in terms of production or service processes, 
conducting business ethically and responsibly towards society. b) Green is 
for businesses and/or activities that have performed environmental 
management beyond compliance through the implementation of 
environmental management systems, efficient utilization of resources and 
adequately implement community development programmes. c) Blue is for 
businesses and/or activities that have performed environmental management 
as required in accordance with any applicable laws. d) Red denotes that the 
environmental management effort does not meet the requirements stipulated 
in the law. e) Black is for businesses and/or activities that intentionally 
perform any act or omission that leads to pollution or environmental damage 
and violations of laws and regulations applicable or not carrying out 
administrative sanctions handed down to them.  
 
Specifically, PROPER is a business performance rating programme measuring 
environmental performance, including CSR. Thus, the researcher argues that 
CSR is currently a prominent issue in Indonesian business. A similar issue is CG, 
discussed in the next section.   
2.5 Corporate Governance in Indonesia 
 
In Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, shared ownership 
generally centres on the founder or family as the controlling shareholder and 
manager (Mangantar and Ali, 2015; International Finance Corporation, 2014; 
Utama and Utama, 2014; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; Globerman et al., 2011; 
Claessens and Djankov, 2002). According to Globerman et al. (2011); Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang (2000), the ten largest families in Indonesia control half of the 
corporate assets. Similarly, according to Utama and Utama (2014); Claessens 
and Yurtoglu (2013); Claessens and Djankov (2002), most Indonesian listed 
companies have a concentrated ownership with wide divergence between control 
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and cash-flow rights. Hence, ownership concentration is a trigger for agency 
conflict between minority and majority shareholders. 
It is worthwhile mentioning that a set of governance mechanisms was 
implemented to mitigate the agency conflict. After the financial crisis in 1998, the 
Indonesian Government initiated several programmes to improve CG. For 
example, by way of capital market authority (BAPEPAM), it promoted CG by 
requiring independent board members and an audit committee chaired by an 
independent director (Siagian, Siregar and Rahadian, 2013, p. 5). According to 
the International Finance Corporation (2014), several laws, regulations and 
governmental decrees on CG have been introduced in Indonesia (see Table 2.4). 
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Table 2.4  Principal Laws and Regulations for Corporate Governance in Indonesia 
Law/Regulation Applicability Comments 
Law No. 40 of 2007 concerning Limited 
Liability Company (Indonesian Company 
Law hereinafter referred to as ICL) 
All limited liability 
company activities 
Establishment of limited liability company, capital and shares, 
company organs (GMS, BOD, BOC), Article of association 
(AoA) of the company, merger, acquisition, and dissolution, 
work programme, annual report, and use of profit, liquidation, 
expiry of company. 
 
Law No. 25 of 2007 concerning 
Investment (―Investment Law‖) 
All investment 
activities (domestic 
and foreign) 
Form of business entity for investment, treatment of investor, 
manpower plan, business sector for investment, rights and 
obligations and liabilities of investor, investment facilities. 
 
Law No. 13 of 2003 concerning Manpower 
(―Manpower Law‖) 
Manpower in 
companies 
Manpower management, rights and obligations of employee, 
rights and obligations of the company, and all related 
manpower plans for business activities. 
 
Law No. 8 of 1995 concerning Capital 
Market (―Capital Market Law‖) 
All listed company 
activities 
Capital market supervisory board (OJK), stock exchange, 
clearing and guarantee corporation, central securities 
depository, investment fund, securities company, securities 
company representatives and investment advisors, capital 
market supporting institutions and professionals, issuers and 
public companies, public documents and reporting to OJK. 
Presidential Regulation No. 36 of 2010 
concerning Lists of Business Fields that 
are Closed to Investments and Business 
Fields that are Conditionally Open for 
Investments (―Negative List‖) 
Business fields for 
foreign investment 
activities 
List of business fields that are open and closed for foreign 
investment. 
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Head of BKPM Regulation No. 12 of 2009 
concerning Procedures and 
Guidelines of Investment Application 
(―BKPM Reg.12/2009‖) 
Foreign investment 
activities 
One-stop service of permit application procedures and 
mechanisms to conduct foreign investment in Indonesia, 
transfer of foreign shares, fiscal and non-fiscal facilities, 
regional incentives, foreign workers manpower plan (RPTKA), 
producer/importer Identification Number (API-P), tax facilities, 
customs. 
 
Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration 
Decree No. 40 of 2012 
concerning Certain Positions that are 
Prohibited for Foreign Workers (―MMT 
Reg. 40/2012‖) 
Companies with 
foreign workers 
List of positions in a company that are restricted for foreign 
workers. 
Indonesian Code of Good Corporate 
Governance 2006 (―GCG Code‖) 
All company 
practices 
Code of conduct and business ethics, company organs, 
shareholders, stakeholders, good corporate governance 
principles, implementation of good corporate governance. 
 
All related regulations 
in OJK Capital Market 
Capital market 
activities 
Capital market supervisory board (OJK), stock exchange, 
clearing and guarantee corporation, central securities 
depository, investment fund, securities company, securities 
company representatives and investment advisors, capital 
market supporting institutions and professionals, issuers and 
public companies, sanctions, public documents and reporting 
to OJK. 
Source: Adopted form International Finance Corporation (2014, pp. 55-56)
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Listed companies in Indonesia must comply with Law No. 40, 2007, which 
provides the legal framework for the governance of corporations and all related 
regulations in the OJK capital market (Asian Development Bank, 2014). 
Moreover, all Indonesian companies are being encouraged to adhere to the CG 
rules included in the CG regulations, although these provisions are currently only 
mandatory for listed companies (International Finance Corporation, 2014, p. 57). 
A company must have a general meeting of shareholders (GMS), a board of 
commissioners, board of directors, internal auditor, external auditor, audit 
committee and corporate secretary. In addition, it may establish a risk policy, CG, 
nomination and remuneration, and other board committees (International Finance 
Corporation, 2014).   
All ordinary shareholders have a right to participate in the GMS and have 
several votes based on the number of ordinary shares they hold. The GMS 
approves nominations for membership of the Board of Commissioners and the 
Board of Directors. In addition, it approves the annual report and financial 
statements, the distribution of profits and losses (including the payment of 
dividends), amended authorised capital, amendments of the AoA, re-organisation 
and dissolution, and extraordinary transactions (International Finance 
Corporation, 2014). In terms of the board system, Indonesian companies have 
adopted two-tier boards or dual systems, which are different to the US or UK CG 
systems (Nur'ainy, Nurcahyo, Kurniasih and Sugiharti, 2013). The dual system 
has unique supervisory and management bodies (Utama and Utama, 2014). The 
supervisory board is known as the Board of Commissioners and the executive 
board is the Board of Directors. Under this system, the day-to-day management 
of the company is controlled by the executive board, which in turn is supervised 
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by the supervisory board (International Finance Corporation, 2014). These two 
bodies have distinct authorities and their composition cannot be mixed, i.e. a 
member of one cannot be a member of the other simultaneously. The advantage 
of the two-tier system is that there is a clear supervisory mechanism; 
nonetheless, it has been criticised for an inefficient decision-making process 
(Waagstein, 2011). 
The Board of Commissioners plays a central role in the CG framework 
(International Finance Corporation, 2014), with responsibility for supervising 
management policy and advising the Board of Directors (Nur'ainy et al., 2013). 
The Board of Commissioners should have expertise and integrity in order to 
perform their responsibilities and to ensure that the company‘s activities are in 
compliance with the applicable laws and regulations (International Finance 
Corporation, 2014). The category of commissioner is regulated in Article 120 of 
Indonesia Company Law no 40 2007, and consists of an Independent 
Commissioner and a Delegated Commissioner (Waagstein, 2011). Accordingly, 
good CG practice suggests that an independent commissioner is an individual 
who has not received substantial financial or other benefits from the company in 
the last three years (Siagian et al., 2013).   
It should be noted that numerous public companies in Indonesia are 
controlled by a single majority shareholder or a group of shareholders who are 
well informed vis-à-vis the company and able to monitor the company‘s 
management closely (Waagstein, 2011). The remaining ownership is often 
extensively dispersed among minority shareholders who lack the resources and 
information to effectively monitor management, or to defend themselves against 
the potential abuses of large shareholders (International Finance Corporation, 
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2014, p. 134). The independent commissioners therefore have a vital role in this 
type of company, ensuring that the control mechanism runs effectively and is in 
accordance with government laws and regulations.  
The Board of Directors is responsible for the day-to-day management of 
the company, and it is the legal representative of the company. It has full 
authority and responsibility for the company in accordance with the company‘s 
aims and objectives, and furthermore, represents the company in and out of court 
(International Finance Corporation, 2014). There is also the Board Committee, 
which is responsible for overseeing, supervising and advising the Board of 
Directors and the Board of Commissioners. The CG Code recommends the 
establishment of specific Board Committees, such as an Audit Committee, Risk 
Policy Committee, and Nomination and Remuneration Committee. The primary 
task of these committees is to assist the Board of Directors. 
The External Auditor is a licensed and accredited audit 
company/organisation (International Finance Corporation, 2014). For listed 
companies, this auditor is a separate unit within the company, chosen by the 
GMS from the Ministry of Finance‘s list of authorised auditors to conduct an audit 
of the financial statements of listed companies, prepare the auditor‘s report and 
submit it to the Board of Directors (Siagian et al., 2013). In contrast, the role of 
the Internal Auditor is becoming increasingly important in encouraging the 
implementation of good CG in listed companies (International Finance 
Corporation, 2014). The Corporate Secretary ensures that the governing bodies 
follow the existing internal corporate rules and policies, amending them or 
instituting new ones as appropriate (International Finance Corporation, 2014, p. 
218). The Corporate Secretary also contributes to establishing and maintaining 
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better communication between the various governing units of the company 
regarding regulations, the CG code and other internal rules. In addition, the 
Corporate Secretary ensures that the governing bodies follow all the relevant 
regulatory requirements, both domestic and possibly foreign (Siagian et al., 
2013). Consequently, the individual frequently acts as an advisor to the Board of 
Commissioners and the Board of Directors on regulatory requirements, listing 
rules and legislation related to CG. He may also identify gaps in CG matters and 
propose a solution to weaknesses (International Finance Corporation, 2014, p. 
218). 
The Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship (IICD) has calculated 
a CG score related to the IDX listed companies. Based on the country‘s 100 
largest market capitalisation public listed companies, the average total CG score 
was 43.29% in 2012, rising to 54.55% in 2013 (Asian Development Bank, 2014), 
i.e. below 60%, and therefore, categorised as poor CG practice. This relatively 
low average score indicates that most Indonesian public listed companies have 
not yet implemented the internationally based CG principles. Hence, the 
researcher argues that CG is remains problematic in the Indonesian context. 
Table 2.5 Corporate Governance Score of Indonesian Companies 2012-2013 
Description Corporate Governance Score (%) 
 2012  2013 
Rights of shareholders 33.10 41.50 
Equitable treatment of shareholders 35.20 51.60 
Role of stakeholders 52.20 58.40 
Disclosure and transparency 53.72 63.52 
Responsibility of the board 44.08 48.78 
Total 43.29 54.55 
Source: Asian Development Bank (2014) 
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2.6 Summary 
 
In conclusion, Indonesia‘s economic conditions have recently improved, as 
seen in the growth of GDP over the last five years. Indonesian listed companies 
have also adopted a diversification strategy (e.g. PT Krakatau Steel). 
Accordingly, they conduct their business in related and unrelated business 
segments. Furthermore, this chapter also described the implementation of CSR 
in Indonesian companies and how they manage CG. In Indonesia government 
law states that CSR is mandatory; hence, most companies implement CSR only 
because they must follow the rules. The following chapter explains a few of the 
theories pertaining to corporate diversification and company performance, 
including CSP and CG theory. 
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CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE 
DIVERSIFICATION, CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the background theory relating to diversification 
strategy, performance and CG. It is organised into five sections: diversification, 
CSP, CG, stakeholder theory and institutional theory. The section on 
diversification offers a definition of diversification, describing motives, cost and 
benefit, industry diversification, international diversification, and the measurement 
of diversification. The section on CSP describes the concept of company 
performance, types of company performance, CSP itself and measuring CSP. 
Finally, the chapter explains the concept of CG and CG mechanisms, such as 
independent commissioners and ownership concentration.  
3.2 Corporate Diversification 
3.2.1 Definition of Corporate Diversification 
Diversification is a company strategy in the growth stage of the product 
life cycle and when a company wants to expand its current operation (David, 
2003). It refers to implementing the company‘s strategy by conducting different 
business activities. According to Pitts and Hopkins (1982), differentiation in 
business activities can be seen from three perspectives: resource independence, 
market discreteness and product difference; product perspective is considered to 
be a combination of resource and market perspectives. Definitions of 
diversification given by different authors tend to be similar, as shown in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1 Definition of Corporate Diversification 
Year Author Definition 
2015 Hill et al. (2015, p. 322) The process of entering new industries, 
distinct from a company‘s core or original 
industry, to make new kinds of products 
for customers in new markets  
2015 Su and Tsang (2015, p. 
1129) 
Operation in more than one industry or 
product market  
2014 Knecht (2014, pp. 47-48) A firm‘s move to enter new markets and 
industries, serve new customer 
segments, offer new lines of product, 
employ different types of resources, and 
expand its operations internationally  
 
2012 Park and Jang (2012, p. 
219) 
Moving into a number of markets 
(sectors, industries, or segments) not 
previously engaged in.  
2012 Barney and Hesterly 
(2012, p. 190) 
A firm implements a corporate 
diversification strategy when it operates 
in multiple industries or markets 
simultaneously 
2008 Johnson et al. (2008, p. 
262) 
Diversification is a strategy that takes an 
organisation away from both its existing 
markets and its existing products  
 
2007 Barney and Clark (2007, 
p. 185) 
A firm implements a corporate 
diversification strategy when it operates 
multiple businesses within its boundaries  
2007 Hill and Jones (2007, p. 
349) 
A company strategy to implant its 
business models and strategies in other 
industries to increase long-term 
profitability  
1982 Pitts and Hopkins (1982, 
p. 620) 
A firm is considered diversified only if it 
simultaneously operates several different 
businesses  
1971 Berry (1971, p. 978)  Corporate diversification is an increase in 
the number industries a company 
participates in 
Sources: Adopted from several studies 
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Only Knecht (2014) explicitly includes all the perspectives to define 
diversification. Other authors, i.e. Barney and Hesterly (2012); Park and Jang 
(2012) and Johnson et al. (2008), employ product and market perspectives 
concurrently. The researcher therefore concludes that diversification is a 
company strategy to operate in multiple or different businesses, in terms of 
products or services, markets and resources. In terms of products, diversification 
is identified by grouping the company‘s output under a product classification 
system, such as Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) for the US economy 
(Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). Some researchers, such as Park and Jang (2013a); 
Hargis and Mei (2006) use the term industry diversification to capture the 
business differences, while Pitts and Hopkins (1982) argue that it is easy to 
collect data using this approach. Product classification is thus one indicator of 
product diversification. 
Based on the market perspective, market characteristics and geographic 
market dimensions are important factors to capture business differences (Pitts 
and Hopkins, 1982). These authors note that the geographic market dimension 
was more popular with earlier researchers who adopted the market approach to 
diversification, asserting that data is easier to access by way of this approach. 
Diversification based on the geographic market dimension has various names. 
For example, Krapl (2015); Kang (2013); Majocchi and Strange (2012); Bobillo, 
López-Iturriaga and Tejerina-Gaite (2010) emphasise that it means international 
diversification, while Hargis and Mei (2006) define it as national diversification, 
and Brammer et al. (2006) see it simply as geographical diversification. At the 
other extreme, Doukas and Kan (2006); Hitt, Hoskisson and Kim (1997); Kim, 
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Hwang and Burgers (1989) label it global diversification. That is, the area chosen 
for geographical diversification varies. 
From the resource independence perspective, several authors, such as 
Pitts and Hopkins (1982) and Rumelt (1974), have stated that businesses are 
different if they can be managed separately or if their resources are independent. 
Based on the criteria for different business, Pitts and Hopkins (1982) believe that 
the task of data collection is more complex, more subjective and less replicable; 
based on the availability and accessibility of data, they only use product and 
market perspectives to describe corporate diversification.  
This study focuses on industry diversification as being synonymous with 
corporate diversification from the product perspective, and employs international 
diversification to capture corporate diversification based on the geographical 
market dimension.  
3.2.2 Motives for Diversification 
There are many reasons behind the decision to diversify. Amit and Livnat 
(1988b) grouped them into two principal motives: synergy and finance., 
Montgomery (1994) added a further motive, market power, whereas Hitt et al. 
(2011) identified three reasons for diversification based on its effect on the 
company‘s value: value creating, value neutral and value reducing diversification. 
Value creating has three components: economies of scope; market power by 
blocking competitors and vertical integration; and financial economies. Value 
neutral diversification has seven components: antitrust regulation, tax law, low 
performance, uncertain future cash flows, risk reduction, tangible resources and 
intangible resources. Finally, from the value-reducing perspective, there are 
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diversifying managerial employment risk and increasing managerial 
compensation.       
The first major motive of diversification is synergy. Synergy occurs when 
two or more business units are combined, providing new opportunities which are 
not achievable individually (Purkayastha et al., 2012). Joint operation creates 
more value than individual operation. Put simply, the result of one plus one 
should be more than two. Purkayastha et al. (2012) argue that synergy occurs in 
two ways. First, it occurs when two or more individual businesses are operated 
as a single organisation; thus, consolidating individual units can create 
economies of scope and economies of scale (Amit and Livnat, 1988b). 
Purkayastha et al. (2012) emphasise that economy of scope is a specific 
expression of synergy, usually thought of in the context of cost.  
According to Barney (2011); Hitt et al. (2011), synergy in economies of 
scope can be created by sharing activities and transferring core competencies. 
Hence, synergy may emerge either from the use of common infrastructures, 
including resources both tangible and intangible, such as marketing and R&D 
operations, brand names, production and distribution systems (Purkayastha et 
al., 2012; Thompson et al., 2007; Alesón and Escuer, 2002; Amit and Livnat, 
1988a); or from transferring resources and capability, for instance managerial 
and technical knowledge, experience and expertise in different businesses 
(Barney and Hesterly, 2012; Hitt et al., 2011). Similarly, according to Chakrabarti, 
Singh and Mahmood (2007), a diversified company may gain scope and scale 
advantages from internalising intermediary functions, such as financial and 
marketing,  which may be inefficient or absent (Chakrabarti et al., 2007). 
Secondly, synergy may occur if the operation of individual businesses 
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complements each other (Amit and Livnat, 1988b). For example, a synergy 
between some products which come from the same product line can offer 
customers more benefits.  
The second major motive for diversification is market power, which is also 
known as conglomerate power (Montgomery, 1994). According to Hitt et al. 
(2011) market power exists when a company is able to sell its products above the 
existing competitive level or reduce the costs of its primary and supportive 
activities below the competitive level, or both of these. This reason is not based 
on efficiency to create maximum profit, but on tactical power to cause competitors 
concern and make them withdraw from the market to minimise competition. The 
company subsequently becomes the only one in the business area; in other 
words it has a  monopoly (Montgomery, 1994). This market power is termed the 
anti-competitive effect, and in a corporation, it can result from one or a 
combination of three actions: predatory pricing, mutual forbearance and 
reciprocal buying (Martin and Sayrak, 2003; Montgomery, 1994; Amit and Livnat, 
1988a). First, the company can use the profit from one business to fund 
predatory pricing in another business within the company. That is, predatory 
pricing is a tactic to set the price of a product lower than other companies‘ prices, 
in order to eliminate competitors from the market. This tactic requires 
considerable funding, because the firm risks losses, and only an organisation 
with strong financial resources, such as a conglomerate, can consider it. In 
contrast, the tactic provides the company with an advantage, seeing as it 
eliminates competitors who are not as stable financially. However, predatory 
pricing makes the market vulnerable to a monopoly. The second action, mutual 
forbearance, occurs when two or more firms that compete in multiple markets 
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collude, breaking down competitive barriers. Finally, companies that diversify can 
take advantage of reciprocal buying between different businesses within the 
company, or with other large firms, destroying smaller competitors. In the long 
term, these three actions eliminate competition in the market.  
Finally, the third major motive for diversification is the financial 
perspective. There are three reasons here to pursue a diversification strategy: 
risk reduction, internal capital market and agency theory (Purkayastha et al., 
2012). Risk reduction (Erdorf et al., 2013; Purkayastha et al., 2012; Martin and 
Sayrak, 2003; Alesón and Escuer, 2002; Amit and Livnat, 1988a) emerges from 
dispersing risk, obeying the adage ―Don‘t put all your eggs in one basket‖. In 
business terms, it implies that a focused company is more vulnerable than a 
diversified one. A diversified company with more than one business or 
marketplace reduces risk, especially in unrelated diversification, which has a 
negative earning correlation (Erdorf et al., 2013; Purkayastha et al., 2012; Amit 
and Livnat, 1988a). It can occur by reducing the probability of failure in a product, 
labour or financial market and reducing the impact of declining or changing 
demand and supply fluctuation (Martin and Sayrak, 2003; Alesón and Escuer, 
2002). However, although a company can minimise unsystematic risk by means 
of unrelated diversification strategy, there is no economic advantage to create a 
higher return for the investor (Purkayastha et al., 2012; Montgomery and Singh, 
1984).  
The second reason is the transaction cost of the internal capital market 
(Erdorf et al., 2013; Barney and Hesterly, 2012; Purkayastha et al., 2012; Martin 
and Sayrak, 2003). Internal capital market efficiency is created by the allocation 
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and flexibility of capital across segments. A diversified firm can use assets from 
one segment as collateral to obtain funding for other segments as external 
capital, and also use any excess of cash flow in one segment to fund another 
(Erdorf et al., 2013; Martin and Sayrak, 2003), as internal equity capital. 
Conversely, a focused company relies heavily on external funding, which is often 
more costly than internal capital (Purkayastha et al., 2012). In addition, the 
transactional cost of internal capital is lower than external funding and less time 
consuming. A diversified firm could therefore have an efficiency benefit by way of 
reducing the transaction cost in raising capital (Erdorf et al., 2013; Purkayastha et 
al., 2012). Furthermore, raising funds internally could also increase efficiency in 
resource allocation by shifting excess capital from one segment to another 
(Erdorf et al., 2013; Purkayastha et al., 2012; Stein, 1997).  
The corporate office of a diversified company has a rich source of 
information on its segment and auditing system which allows it to control the 
manager effectively. Hence, internal funding leads to a better monitoring process 
than institutional lending (Erdorf et al., 2013; Purkayastha et al., 2012). However, 
several authors have questioned the efficiency of the internal capital market and 
argue that it has some disadvantages. For example, as funding decisions are 
decided by headquarters, the internal capital market reduces the managerial 
entrepreneurial incentive (Purkayastha et al., 2012; Gertner, Scharfstein and 
Stein, 1994). It may also increase agency conflict when a manager‘s decision is 
not in line with the shareholders‘ demands resulting in a power struggle between 
divisions. Subsequently, it can lead to inefficient cross-subsidisation (Erdorf et al., 
2013; Purkayastha et al., 2012; Martin and Sayrak, 2003).   
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The third reason from a financial perspective is agency theory (Erdorf et 
al., 2013; Doaei, Anuar and Hamid, 2012; Purkayastha et al., 2012; Montgomery, 
1994). In modern firms, owners do not always manage the company directly. 
Owners, principals or shareholders may hire a manager to run the business, 
giving authority to the manager to make decisions concerning the firm in the 
owner‘s best interest. The relationship between owners and manager in this case 
is known as an agency relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Ownership is 
no longer in line with the control of the business, that is, there is a separation of 
ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To make sure all the 
manager‘s decisions are based on the owners‘ interest, the owners should 
control the manager. A lack of control may encourage managers to focus on their 
own interests rather than the owners‘ welfare. Hence, agency theory explores the 
possibility of managerial decisions in a diversification strategy being motivated by 
personal gain.  
There are four personal benefits that could be pursued by managers via 
diversification: power and prestige, higher compensation, reduced risk of 
unemployment, and making the manager indispensable to the company 
(Purkayastha et al., 2012). A diversified firm is associated with larger size, and 
managing a large business gives the manager more power and prestige (Erdorf 
et al., 2013; Purkayastha et al., 2012; Jensen, 1986). Additionally, the size of a 
firm is also related to managerial compensation, large firms being associated with 
higher executive compensation (Erdorf et al., 2013; Purkayastha et al., 2012; Dyl, 
1988). Similarly, a diversified company expects to be stronger against the risk of 
business failure rather than a focused firm. Reducing risk by means of 
diversification will have an impact on the manager‘s employment risk (Erdorf et 
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al., 2013; Purkayastha et al., 2012; Amihud and Lev, 1981). Finally, managing a 
diversified business requires a specific skill and a good understanding of many 
businesses. Managers who invest in a new business that fits their particular skills 
can increase demand for their personal skill. Shleifer and Vinishny (1997) call this 
behaviour managerial entrenchment. Hence, managers can become 
indispensable through diversification (Erdorf et al., 2013; Purkayastha et al., 
2012; Shleifer and Vinishny, 1997). Motives for diversification may also reflect the 
benefits and costs of diversification. 
3.2.3 Cost and Benefit of Diversification 
According to Ataullah et al. (2014), a company may gain several benefits 
from diversifying its business, such as economies of scope, increasing market 
power, increasing competitive advantage, raising the debt capacity and being 
more active in internal capital markets. In addition, Berger and Ofek (1995) add 
increasing debt capacity through increasing interest on tax shields; a diversified 
firm will have higher leverage and lower tax payments than a focused firm. Martin 
and Sayrak (2003) agree that a diversified company benefits in terms of a tax 
shield, and moreover, risk reduction, increased debt capacity, its internal capital 
market, and a combination of resources. With an internal source of financing, the 
firm‘s managers can exercise superior decision control over project selection, 
rather than leaving investment decisions to the whims of less well informed 
investors in the external capital market. Therefore, corporate diversification may 
create shareholder value by mitigating failures in product, labour and financial 
markets. 
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According to George and Kabir (2012), the efficient internal capital market 
argument typically suggests that diversified firms have more access to internally 
generated resources and can exploit superior information to allocate resources 
among divisions. Diversified firms can also employ a number of mechanisms to 
create and exploit market power advantages; tools that are largely unavailable to 
their more focused counterparts. These mechanisms include predatory pricing 
(i.e. sustained price cutting with the goal of driving existing rivals from future 
entry), cross-subsidisation (whereby a firm taps excess revenues from one 
product line to support another), entry deterrence (constructing a reputation for 
predatory behaviour or signalling that such a response is likely in the event of a 
new entry), and reciprocal buying and selling (a company gives preference in 
purchasing decisions or contracting requirements to suppliers). From a resource-
based perspective, further benefits of diversification include the ability to exploit 
excess firm-specific assets and share resources, such as brand names, 
managerial skills, consumer loyalty and technological innovation. Benefits also 
stem from tax and other financial advantages associated with diversification. 
 Diversification strategy not only has benefits but also costs (Ataullah et 
al., 2014; George and Kabir, 2012; Berger and Ofek, 1995). For example, Berger 
and Ofek (1995) have identified the following costs. First, a diversified firm may 
invest too much in a business line with poor investment opportunity. Second, it 
may invest more in projects with a negative net present value. Third, unprofitable 
business lines in conglomerates may have greater losses than in a focused 
business. Finally, asymmetric information costs in a diversified firm will be higher 
than in a focused firm. In addition, Ataullah et al. (2014); Martin and Sayrak 
(2003)emphasise that from the agency theory perspective, managers can pursue 
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a diversification strategy to benefit themselves at the stakeholders‘ expense. 
Somewhat differently, George and Kabir (2012) assert that diversified firms are 
prone to severe agency problems that can lead to inefficient resource allocation. 
Jensen (1986) says that managers of firms with large free cash flows undertake 
redundant expansion activities for their private benefit. He stresses the 
information processing problems that arise between corporate headquarters and 
divisional managers. Accordingly, information and incentive problems may lead to 
misallocation of resources among the divisions of a diversified firm. 
Martin and Sayrak (2003) note that a diversified firm simply does an 
inferior job of allocating resources than a focused firm. Thus, the root of the 
problem is inefficiency rather than agency. This inefficiency could be a result of 
the asymmetry of information problem between the company‘s central 
management and the operational management. Similarly,  Chen and Yu (2012) 
stress that diversification can also increase costs due to the difficulties associated 
with coordination, asymmetry of information and incentive misalignment between 
headquarters and divisional managers in multidivisional firms. According to Su 
and Tsang (2015), when a business unit shares resources and becomes jointly 
specialised in order to create economies of scope, then monitoring the 
performance of individuals becomes more complicated, resulting in a greater 
potential for avoiding responsibility, and other opportunistic behaviour. Thus, the 
diversification strategy can destroy the shareholder‘s value.  
Consequently, the researcher argues that a diversification strategy not 
only has several positive points, but also has a few negative consequences. The 
benefits of diversification could be grouped into several points: creating synergy 
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from economies of scope; increasing market power; and financial benefit such as 
creating an internal capital market, increasing debt capacity, increasing interest 
from tax shields and reducing risk. The negative consequences may relate to 
agency problems and the inefficient allocation of resources.         
3.2.4 Product Diversification 
Derived from the definition of corporate diversification, product 
diversification describes a company which adopts a diversification strategy by 
having multiple businesses or different businesses in terms of product. Hence, to 
identify product diversification, this study uses an established product 
classification code; the updated version of International Standard Industry 
Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC). According to several prior studies, 
product diversification may be classified as either related diversification or 
unrelated diversification (Hashai, 2015; Oh et al., 2015; Su and Tsang, 2015; 
Zahavi and Lavie, 2013; Chang et al., 2012; Chen and Yu, 2012; Palepu, 1985). 
Some authors refer to them as intra-industry and inter-industry diversification 
(Zahavi and Lavie, 2013; Li and Greenwood, 2004), or within-industry and 
across-industry diversification (Hashai, 2015; Li and Greenwood, 2004). The 
following part discusses these two forms of product diversification. 
3.2.4.1 Related Diversification 
Related diversification in general is defined by the similarity of resources 
and market. Table 3.2 shows several definitions of related diversification.  
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Table 3.2 Definition of Related Diversification 
Year Author Definition 
2015 Hill et al. (2015, 
p. 331) 
A corporate-level strategy that is based on the goal 
of establishing a business unit in a new industry that 
is related to a company‘s existing business units by 
some form of commonality or linkage between their 
value-chain functions  
2014 Knecht (2014, p. 
49) 
The firm diversifies to serve similar customers or 
market segments, employing similar resources  
2013 Zahavi and 
Lavie (2013, p. 
979)  
Intra-industry diversification refers to the extent to 
which the firm‘s businesses draw on similar skills or 
resources, common technologies, or shared 
customers. 
2012 Chen and Yu 
(2012, p. 521) 
Related diversification means diversifying into 
business associated with similar products, vertically 
integrating complementary activities (corresponding 
to backward or forward integration), or sharing 
intangible assets such as marketing knowledge, 
patented technology, product differentiation, superior 
managerial capabilities, or routines and repertoires.  
2008 Johnson et al. 
(2008, p. 265) 
Related diversification is corporate development 
beyond current products and markets, but within the 
capabilities or value network of the organisation  
2007 Barney and 
Clark (2007) 
A firm exploits a core competence in its 
diversification efforts 
2007 Hill and Jones 
(2007, p. 394) 
A strategy of establishing a business unit in a new 
industry that is related to a company‘s existing 
business units. 
2003 David (2003, p. 
169) 
A company‘s strategy which adds new products or 
services that are related.  
2001 Langford and 
Male (2001, p. 
78) 
The broad confines of the industry within which a 
firm operates.  
2000 Palich, Cardinal, 
et al. (2000, p. 
159) 
Related diversification involves multiple industries 
with businesses that are able to tap a common pool 
of corporate resources.  
1994 Shrivastava 
(1994, p. 92) 
A domain choice that encompasses related product 
markets.  
1991 Vachani (1991, 
p. 307)  
Dispersion of activities across business segment 
within industries.   
Sources: Adopted from several studies 
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Synergy from economies of scope is the primary motive for unrelated 
diversification, followed by the market power motive. Therefore, in terms of 
benefit diversification, synergy in a diversified firm is greater in related 
diversification than unrelated diversification, as management is more familiar with 
the market it has entered and the technology used (Su and Tsang (2015); (Wan 
et al., 2011; Michel and Shaked, 1984). Su and Tsang (2015) agree that related 
diversification is more likely to enjoy economies of scope where input is shared 
and utilised jointly by different business units. Related diversification also 
enhances the market power of the consolidated company (Amit and Livnat, 
1988b). It has an impact on market power for the reason that when a company 
diversifies its business to a related product or market, it may become more 
efficient via actions such as predatory pricing, mutual forbearance and reciprocal 
buying (Martin and Sayrak, 2003; Montgomery, 1994; Amit and Livnat, 1988a). 
Related diversification is thus a product diversification strategy, which uses the 
same resources and optimises the capabilities or the value network of the 
organisation to serve the same customers or related market segments. 
3.2.4.2 Unrelated Diversification 
 
Unrelated diversification has several definitions and also relates to 
resources and markets (see Table 3.3). In general, unrelated diversification 
relates to new products with different competencies or resources and/or markets.  
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Table 3.3 Definition of Unrelated Diversification 
Year Author Definition 
2015 Hill et al. (2015, 
p. 331) 
A corporate-level strategy based on a multi-
business model that uses general organisational 
competencies to increase the performance of all 
the company‘s business units.   
2014 Knecht (2014, p. 
50) 
The firm diversifies into businesses not related to 
similar customer or market segments, or not 
employing similar resources.  
2013 Zahavi and Lavie 
(2013, p. 979)  
Inter-industry diversification refers to expansion  
into additional businesses new to the firm. 
2013 Castañer and 
Kavadis (2013, p. 
864) 
Unrelated diversification refers to the extent to 
which a firm operates in different businesses, 
have different input-output configurations and 
thus few or no resources in common.  
2012 Chen and Yu 
(2012, p. 552)  
Unrelated diversification refers to a firm‘s 
diversification into business areas where no 
physical or knowledge resources are shared, 
other than financial resources. 
2008 Johnson et al. 
(2008, p. 267) 
The development of products or services is 
beyond the current capabilities and value 
network.  
2007 Barney and Clark 
(2007) 
A firm does not exploit a core competence in its 
diversification efforts. 
2007 Hill and Jones 
(2007, p. 350) 
The multi-business model implants general 
organisational competencies in new business 
units.  
2003 David (2003, p. 
170) 
A company‘s strategy which adds new, unrelated 
products or services for present customers 
(horizontal diversification) or both of new 
customers and new products (conglomeration).  
2001 Langford and 
Male (2001, p. 
78) 
Takes the firm outside the industry, markets or 
products within which it currently operates. 
1994 Shrivastava 
(1994, p. 92) 
Involves operating a set of diverse, unrelated 
businesses (conglomerate strategy).  
1991 Vachani (1991, p. 
307)  
The extent to which a firm‘s activities are 
dispersed across different industries.   
Sources: Adopted from several studies 
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As with most diversification, the main motive of unrelated diversification is 
financial resources (Su and Tsang, 2015; Hitt et al., 2011; Chatterjee and 
Wernerfelt, 1991). Most unrelated diversified companies enjoy the financial 
benefits of diversification. Unrelated diversification results in reducing transaction 
costs, tax benefit, risk reduction, agency motive and leveraging firms‘ resources 
and capabilities (Su and Tsang, 2015; Ataullah et al., 2014; Amit and Livnat, 
1988a; Amihud and Lev, 1981). Amit and Livnat (1988a) argue that by using an 
unrelated diversification strategy, a business will use excess resources and 
enhance efficiency, leading to a reduction in transaction costs. They add that 
unrelated diversification will increase tax benefits because the company will 
receive an additional interest deduction due to conglomerate diversification. 
Moreover, unrelated diversification contributes to the risk reduction motive and 
leveraging of an organisation‘s resources and capabilities as that firm diversifies 
its business and of course reduces the risk of failure.  
In summary, unrelated diversification is a product diversification strategy, 
which uses different resources, beyond the existing capabilities or value network 
of the organisation, to serve current or different customers or unrelated market 
segments.  
3.2.5 International Diversification 
Diversification strategy also has a geographical or international context 
(Alfredo, Felix and Fernando, 2012; Doaei et al., 2012). An internationally 
diversified firm is one which operates beyond its domestic market (Kang, 2013; 
Doaei et al., 2012; Ferris and Sen, 2010). Table 3.4 gives several definitions of 
international diversification.  
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Table 3.4 Definition of International Diversification 
Year Author Definition 
2016 Ma et al. (2016) p. 
750 
International diversification is a strategy 
through which a firm expands the sales of its 
goods or services across the borders of global 
regions and countries into different geographic 
locations or markets. 
2014 Knecht (2014, p. 51) International diversification reaches into 
markets outside the firm‘s home country.  
2013 Kang (2013) p.101 International diversification refers to a firm‘s 
expansion beyond its domestic market into 
other regions or countries 
2012 Barney and Hesterly 
(2012, p. 190) 
Diversification occurs when a firm operates in 
multiple geographic market simultaneously. 
2011 Hitt et al. (2011) p. 
219 
International strategy is a strategy through 
which the firm sells its goods or services 
outside its domestic market. 
2006 Strike et al. (2006, p. 
851) 
A number of different markets in which a firm 
operates and their importance to the firm, 
where market refers to the different geographic 
locations that cross national borders.  
1991 Vachani (1991, pp. 
307-308)  
Related international geographic diversification 
is the dispersion of a multinational‘s activities 
across countries within a relatively 
homogeneous cluster of countries and is 
analogous to the concept of related product 
diversification. Unrelated international 
diversification is the dispersion of the 
multinational‘s activities across heterogeneous 
geographic regions and is analogous to the 
concept of unrelated product diversification.  
Sources: Adopted from several studies 
The benefits of international diversification include creating value, if 
companies can leverage economies of scale and scope, location advantage and 
synergy creation via asset internalisation (tangible and intangible) and synergise 
their operation efficiently (Alfredo et al., 2012; Doaei et al., 2012; Lee, Hooy and 
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Hooy, 2012; Ferris and Sen, 2010). International diversification may also reduce 
a firm‘s risk of reduction in demand from the domestic market (Alfredo et al., 
2012). It may create economies of scale and economies of scope (Qian, Qian, Li 
and Li, 2008). Global diversification is also beneficial because the organisation 
can enhance its cash flow stability and reduce cash flow uncertainty (Doukas and 
Kan, 2006). Lastly, it allows the company to access international human 
resources and knowledge stock which relates to the firm‘s innovation (Gao and 
Chou, 2015).  
In contrast, the decision to diversify globally also has some 
disadvantages. For example, the complexity of international firms increases 
coordination costs, difficulties in transferring assets to create a competitive 
advantage and inefficiencies from the lack of adaptability to environmental 
differences (Ferris and Sen, 2010). Therefore, the corporate diversification 
strategies adopted differ in level and type. To understand the type, and how 
inherent the diversification strategy the company has adopted is, a measurement 
of corporate diversification is required. 
3.2.6 Measurement of Diversification 
This part consists of the diversification measurement of a product and 
international diversification. 
3.2.6.1 Product Diversification Measurement  
 
Historically, product diversification has been measured by either the 
strategic approach or the business count approach (Martin and Sayrak, 2003; 
Sambharya, 2000; Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). Both should be considered when 
choosing the measurement for corporate diversification, as recommended by 
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Ataullah et al. (2014); Park and Jang (2013a, 2013b). The strategic approach 
uses a categorical measurement and deals with the type of diversification (Martin 
and Sayrak, 2003; Sambharya, 2000; Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). It was introduced 
by Wrigley in 1971 when he proposed four discrete measurements for four 
categories of diversification: single business, dominant business, related 
business and unrelated business (Martin and Sayrak, 2003; Sambharya, 2000; 
Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). In 1974, Rumelt expanded it into nine sub-categories 
(single business, single vertical, dominant vertical, dominant constrained, 
dominant linked, dominant unrelated, related constrained, related linked, and 
unrelated) based on the specialisation ratio, direction of diversification and 
vertical ratio (Sambharya, 2000; Pitts and Hopkins, 1982; Rumelt, 1982, 1974).  
Strategic approach considers resources, such as skill sharing, strengths 
and tangible attempts to exploit other common features to capture the 
relatedness between business units (Sambharya, 2000; Pitts and Hopkins, 1982; 
Rumelt, 1982, 1974). Although these approaches are rigorous conceptually, they 
require extensive information from various resources and are also time 
consuming (Sambharya, 2000; Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). Moreover, the 
categories rely heavily on the researcher‘s judgment and might be very subjective 
(Martin and Sayrak, 2003; Sambharya, 2000; Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). Hence, 
the reliability of this approach is questionable (Sambharya, 2000; Pitts and 
Hopkins, 1982).  
More successfully, according to Sambharya (2000); Datta, Rajagopalan 
and Rasheed (1991), the business count approach is a continuous measurement 
of corporate diversification which is focused on the level of diversification. The 
level of entropy as one measurement in this approach, could also capture the 
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type of diversification (Martin and Sayrak, 2003; Sambharya, 2000). The 
business count approach was based on an established product classification 
code, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) (Martin and Sayrak, 2003; 
Sambharya, 2000; Montgomery, 1982; Pitts and Hopkins, 1982), and therefore, is 
more objective and reliable. The data to measure diversification can be accessed 
readily via companies‘ financial statements in their annual reports. Details of the 
company's sales based on the product classification system make the continuous 
measurement of diversification possible, from which to calculate corporate 
diversification easily and promptly (Montgomery, 1982).  
Nevertheless, these measurements have a limitation, the internal 
consistency of the product classification system‘s coding (Martin and Sayrak, 
2003; Montgomery, 1982). Martin and Sayrak (2003) and Montgomery (1982) 
argue that the SIC is limited to reflecting the relationship between products, 
because the numerical differences between categories of industry cannot be 
defined as an interval or ratio scale. Hence, the business count approach cannot 
provide a refined measurement regarding corporate diversification. Nevertheless, 
after the consistent pattern between different levels of refinement in SIC has 
been taken into account, Montgomery (1982) states that this weakness is less 
threatening. These measurement approaches are summarised in Table 3.5.  
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Table 3.5 Corporate Diversification Measurement      
Approach  Characteristic Strengths Weaknesses 
Strategic 
Approach 
- Relies heavily on 
researcher‘s judgment 
- Categorical measure 
- Focuses on type of 
diversification 
- Rigorous 
conceptually 
- Subjective 
- Reliability is 
questionable  
- Need to collect 
information 
from various 
resources 
- Time 
consuming 
Business 
count 
approach 
- Relies on a formal 
product classification 
system, such as SIC 
- Continuous measure 
- Focuses on degree of 
diversification 
- Objective 
- Reliability is 
high 
- Information is 
available and 
accessible  
- Easy to 
calculate 
- Less time 
consuming 
- Internal 
inconsistency of 
product 
classification 
system coding 
Sources: Adapted from Martin and Sayrak (2003); Sambharya (2000); 
Montgomery (1982); Pitts and Hopkins (1982)  
From this table, it can be concluded that: first, the business count 
approach is suitable for the differentiation process of a business based on 
products or services, because it relies on the established product classification 
system. Second, this approach offers objectivity, which leads to a high reliability 
of measurement. Third, availability and accessibility of data and the ease of 
computation make this approach less time consuming. For these reasons, this 
approach is suitable for a study which has a large sample of analysis.        
 There are three principal methods to measure diversification in the 
business count approach: the number of segments or industry groups, the 
Herfindahl Index and the Entropy measure (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). The first, is 
based on the number of industry groups which a firm operates (Martin and 
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Sayrak, 2003). A company with a higher number of segments or industry groups 
is more diversified (George and Kabir, 2012); Pitts and Hopkins (1982), termed 
this a numerical count. It is a simple measurement of corporate diversification, 
although it cannot describe which industry is more important than others for the 
firm (Martin and Sayrak, 2003; Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). For example, there are 
two firms, X and Y. Firm X, based on a three-digit SIC or ISIC codes, has three 
industrial groups, and Firm Y has four industrial groups. By using this approach, 
Y is more diversified than X, because it has more industries. Nevertheless, in 
exploring it with additional information concerning the number of sales in each 
industry, the result can be different. For example, each of Firm X‘s three 
industries, might contribute 33.33% to the total sales of the business; however, 
Firm Y might rely on one of its four industries to contribute 70% of the company‘s 
total sales. This implies that Firm Y is more volatile than Firm X, because the 
latter is more diversified. To eliminate this problem, the Herfindahl Index (HI) is 
recommended (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). 
The second measurement of the business count approach, HI, was 
originally developed as a measure of industry concentration (Martin and Sayrak, 
2003). The higher the degree of industry concentration, the lower the level of its 
diversification. HI is the square of the sales share of each industry in the firm. 
Equation 3.1 shows the HI formula (Acar and Sankaran, 1999; Jacquemin and 
Berry, 1979): 
Equation 3.1 Herfindahl Index Measurement 
                 ∑                                                                                  (3.1) 
Where: Pi = is the percentage contribution of industry i within a company  
 n = is the number of industries in the company 
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HI takes a value between 0 and 1, or 0<HI<1. The higher the index, the lower the 
corporate diversification. In practice, the contribution of the industry could be 
sales, assets or revenue.  
Berry (1971) modified the original HI by adjusting the equation with a 
denominator: the Berry-Herfindahl Index (Montgomery, 1982). The denominator 
was added to accommodate the use of a firm‘s sales share, which is not summed 
into one. Thus, the formula for Berry-HI (Kranenburg, Hagedoorn and Pennings, 
2004; Sambharya, 2000; Montgomery, 1982) is: 
Equation 3.2 Berry Herfindahl Index equation 
          (
∑   
  
   
(∑   
 
   )
 )                                                  (3.2) 
With this measurement, if a company operates in a single segment or industry, 
the index will be zero (Kranenburg et al., 2004); unlike the original HI, the higher 
index means a higher degree of corporate diversification. HI measurement can 
capture the relative importance of a business or segment in a firm (Zahavi and 
Lavie, 2013; George and Kabir, 2012; Martin and Sayrak, 2003; Sambharya, 
2000), and several previous studies, such as Zahavi and Lavie (2013); George 
and Kabir (2012) applied it. However, it failed to capture the relatedness among 
two- three- or four-digit ISIC codes (Martin and Sayrak, 2003; Sambharya, 2000). 
To resolve this shortcoming, Jacquemin and Berry introduced the entropy 
(inverse) measure in 1979 (Doaei et al., 2012; Martin and Sayrak, 2003; 
Jacquemin and Berry, 1979). 
The last measurement of the business count approach is the entropy 
measure as espoused by Jacquemin and Berry (Purkayastha, 2013; Doaei et al., 
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2012; Jacquemin and Berry, 1979). This considers three elements of 
diversification: the number of operating industry/product segments in a company, 
the portion of the firm‘s total assets or sales across the industry/product 
segments and the degree of relatedness among the various industry/product 
segments (Martin and Sayrak, 2003; Palepu, 1985). The last element in the 
entropy measure enables the decomposition of related and unrelated 
diversification by classifying each of the business segments (Kang, 2013; 
Purkayastha, 2013). Furthermore, related diversification (DR) can be defined as 
four-digit segments within a two-digit industry, and unrelated diversification (DU) 
occurs if a firm operates only in two-digit industries (Hoskisson and Johnson, 
1992). Total diversification (DT) is the sum of DR and DU. The entropy 
measurement is shown in equations 3.3-3.7 (Doaei et al., 2012; Sambharya, 
2000; Acar and Sankaran, 1999; Palepu, 1985; Jacquemin and Berry, 1979). 
Equation 3.3 Total Diversification 
DT = DR + DU                                                                            (3.3) 
Equation 3.4 Total Related Diversification 
DR = DT-DU                                                                               (3.4) 
Equation 3.5 Total Related Diversification  
   ∑     
  
                                                                           (3.5) 
Equation 3.6 Related Diversification in several segments 
    ∑   
 
     
 
  
                                                                        (3.6) 
Equation 3.7 Total Unrelated Diversification  
   ∑     
 
  
 
                                                                           (3.7) 
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DT = Total diversification  
DR= Related Diversification 
DU= Unrelated Diversification 
n   = is the number of segments in the firm (industry based on four-digit ISIC) 
Pi  = is the sales share of ith segment (industry based on four-digit ISIC) in the 
total sales of the company 
m = is the number of industry groups in the firm (industry based on two-digit ISIC) 
Pj  = is the share of jth group‘s sales in the total sales of the firm  
Pji = is the share of segment i of group j in the total sales of the group 
 
According to Ataullah et al. (2014) and Sambharya (2000), the entropy measure 
has numerous advantages, such as technical rigour, a strong theoretical base, 
lacks subjectivity and relatively minor shortcomings. Several studies, such 
Ataullah et al. (2014); Kang (2013); Lien and Li (2013); Park and Jang (2013a, 
2013b); Chen and Yu (2012) still apply this measurement. Table 3.6 summarises 
the business count approach related to diversification measurement. 
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Table 3.6 Business Count Approach 
Measure Formula Strengths Weaknesses 
Numerical 
count 
Number of 
industry groups 
- Simple 
- Easy to compute 
 
- Fails to 
capture the 
relative 
importance 
or 
distribution 
of the firm‘s 
involvement 
in each 
industry 
 
Herfindahl 
Index 
- Based on 
revenue 
- Based on 
assets 
   ∑   
 
 
 
 
- Simple 
- Easy to compute 
- Captures the relative 
importance or 
distribution of the 
firm‘s involvement in 
each industry 
 
- Fails to 
capture the 
relatedness 
of the firm‘s 
businesses 
Entropy 
Measure 
DT = DR + DU 
   ∑    
 
 
   
 
    ∑  
 
   
  
 
  
 
 
   ∑    
 
  
 
   
 
- Technical rigour 
- Strong theoretical 
base 
- Can be decomposed 
into related and 
unrelated 
diversification 
components by 
classifying each of the 
firm‘s business 
segments into related 
industries or capturing 
diversification across 
products and within 
product groups; 
related and unrelated 
diversification 
Computation 
is complex 
Requires data 
on 4-digit level 
Sources: adapted from Ataullah et al. (2014); Martin and Sayrak (2003); 
Sambharya (2000); Pitts and Hopkins (1982) 
 
3.2.6.2 International Diversification Measurement 
Several authors, such as Majocchi and Strange (2012); Hitt et al. (1997) 
have classified the international diversification measurement into uni-dimensional 
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and multi-dimensional measurements. Moreover, there are three measurements 
in the uni-dimensional measure, specifically the ratio of foreign sales to total 
sales (Kang, 2013; Majocchi and Strange, 2012), the ratio of foreign assets to 
total sales, and the number of geographic segments (Krapl, 2015). The last of 
these is similar to the number of industries in the industry diversification 
measurement. However, the uni-dimensional measurement has a weakness, 
which does not take into account the geographical distribution (Majocchi and 
Strange, 2012). A further disadvantage is the similarity or dissimilarity of 
geographic regions (Vachani, 1991). This means that two companies may have 
the same ratio of foreign sales or foreign assets, but operate in a different 
number of geographic segments. Or, two companies might have the same 
number of geographic segments, although one company relies on domestic 
operation and the other on foreign operation. Therefore, multi-dimensional 
measurement is used to eliminate this weakness.  
One of the multi-dimensional measurements is Kim‘s entropy index (Kim, 
1989a). Originally, this measurement extended the Jacquemin-Berry entropy 
measurement to develop a global diversification measurement. This is a multi-
dimensional measurement which has been used in various studies related to 
international diversification (Majocchi and Strange, 2012; Wiersema and Bowen, 
2008; Chang and Wang, 2007; Hitt et al., 1997). The formula for this 
measurement is: 
Equation 3.8 International Diversification  
   ∑     
 
  
 
                                                                              (3.8) 
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ID = international diversification  
j   = number of geographic segments (number of countries) 
xj   = percentage of sales realised in market j 
 
The entropy measure is 0 for a company which only operates in one 
country, while higher values indicate greater international diversification. 
According to Vachani (1991), it is important to divide international diversification 
into related and unrelated international diversification, based on the similarities 
and differences among countries, such as physical proximity, cultural proximity 
and level of economic development. He introduced the related and unrelated 
international diversification measurement.   
3.3 Company Performance 
3.3.1 Definition of Company Performance 
 
Performance is the result of activities in a particular period, conducted by 
an individual, group or firm. Activities undertaken by a company are determined 
by the organisation‘s strategy. Sahut, Hikkerova and Khalfallah (2013) define 
company performance as a perceptible result from the adoption of company 
strategy. Furthermore, an evaluation of the company‘s performance is required 
by the business community or company stakeholders to evaluate strategy 
formulation and accountability (Crowther, 1996).  
Company performance can be measured in several ways. Pun and White 
(2005) have grouped it into quantitative and qualitative measurements. The 
quantitative measurement is a numeric measurement, such as financial ratio, 
staff turnover and number of customer complaints. This measurement is easy to 
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use and manage. Qualitative measures, for instance perception and satisfaction 
of customers and employees, quality and motivation are not straightforward to 
measure and are often not connected to the organisation‘s current strategy. 
Alternatively, Goyal and Rahman (2013); FitzRoy, Hulbert and Ghobadian (2012); 
Verbeeten and Boons (2009); classified performance measurement into financial 
and non-financial. In addition, Barney (2011) used simple accounting measures, 
adjusted accounting measure, market measure and stakeholder point of view 
measure.  
3.3.2 Financial and Non-Financial Performance 
Financial performance measurements provide information on 
performance in monetary terms. They reveal how well a company is achieving an 
aim, (Kang, 2013) more specifically in its operation. Verbeeten and Boons (2009) 
stated that financial performance measurement ranges from accounting-based 
performance measurement to extended financial performance measurement, 
such as economic profit measurement. Accounting-based performance 
measures, the traditional measurement, are relied on heavily for accounting data, 
for instance financial budgets, profit or return on investment, and earnings. For 
example, this measure employs budgets compared with actual return on capital 
employee (ROCE) and return on total capital (ROTC) (Verbeeten and Boons, 
2009). Conversely, economic profit performance measurement, including 
economic value added, shareholder value added and cash flow return on 
investment, depend on residual income and cash flow. Accounting-based 
measures play an important role in the evaluation of performance, because they 
are required for external reports, reliable, easy to understand, and capture all 
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organisational activities (Otley, 1999). However, performance information from 
these measures is considered to be historic and backward looking, encouraging 
short-term behaviour, and generating management frustration and resistance. All 
of these factors mean that accounting-based financial measures are not in line 
with the strategic goals of an organisation (Verbeeten and Boons, 2009) 
Purkayastha et al. (2012) classified the performance of companies into 
accounting measures and market measures, then each of these into a return 
dimension and a risk dimension. Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Investment 
(ROI), Return on Sales (ROS), Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Capital 
(ROC), growth in sales and growth in earnings per share are some examples of 
return measurements using accounting data. Return measures using market-
based data are abnormal return, Sharpe Index, Treynor Index, market-to-book 
equity and Tobin‘s Q. The risk measures from accounting data are variability in 
ROA, ROC and earnings, while market-based risk measures are total risk, 
systematic and unsystematic risk. Accordingly, accounting-based measures 
focus on measuring past performance and are vulnerable to accounting-data 
manipulation (Purkayastha et al., 2012; Chakravarthy, 1986). As a consequence, 
these measures do not represent future cash flow (Purkayastha et al., 2012). 
Barney (2011) described simple accounting measures using four ratios to 
measure performance: profitability ratio, liquidity ratio, leverage ratio and activity 
ratio. Profitability ratio reflects the ability of a business to generate profit. ROA, 
ROE, gross profit margin, earning per share (EPS), price earning (P/E) and cash 
flow per share are all examples of profitability ratio. Liquidity ratio demonstrates 
the ability of the firm to meet short-term financial liability; current ratio and quick 
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ratio are examples. Leverage ratio reflects the level of financial liability of the 
company, and includes debt to asset, debt to equity and time interest earned. 
Activity ratios, such as inventory turnover, account receivable turnover and 
average collection period, reveal the company‘s level of activity. Additionally, 
ratios can be used to capture integrative and complete performance, such as 
Altman‘s equation to predict bankruptcy. However, these simple accounting 
measures have three shortcomings (Barney, 2011). The first is that the financial 
statement is the result of an accounting process, which is influenced by 
managerial discretion in choosing the accounting method for revenue, inventory, 
depreciation and others. Second, simple accounting measures have only focused 
on short-term orientation and tend to ignore long-term performance. Finally, this 
measure fails to assess the role of intangible resources and capabilities.  
In general, financial performance has some limitations and regularly fails 
to represent long-term performance and the survival of the organisation (Kaplan 
and Norton, 1996). Barney (2011) stated that although financial performance is 
crucial for the company‘s core stakeholders, this performance measure alone is 
not complete, and usually ignores the role of various stakeholders. Similarly, 
Harrison and Wicks (2013) argue that although financial measures play an 
important role, they have a limited perspective on value creation, especially as 
they always attempt to quantify events in terms of specific and measurable 
financial outcomes, in the short or medium period. Thus, they may narrow the 
business‘s potential and/or the manager‘s view of the total firm value across 
stakeholders. Non-financial performance measurement is a supplement to 
improve the strategic dimension of performance information which cannot be 
provided by accounting performance measurement (Verbeeten and Boons, 
80 
 
2009). In contrast, non-financial performance information is provided in non-
monetary terms. Verbeeten and Boons (2009) have used employee and 
customer measurement, process, quality measures and innovation to measure 
non-financial performance. Moreover, Goyal and Rahman (2013) have divided 
non-financial performance into marketing performance, human resource 
performance and operational performance.  
Clarkson (1995) states that the aims of the company, both economic and 
social, are to make and distribute increased welfare and value to all groups 
belonging to its primary stakeholders, without giving priority to one group at the 
expense of others. In line with this argument, Barney (2011) has suggested 
measuring performance not only from the stockholder‘s perspective but also from 
the perspectives of multiple stakeholders: customers, employees, suppliers and 
others. Accordingly, measuring performance across stakeholders includes 
tangible and intangible factors to measure an organisation‘s current performance 
and offers new insight into how the firm will perform in the future (Harrison and 
Wicks, 2013). Harrison and Wicks (2013) also suggested employing the utility for 
the stakeholder as a performance measurement, including both economic and 
other stakeholder benefits. Their examples of performance measurement from 
perspectives of multiple stakeholders are shown in Table 3.7.  
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Table 3.7 Example of performance measures from multiple stakeholders‘ 
perspectives 
Stakeholders Potential categories for 
measuring happiness/wellbeing 
Potential proxies for 
researchers 
Employees - Various components of 
employment contract 
- Perceived fairness of decision-
making process 
- Perceived treatment 
- Perceived authenticity 
- Consistency between stated 
vs. realised firm values 
- Promotion policies/upward 
mobility 
- Firm‘s environmental 
performance 
- Firm‘s position/performance 
on other social issues 
Objective measures such as 
turnover, and legal action 
- Compensation and benefit 
- Workplace benefits 
- Legal action or, if 
unionised, grievances  
- Productivity measures 
- Inclusion on list of the best 
company to work for  
- Internal promotion to top 
management turnover 
- Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini 
(KLD) health and safety 
concern or strength 
- KLD workforce reductions 
- KLD pension/benefits 
concerns or strengths 
- KLD cash profit sharing 
Customers - Product/service features 
- Perceived treatment during 
transactions 
- Perceived authenticity 
- Firm‘s environmental 
performance 
- Firm‘s position/performance 
on other social issues 
- Objective measures such as 
repeat business, and legal 
actions 
- Growth in sales 
- Consumer reports on 
product/services 
- Reputation rankings 
- KLD product safety 
concern 
- KLD marketing or 
contracting controversy 
- KLD quality ranking of 
product 
- KLD R&D/innovation 
ranking 
Suppliers - Perceived treatment during 
transactions 
- Firm‘s environmental 
performance  
- Firm‘s position/performance 
on other social issues 
- Nature of payment 
- Objective measures such as 
longevity and availability of 
supplies 
 
 
 
- Days payable 
- Longevity of supplier 
relationship 
- Legal action 
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Stakeholders Potential categories for 
measuring happiness/wellbeing 
Potential proxies for 
researchers 
Shareholders - Financial return 
- Perceived risk of investment 
- Governance structure and 
policies 
- Disclosure of pertinent 
information/transparency 
- Firm‘s environmental 
performance  
- Firm‘s position/performance 
on other social issues 
- Objective data on return and 
risk 
 
- Shareholder return 
- Price to earnings ratio 
- Risk associated with return 
- Number of shareholder 
proposals 
- Compensation levels of 
top managers 
- KLD ownership concern 
Community - Perceived impact on 
community/environment (from 
community leaders or general 
perception) 
- Perception of integrity of firm 
- Objective data on number of 
positive/negative encounters, 
community service, charitable 
and infrastructure 
contributions 
- Tax breaks or other 
advantages provided to 
the firm 
- New local regulations that 
affect firm 
- Legal action 
- KLD tax disputes or 
investment controversies 
- KLD negative economic 
impact 
- KLD generous giving 
Sources: Adopted from Harrison and Wicks (2013) 
Although most stakeholder-based company performance proxies 
suggested by Harrison and Wicks (2013) are non-financial, the financial return 
and shareholder happiness categories fall under financial performance. Another 
performance measurement which consists of both financial and non-financial 
performance is the balance scorecard. According to Kaplan and Norton (1996), 
this measures company performance by combining financial performance with 
other performance measurements, including internal business process, learning 
and growth, and customers. Wood (2010) argues that the business organisation 
is the locus of action with consequences for stakeholders and society, as well as 
for the company itself. Therefore, she emphasises that the company‘s activities 
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should be focused on the impacts and outcomes for society, stakeholders and 
the company. Based on this concept, company performance is measured by 
CSP. Certain researchers assume that CSP and financial performance are 
different dimensions of performance, and investigated the link between CSP and 
financial performance; for example, Barnett and Salomon (2012); Soana (2011); 
Waddock and Graves (1997); McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis (1988).   
However, based on her concept of CSP, Wood (2010) believes that financial 
performance is one dimension of CSP. 
Figure 3.1 is derived from these various opinions concerning the 
performance of companies.  
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Figure 3.1 Firms’ Performance 
 
Sources: Adapted by author from Goyal and Rahman (2013); (FitzRoy et al., 
2012); Barney (2011); Verbeeten and Boons (2009); Brammer et al. 
(2006);Harrison and Wicks (2013); Kaplan and Norton (1996)  
3.3.3 Corporate Social Performance 
Corporate Social Performance (CSP) is a performance measurement 
which is based on different stakeholders‘ perspectives. According to Kang (2013), 
CSP may reflect the response of a business to stakeholders‘ demands and to 
social issues that are related to the firm‘s operation. Turban and Greening (1996, 
p. 658) argue that CSP can be defined as ―a construct that emphasises a 
company‘s responsibilities to multiple stakeholders, such as employee and 
community at large, in addition to its traditional responsibilities to economic 
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shareholders‖. Brammer et al. (2006) state that CSP has become a principal 
component of business organisation performance, since a company is under 
intense pressures from stakeholders, including customers, employees and 
socially responsible investors, to reveal its commitment and contribution to 
society in social and environmental issues. Moreover, Kang (2013) states that 
CSP may become a complementary measurement for performance, specifically 
as a long-term performance and viability predictor. The measurement of CSP 
reflects a broad range of economic, social and environmental impacts arising 
from the business operation (Gond and Crane, 2010; Chen and Delmas, 2011). 
Table 3.8 shows a few definitions of CSP. In general, most of the previous 
authors define CSP as a performance measurement based on corporate or 
organisational response to stakeholder demand and social issues, stakeholders 
including employees, customers and communities (Cheung, Jiang, Mak and Tan, 
2013; Kang, 2013; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006). For example, Wood (2010) notes 
that CSP focuses on the impacts and outcomes for society and the stakeholders 
of the company. Luo and Bhattacharya (2009) emphasise that CSP deals with 
corporate prosocial programmes. 
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Table 3.8 Definitions of CSP 
Year Author Definition 
2015 Aguilera-Caracuel et al. 
(2015, p. 324)  
The measurement of the general 
performance of organisations in 
protecting and improving social 
wellbeing, compared to their main 
competitors, for a given period of time. 
The degree of success and 
implementation that CSR practices 
have as a response to stakeholders‘ 
social demands. 
2009 Luo and Bhattacharya 
(2009, p. 202)  
A company's overall performance in 
these diverse corporate prosocial 
programmes in relation to those of its 
leading competitors in the industry. 
2013 Kang (2013, p. 95) CSP is an effective measure of a firm‘s 
response to stakeholder demands and 
social issues. 
2010 Wood (2010, p. 54) CSP is asset of descriptive 
categorisations of business activity, 
focusing on impacts and outcomes for 
society, stakeholders and the firm. 
2013 Cheung et al. (2013, p. 
625)  
CSP is a set of corporate actions that 
positively affect an identifiable social 
stakeholders‘ interests and do not 
violate the legitimacy claims of another 
identifiable social stakeholder in the 
long run. 
2011 Chiu and Sharfman 
(2011, p. 1564)  
CSP is a firm‘s actions in the promotion 
and configuration of social 
responsibilities, processes, policies, 
programmes and observable outcomes 
that are beyond the immediate interests 
of the firm and beyond that which is 
required by law. 
2006 Neubaum and Zahra 
(2006, p. 109) 
CSP refers to the company policies, 
programmes and actions intended to 
improve the quality of life in society, as 
well as company‘s efforts to foster 
positive relationship with key 
stakeholders such as employees, 
customers, and communities. 
Sources: adapted from several studies. 
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3.3.4 Dimensions of CSP 
 
According to Walls et al. (2012); Brammer et al. (2006); Kang (2013); 
Wood (2010); Waddock and Graves (1997), CSP is a multi-dimensional 
construct. CSP dimensions vary among standards, agencies and researchers. 
First, the Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS) propose three: 
environment, social and governance dimensions. The social dimension is divided 
into specific subjects such as human rights, the employee, community and supply 
chain management (Wood, 2010). Like EIRIS, Brammer and Millington (2008) 
employ only three CSP dimensions: community, environment and employee. 
Second, the measurement by Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD) (Kang, 2013) 
applies eight CSP dimensions: community, CG, diversity, employee relationships, 
environment, human rights, products, and controversial business, such as 
alcohol, gambling, tobacco, firearms, military and nuclear power (Risk Metrics 
Group). Every dimension consists of strength and concern indicators. Several 
authors used KLD‘s dimensions of CSP, including Kang (2013); Chiu and 
Sharfman (2011).  
Third, Cheung et al. (2013) note that CSP can be measured based on 
OECD CG principles. This measurement has several dimensions: employees, 
customers, environment, suppliers, society/community and creditors. Fourth, the 
Fortune index is used to determine the ―most admired company‖, with eight 
dimensions, including long-term investment value, quality of management and 
sensible use of corporate assets. Fifth, the Canadian Social Investment Database 
(CSID) uses seven dimensions, including community, diversity and environment. 
Sixth, Innovest Intangible Asset (IVA) has four dimensions: stakeholder capital, 
strategic governance, human capital and environment. For example, Graves and 
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Waddock (1994) have used IVA dimensions in measuring CSP. Seventh, GRI 
guidelines divide CSP dimensions into economic, environmental and social; the 
social dimension consists of labour practices and decent working conditions, 
human rights, society and product responsibility.   
According to Waddock and Graves (1997), CSP is characterised by a 
variety of input behaviours, internal/process behaviours and output behaviours. 
The first can be seen in indicators such as investment in pollution control 
equipment. Internal behaviours include treatment of women and minorities, and 
relationship with customers, in addition to output behaviours community relations 
and philanthropic programmes. Accordingly, it may be understood that there are 
some dimensions of CSP which relate to the stakeholders‘ view. From this, the 
researcher argues that the CSP dimensions are derived from stakeholder 
identity, for instance employees, customers, communities and environment.  
3.3.5 CSP Measurement 
 
Some measurements of CSP have been covered in previous studies 
(Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2015; Peng and Yang, 2014; Kang, 2013; Ho and 
Wang, 2012; Chiu and Sharfman, 2011; Soana, 2011; Brammer et al., 2006; 
Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Waddock and Graves, 1997). For example, Brammer 
et al. (2006) accentuate three measurements of CSP based on community 
performance, environmental performance and employees‘ performance 
dimensions. In community performance, they employ a scoring method graded 
from 1 to 4. For environmental performance, they consider policies, systems, 
reporting and performance indicators, graded from 1 to 5. Finally, employees‘ 
performance is divided into several indicators, such as health and safety, training 
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and development, equal opportunities, employee relations, job creation and job 
security, each scored from 1 to 3. Soana (2011) emphasises five methods to 
measure CSP ascertained in previous studies: questionnaire surveys, 
reputational measures, one-dimensional indicators, ethical rating and content 
analysis.  
Chiu and Sharfman (2011) argue that there are two groups of CSP 
measurement methods, uni-dimensional (e.g. pollution control or corporate 
philanthropy) and multi-dimensional (e.g. Fortune magazine‘s America‘s Most 
Admired Companies data, primary survey, content analysis and KLD social 
performance indicators). In addition, Ho and Wang (2012) mentioned reputation 
indices and databases as CSP measurements methods, such as KLD, Fortune 
index, CSID, pollution control performance from the Council of Economic 
Priorities, and IVA from an independent evaluation agency known as Innovest. 
Rather differently, Waddock and Graves (1997) note that CSP has been 
measured by methods including forced-choice survey, fortune reputational and 
social responsibility index, content analysis of documents, behavioural and 
perceptual measures, social disclosure and pollution control as uni-dimensional 
measures. Additionally, there are many ways of measuring CSP, such as; 
questionnaire survey, reputational measurement, one-dimensional indicators, 
ethical rating and content analysis.  
First, questionnaire surveys measure CSP by way of an analysis of the 
questionnaire data completed by managers and directors (Chiu and Sharfman, 
2011; Soana, 2011; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Directors and managers are 
appropriate respondents for CSP surveys, because of their involvement in 
strategic decision making (Soana, 2011). However, this method has some 
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disadvantages. For example, Soana (2011) argues that the managers and 
directors are an internal party of the company; therefore, their responses will 
reflect their own perceptions of social responsibility. Moreover, the absence of 
any of their responses will eliminate their company from the research sample and 
affect the response rate. That is, according to Graves and Waddock (1994), 
response rate is one of the weaknesses of survey measures.    
Second, reputational measurement evaluates CSP by using ratios 
calculated by the researcher or specialised journals as third parties to determine 
a score for the company‘s reputation, which is reflected in the CSP (Ho and 
Wang, 2012; Soana, 2011; Liston-Heyes and Ceton, 2009; Quevedo-Puente, 
Fuente-Sabaté and Delgado-García, 2007; Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998). 
Researchers can measure it by using specific selected indicators to determine 
the corporate reputation themselves. They could also use existing results of 
surveys from relevant stakeholders or existing measurements for corporate 
reputation already conducted by specialised journals, such as the Corporate 
Reputational Index (CRI) or Fortune‘s ―most admired company‖ database (Ho 
and Wang, 2012; Chiu and Sharfman, 2011; Soana, 2011; Luo and 
Bhattacharya, 2009).  
According to Soana (2011), reputational indicators as perceived by a third 
party are a good proxy for CSP, as they are not influenced by the company‘s 
financial-economic performance (Soana, 2011). However, this measurement has 
a few shortcomings. As stated by Liston-Heyes and Ceton (2009), CSP 
measurement is based on perception, which has a subjective nature towards 
social performance. Jizi et al. (2014) called it obscure; hence, it could be 
misaligned with the real CSP. Moreover, some reputational measurements are 
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affected by ―the financial performance halo‖ or previous financial results of the 
company, for example, the CRI calculated by Fortune magazine (Soana, 2011; 
Liston-Heyes and Ceton, 2009; Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998; Brown and Perry, 
1994; Graves and Waddock, 1994). 
Third, a one-dimensional indicator measures CSP via a single one of the 
multiple aspects of CSP practice (Peng and Yang, 2014; Zhang, 2012; Soana, 
2011; Carroll, 1979). Dialogue with the local community, philanthropy (Chiu and 
Sharfman, 2011), orientation towards the client (Soana, 2011), degree of 
involvement in illegal practice, respect for the environment and pollution control 
investment (Peng and Yang, 2014; Chiu and Sharfman, 2011) are some of CSP 
proxies related to this method. Moreover, a number of independent agencies 
have compiled these indicators, such as the Toxics Release Inventory, 
Governmental Pollution Indices and Pollution Performance Ranking, as a 
measure of CSP (Ho and Wang, 2012; Soana, 2011). However, one-dimensional 
indicators also have limitations. For example, they measure CSP only from a 
single dimension (Soana, 2011). In fact, CSP measures a firm‘s commitment 
level in a number of social, ethical and legal issues and it is a multi-dimensional 
concept, which comprises the company‘s responses to a wide range of 
stakeholders‘ demands related to the business‘s operation (Zhang, 2012; Chiu 
and Sharfman, 2011; Carroll, 1979) 
Fourth, ethical rating is a multi-dimensional index of CSP measurement, 
which is calculated by a specialised agency (Soana, 2011; Wood, 2010). It uses 
multiple indicators derived from different stakeholders‘ points of view. Several 
agencies have summed all indicators directly, whereas others have summed 
them according to their weight in an overall ethical rating. These have resulted in 
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some ethical ratings, such as the KLD measurement (Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 
2015; Kang, 2013; Ho and Wang, 2012; Chiu and Sharfman, 2011; Wood, 2010; 
Neubaum and Zahra, 2006), Michael Jantzi Research Associates (MJRA) in 
Canada (Soana, 2011), CSID (Ho and Wang, 2012; Wood, 2010), EIRIS ESG 
rating in the UK (Soana, 2011; Brammer et al., 2006), and IVA from Innovest (Ho 
and Wang, 2012). The ethical rating could eliminate the weaknesses of one-
dimensional indicators, nonetheless it relies on inconsistent models and inter-
agency indicators. Each agency will have composed its own quantification 
models and indicators based on their own circumstances (e.g. KLD database). 
KLD does have several advantages (Chiu and Sharfman, 2011; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997). First, it values all companies that publish their financial 
information in the Standard & Poor‘s database. Second, it establishes a separate 
ranking for each main social dimension. Third, it uses objective and uniform 
criteria in the valuation of the social aspects of the firm. Fourth, the information 
under consideration comes from various sources, both internal and external 
(Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2015). Finally, it has a good construct validity of the 
social performance measure (Kang, 2013).  
Ethical ratings are multi-dimensional and generalisable across industries 
and therefore, represent a comprehensive evaluation of a firm‘s CSP (Neubaum 
and Zahra, 2006). These ratings are the result of a comprehensive process 
undertaken by qualified experts who closely monitor companies‘ CSP practices 
(Neubaum and Zahra, 2006). The ethical ratings are also comprehensive and 
objective (Chiu and Sharfman, 2011; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997). In addition, the database for this rating is large and addresses a 
cross-section of the industry. As the raters are not evaluating their own 
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companies‘ performances, there is less chance of self-serving bias from which 
primary data might suffer (Chiu and Sharfman, 2011). However, even ethical 
ratings such as KLD have certain limitations, such as not being globally focused 
and only trading on the US stock exchange. Additionally, KLD‘s dichotomous 
variable for ‗‗strength‘‘ and ‗‗concern‘‘ may ignore some valuable information 
(Peng and Yang, 2014), and it assigns equal weight to each dimension, which 
inhibits the capture of incremental differences across the dimensions (Ho and 
Wang, 2012). 
Finally, content analysis (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Jizi et al., 
2014; Cheung et al., 2013; Khan et al., 2013; Chiu and Sharfman, 2011; Soana, 
2011; Waddock and Graves, 1997) calculates volume/quantity or quality of CSP 
disclosure in published company documents, printed and/or online. Content 
analysis also refers to disclosure analysis (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Jizi 
et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2013; Bouten et al., 2011; Hooks and Van Staden, 2011; 
Joseph and Taplin, 2011), seeing as it assumes that social disclosure is a good 
indicator of CSP. This assumption is based on Fischer and Sawczyn (2013) 
argument, which emphasises that a company with superior CSP voluntarily 
reveals credible information regarding its corporate social activities to express its 
performance. It is also congruent with Fischer and Sawczyn (2013); Clarkson, Li, 
Richardson and Vasvari (2008), who argue that a firm with good CSP is not only 
more likely to disclose CSP information than a company with poor CSP, but the 
measure will be predominantly quantitative or objective, and is unlikely to be 
imitated by a firm with poor CSP.  
Content analysis can be a simple count of words, lines or sentences in 
relation to CSP information (disclosure abundance or volumetric disclosure); a 
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count of the extent or number of CSP items in a checklist (disclosure 
occurrence); or quantification of the quality of the CSP disclosure (Jizi et al., 
2014; Khan et al., 2013; Bouten et al., 2011; Hooks and Van Staden, 2011; 
Joseph and Taplin, 2011; Quevedo-Puente et al., 2007). Hence, calculation in 
content analysis involves scoring the disclosure, specifically in quality disclosure. 
Some authors refer to this as a scoring method (Haji, 2013; Al-Tuwaijri, 
Christensen and Hughes, 2004), while others present disclosure in the form of an 
index, named a disclosure index (Fischer and Sawczyn, 2013; Khan et al., 2013; 
Joseph and Taplin, 2011; Hassan and Marston, 2010). According to Graves and 
Waddock (1994), the weakness of content analysis depends on the 
comprehensiveness of and the purposes for which the documents were originally 
created. 
In summary, Table 3.9 shows the CSP measurement methods, grouped 
by compiler (researcher or agency) and data source (primary or secondary).  
Table 3.9 Measurement methods of CSP  
Measurement 
method 
Measured by Source of Data 
 Researcher Specialised 
Agency 
Primary Secondary 
Survey v  v  
Reputational 
measures 
v v  v 
One-dimensional 
indicators 
v v  v 
Ethical Rating  v  v 
Disclosure Measure v   v 
Sources: Adapted from several studies 
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If they use a CSP measurement compiled by a specialised agency, such as 
reputational measure, one-dimensional indicators and ethical rating, researchers 
do not need to calculate CSP. Unfortunately, databases for this type of 
measurement are largely available only in developed countries. For example, 
those referred to above are all from the US, UK or Canada. Therefore, CSP and 
CSR studies in emerging countries, such as those conducted by Khan et al. 
(2013); Reimann, Ehrgott, Kaufmann and Carter (2012); Muller and Kolk (2009) 
tend to use survey and disclosure measurements.        
3.3.6 Content Analysis 
 
Krippendorff (2013) defines content analysis as a research technique for 
drawing replicable and valid conclusions from text or other meaningful matter into 
the context of use. In line with that Hooks and Van Staden (2011) the result of 
content analysis then can be analysed statistically. 
From the context of CSP, various authors agree that content analysis can 
be described as quantifying the extent or quality of CSP disclosure in published 
company documents; printed and/or online (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; 
Jizi et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2013; Bouten et al., 2011; Hooks and Van Staden, 
2011; Joseph and Taplin, 2011). Moreover, because the definition of content 
analysis relates to disclosure, these authors mention content analysis in 
conjunction with disclosure analysis. 
The extent of disclosure refers to both the volume of disclosure 
(disclosure abundance) and to the presence/absence of disclosure (disclosure 
occurrence) (Joseph and Taplin, 2011). Conversely, quality of disclosure refers to 
the completeness or the degree of detail in the disclosure (Hooks and Van 
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Staden, 2011). Hence, content analysis has numerous ways of analysing 
narrative disclosures. It can range from complex coding and counting of every 
sentence, graph, chart, table, etc. as the unit of analysis, to the use of quality 
indices as the basis for seeking the presence of an item (Hooks and Van Staden, 
2011).  
The disclosure index involves identifying certain information or items 
which should appear in a company report, in the form of a checklist and scoring 
the disclosure items based on a detailed measurement system (Fischer and 
Sawczyn, 2013; Khan et al., 2013; Hooks and Van Staden, 2011; Joseph and 
Taplin, 2011; Clarkson et al., 2008). This is why several authors (Haji, 2013; Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004) have named it the scoring method. The index is used to 
evaluate a narrative disclosure; it assesses, compares and explains differences 
in the quantity and quality of the information disclosed by a company (Hooks and 
Van Staden, 2011). Quantity disclosure in the disclosure index is associated 
disclosure occurrence (the presence or the absence of expected information) 
(Hooks and Van Staden, 2011; Joseph and Taplin, 2011; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004).  
To measure the quantity of a disclosure index, a binary coding system is 
used, an item scoring 1 if disclosed and 0 if not (Haji, 2013; Khan et al., 2013; 
Hooks and Van Staden, 2011; Joseph and Taplin, 2011; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). 
This type of disclosure index is also known as an unweighted disclosure index 
(Haji, 2013; Joseph and Taplin, 2011). Conversely, quality in the disclosure index 
reflects how information is stated, and is associated with the type of information, 
comprehensiveness of the information or degree of detail (Haji, 2013; Hooks and 
Van Staden, 2011; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). Moreover, how each disclosure item 
is stated will be rewarded or scored more than the others with a value which 
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reflects the quality of disclosure. For example: it may score 3 for quantitative 
disclosure, 2 for non-quantitative but specific disclosure, 1 for general qualitative 
disclosure and 0 for undisclosed information (Fauzi, 2008; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 
2004). It may score 3 if the company disclosed both qualitative and quantitative 
information, 2 if it disclosed information quantitatively, 1 if disclosed information 
qualitatively and 0 if the information was not undisclosed (Haji, 2013). This type 
of disclosure index is the weighted disclosure index (Hooks and Van Staden, 
2011; Joseph and Taplin, 2011; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004).  
After scoring the information, certain authors sum the score arithmetically 
to compile the index (Fischer and Sawczyn, 2013; Hooks and Van Staden, 2011; 
Joseph and Taplin, 2011; Clarkson et al., 2008); the minimum index score is 0 
and the maximum will be the same as the number of the item. Other authors sum 
the scores arithmetically and subsequently divide them by the maximum score for 
all items (Haji, 2013; Khan et al., 2013). This method will have 0 for a minimum 
score in the index and 1 for a maximum score. The higher score reflects the 
greater extent and quality of the disclosure, which indicates that the company has 
a higher CSP level.   
Moreover, content analysis requires a unit of analysis. According to 
Krippendorff (2013, p. 97) units are defined as ―wholes that analysts distinguish 
and treat as independent elements‖. He argues that three types of unit deserve 
distinction in content analysis: sampling, context and recording units. The 
sampling unit distinguishes selective inclusion in analysis (Krippendorff, 2013). In 
CSP disclosure, the sampling unit is the company‘s disclosure tool or vehicle 
used by the researcher. It can be a Corporate Annual Report (CAR), a 
standalone report or a corporate social report (e.g. a sustainability report or CSR 
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report, a company website, etc.). Certain researchers use a single sampling unit, 
including Haji (2013); Bouten et al. (2011); Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004). Khan et al. 
(2013) use the CAR, Clarkson et al. (2008) the sustainability report, and others, 
two or more sampling units (Fischer and Sawczyn, 2013; Hooks and Van Staden, 
2011).  
Context units are ―units of textual matter that set limits on the information 
to be considered in description of recording units‖, and ―recording or coding units 
are distinguished for separate description, transcription, recording or coding‖ 
(Krippendorff, 2013, p. 101 and 199). To differentiate these units clearly, 
Krippendorff argues that a sentence is a minimal context unit for words. In order 
to understand the meaning of a word, its role in a sentence, or even more, must 
be identified. In volumetric content analysis, the coding unit is more important 
than the context unit, because it is not counted, need not be independent of each 
other, can be overlapped and may be consulted in the description of several 
recording units (Krippendorff, 2013). The recording or coding unit for volumetric 
content analysis can be a word, line, sentence, paragraph or page (Joseph and 
Taplin, 2011). In contrast, according to Bouten et al. (2011); Hooks and Van 
Staden (2011); Joseph and Taplin (2011), in the disclosure index approach, 
previous researchers have paid more attention to the context, since the recording 
unit is the presence or absence of specific information (binary coding) or 
weighted coding based on the quality of specific information. 
Both content analysis approaches have shortcomings in measuring CSP 
disclosure. Disclosure abundance or volumetric analysis has disadvantages 
related to subjectivity in the counting of units: subjectivity in the conversion of 
disclosures in tables and figures into an equivalent number of sentences and 
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double counting of repetitive messages (Hooks and Van Staden, 2011; Joseph 
and Taplin, 2011). The disclosure index suffers from subjectivity in the allocation 
of similar disclosures as separate items, and cannot capture the full quantity of 
disclosure, because it only measures the first disclosure of any item (Joseph and 
Taplin, 2011).  
Accordingly, after statistical investigation to compare these measures, 
Joseph and Taplin (2011) established that the R-squared of regression analysis 
between some independent variables with sustainability disclosure for disclosure 
abundance/volumetric is lower than the disclosure occurrence (presence or not). 
This suggests that the number of disclosures in a specific unit analysis, in this 
case a sentence, is less accurate compared to the number of disclosed items. In 
terms of disclosure index measurement, the unweighted disclosure index only 
counts the extent of disclosure but ignores quality. Counting the number or 
volume of disclosure, including the extent of disclosure, could be misleading 
when the quality of disclosure is the more important aspect (Bouten et al., 2011; 
Toms, 2002). This weakness can be solved by the weighted disclosure index. In 
contrast, Hooks and Van Staden (2011) ascertained that unweighted and 
weighted disclosure indices are very highly correlated, which means that using 
every type of disclosure index in further analysis, would not result in any major 
difference. Moreover, because any item is equally relevant for all organisations 
and less subjective, most studies use the unweighted disclosure index (Joseph 
and Taplin, 2011).   
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3.4 Corporate Governance 
3.4.1 Definition of Corporate Governance 
According to the International Finance Corporation (2014); Claessens and 
Yurtoglu (2013), the definition of CG varies according to the institution, author, 
country or legal tradition. Several definitions in relation to CG are shown in Table 
3.10. 
Table 3.10  Definition of Corporate Governance 
year Author  Definition 
2014 International Finance 
Corporation (2014, p. 
30)   
Corporate governance is the structures and 
processes for the direction and control of 
companies. 
2013 Claessens and 
Yurtoglu (2013, p. 3)  
Corporate governance from the behavioural 
pattern perspective is the set of behaviours of a 
corporation in terms of such measures as 
performance, efficiency, growth, financial 
structure, and treatment of shareholders and 
other stakeholders. 
Corporate governance from the normative 
framework perspective is the rules under which 
firms are operating.  
2011 Hitt et al. (2011, p. 
286) 
Corporate governance is a set of mechanisms 
used to manage the relationship among 
stakeholders and to determine and control the 
strategic direction and performance of the 
organisation. 
2008 Jamali, Safieddine and 
Rabbath (2008, p. 44)  
Governance sets the tone for the organisation, 
defining how power is exerted and how 
decisions are reached. 
1999 The Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation 
and Development 
(OECD) 
The internal means by which corporations are 
operated and controlled […], which involves a 
set of relationships between a company‘s 
management, its board, its shareholders and 
other stakeholders. 
1997 Shleifer and Vinishny 
(1997, p. 737)  
Corporate governance deals with the ways in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their 
investment. 
Source: adapted from several studies 
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CG is a set of mechanisms or the way in which a company manages its 
stakeholders‘ relationship and how the company decides and controls its 
strategic direction and performance. In terms of the stakeholder relationship, CG 
manages the relationship between capital stakeholders, such as shareholder and 
creditor, management and other stakeholder(s), (e.g. employee, customer, 
supplier, etc.) to achieve a certain rate of return and profit on the shareholders‘ 
investment and other stakeholders‘ interests. The interests of stakeholders may 
differ and occasionally conflict. Separation of ownership and managerial control, 
or an agency relationship, are common in modern companies (Hitt et al., 2011); 
Jensen and Meckling (1976): the agency relationship can be problematic when 
there is a conflict of interest between shareholder and management, or agency 
conflict. Therefore, CG is required to maintain the relationship and ensure the 
company‘s direction and performance.     
3.4.2 Mechanism of Corporate Governance    
Hitt et al. (2011) classified governance mechanisms into internal and 
external. Internal mechanism concerns the concentration of ownership, the board 
of directors and executive compensation. External mechanism consists of a 
single factor; market control. Walls et al. (2012) identified CG dimensions, 
including ownership (institutional ownership, investment turnover, shareholder 
activism and shareholder concentration), board of directors (board independence, 
board size, and board diversity) and management (CEO compensation, CEO 
duality, CEO positions and managerial control). Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) 
emphasise that CG is demonstrated in two mechanisms, ownership (i.e. 
government, block or institutional ownership) and the board of directors (size, 
independence and diversity). Li, Lu, Mittoo and Zhang (2015) similarly classify 
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CG into two mechanisms, the board of directors (i.e., board independence) and 
ownership concentration (e.g. controlling shareholder).  
Khan et al. (2013) suggest a third mechanism pertaining to CG; in addition 
to ownership (e.g. managerial, public or foreign ownership) and board of directors 
(board independence), is management (e.g. role duality and audit committees). 
Jizi et al. (2014), board of directors (board independence and board size) and 
management (CEO duality), while Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015) consider 
only the board of directors (board independence) as the CG dimension in their 
study. Hafsi and Turgut (2013) use board of directors (board diversity) and Choi 
et al. (2013) ownership concentration as the CG dimension., Nguyen, Locke and 
Reddy (2015) consider the external (i.e. legal system, takeover market) and 
internal (e.g. ownership concentration) governance mechanisms. Neubaum and 
Zahra (2006) comment that most previous research has considered the volume 
or percentage of an institution‘s ownership, as a key indicator of its vigilance to 
monitor or influence executives‘ attention on CSP.  
The board of directors is an appointed or elected body or committee that 
has responsibility for overseeing the organisation‘s activities (Hill et al., 2015). Its 
functions include monitoring and provision of resources. There are two types of 
board director: the insider and the outsider. The former is a member of the board 
who works directly with members of management or as an executive of the 
company, as opposed to the outside director, who is a non-management or 
executive member of the board (Majocchi and Strange, 2012; Zhang, 2012; 
Wang and Dewhirst, 1992). The absence of direct ties with the company makes 
the outside director independent; thus, Majocchi and Strange (2012); Zhang 
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(2012) have used the proportion of outside directors as a proxy regarding board 
independence.  
3.5 Summary 
 
To sum up, this chapter has introduced several theories vis-à-vis corporate 
diversification (e.g. stakeholder theory, institutional theory and agency theory), 
company performance (e.g. financial performance, non-financial performance 
and a combination), CSP, and CG mechanisms, internal and external. 
Definitions, dimensions and measurements of these constructs have been 
discussed in detail. For example, corporate diversification can be divided into 
three constructs: related, unrelated and international diversification. The 
subsequent chapter explains the relationship between these three concepts. 
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CHAPTER 4 STUDIES ON CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE,CSP AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on corporate diversification, CG and 
CSP and describes hypothesis development based on previous studies. It first 
explains the contributions of previous studies, and subsequently discusses the 
key themes of previous studies to define academic gaps in previous research. 
This part is followed by an explanation of the relationship between corporate 
diversification, CG and CSP regarding hypothesis development.   
4.2 Corporate Diversification, Corporate Governance and CSP   
Corporate diversification is receiving increasing attention in current 
research (Gao and Chou, 2015; Hashai, 2015; Krapl, 2015; Oh et al., 2015; Su 
and Tsang, 2015), especially as it may have an impact on corporate performance 
(Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2015; Castañer and Kavadis, 2013; Kang, 2013; 
Markides and Williamson, 1996). Furthermore, some authors argue that CG also 
has a relationship with CSP (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Jizi et al., 2014). 
Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) investigate the relationship between good CG 
and stakeholders, while other authors have used several CG mechanisms as 
moderating variables regarding the relationship between CSP and managerial 
entrenchment, earnings management, family firms, etc. (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et 
al., 2015; Choi et al., 2013; McGuire et al., 2012; Surroca and Tribó, 2008). 
Accordingly, the researcher argues that corporate diversification and CG have an 
association with CSP. Furthermore, this study has discussed several previous 
studies on these topics (see Appendix 1 and 2 for more detail).  
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Attig et al. (2016) investigated the effect of internationalisation on CSR and 
examined the role of the institutional environment on the relationship between 
them. They argue that internationalisation drives businesses to respond to their 
stakeholders, including employees and the community. Therefore, they noted that 
internationalisation might be related to CSR. Their study was conducted on 3,040 
US companies and 16,606 firm-year observations over the period 1991-2010. 
The dependent variable in their research was CSR, using the MSCI ESG Stat 
database (KLD database) measurement. The independent variable 
internationalisation was measured by foreign sales to total sales and foreign 
sales to total assets. It was also measured by HI and entropy for firms with a 
geographic segment. Furthermore, their study also used control variables, such 
as firm size, firm age, profitability (ROA), leverage, intangible assets (market to 
book ratio) and long-term institutional ownership. All the financial data were 
collected from the Compustat database. A one-year lag regression model, both 
fixed effect and firm random models, were applied. The results reveal that 
internationalisation is positively related to CSR for each alternative measurement. 
Furthermore, strong institutional environments and strong legal and political 
institutions will strenghten the positive relationship between internationalisation 
and CSR. The limitations of their sudy are that CSR was measured by a binary 
rating of KLD indicators for corporate social activity and uni-dimensional 
measurements for internationationalisation, which may not be the ideal situation.    
Ma et al. (2016) explored the relationship between international 
diversification and CSR in China as an emerging economy. From the stakeholder 
and institutional perspective, they argue that the international diversification-CSR 
relationship in international contractors is positive. Furthermore, they assert that 
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the scope of international diversification, such as geographical and product 
diversification, also relates to CSR and might moderate the international 
diversification-CSR relationship. They employed 266 observations from 
contractor companies in China from 2010 to 2014. The dependent variable in this 
research was the CSR index, measured by way of disclosure analysis. 
Independent variables were the degree of international diversification (foreign 
revenue/total revenue), geographical diversification (inverse HI) and product 
diversification (inverse HI). Their study also used control variables, such as 
ownership (type of controlling shareholder), listed (binary), geographic dummy 
(eight categories of geographic area) and project dummy. Their results indicate 
that the degree of international diversification has a positive relationship with 
CSR and geographical diversification. Moreover, the positive relationship 
between international diversification-CSR is weakened by geographical 
diversification.  
Alternatively, product diversification has a positive impact on CSR, 
although it cannot moderate the international diversification-CSP relationship. 
Their study made several practical contributions, such as exploring how 
international diversification influences CSR, exploring how the scale and scope of 
international diversification could have different impacts on CSR, providing CSR 
measurements for companies that are not listed in the CSR rating database and 
expanding previous study results to emerging economies. Finally, their study has 
a few limitations that offer opportunities for future research, including developing 
the detail and comprehensive measure of the CSR disclosure, studying other 
emerging countries and comparing the results for developed and emerging 
economies.           
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Aguilera-Caracuel et al. (2015) conducted a study to analyse the effect of 
the international cultural diversification of a multinational enterprise (MNE) on 
CSP and to investigate the moderating effect of slack financial resources on this 
relationship. They employed stakeholder theory as their underlying theory to 
explain the relationship between international cultural diversification and CSP. 
They argue that MNEs that extend their activities to culturally distant countries 
have an opportunity to address the diverse CSR demands that may exist in the 
different markets in which they operate, thereby improving their level of social 
performance. They also analyse whether excess financial resources can be used 
to conduct advanced CSR activities, in order to improve companies‘ CSP levels.  
Aguilera-Caracuel et al. (2015) studied 113 MNEs and 672 observations 
over a six-year time period of analysis (2005–2010) in US companies from the 
chemical, energy and industrial machinery sectors. These industries are 
characterised by serious environmental and social impacts worldwide. Their 
study employed Standard and Poor‘s database (capital IQ) for financial 
information and the KLD database for CSR information. Internal cultural 
diversification was measured by the cultural entropy index (CEI) with five 
dimensions of culture: power/distance, individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity 
vs. femininity, uncertainty/avoidance index and long-term vs. short-term 
orientation. Their study was conducted in five different regions based on the 
degree of cultural similarity: North America (USA, Canada and Mexico), Latin 
America, Asia, Western Europe and Eastern Europe. Moreover, slack financial 
resource was measured by the current asset to current liabilities ratio. Social 
performance was measured by several indicators: relations with the local 
community, relations with women and disadvantaged groups, relations with 
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employees, environmental impact, and the socially responsible characteristics of 
the products offered by the organisations from the KLD database. Finally, their 
study used control variables, for instance type of industry and size.    
To test their argument Aguilera-Caracuel et al. (2015) used fixed-effect 
regression. Their results demonstrate a direct and significant relationship 
between international cultural diversification and the improved social performance 
of MNEs. Moreover, in the context of MNEs which operate in markets with a 
diverse cultural profile, they argue that the slack financial resources allow these 
companies to conduct advanced CSR practices which arguably will have a 
significant impact on their CSP. Hence, the presence of slack financial resources 
in these organisations encourages the existing relationship between international 
cultural diversification and CSP.  
Their research makes several contributions as follows. Firstly, their study 
reinforces stakeholder theory as applied to international companies and to the 
performance of these businesses in the social sphere. Secondly, it contributes to 
the literature regarding the history that focuses on the CSP-financial relationship 
via theoretical and empirical analyses of how CSP affects the international 
cultural diversification of MNEs. Thirdly, their study investigated the relationship 
between slack financial resources and the social performance of MNEs that 
operate in culturally distant markets. However, their research also has some 
limitations, such us only using US MNEs. Moreover, by using regional cultural 
profiles, their study might disregard the cultural reality of each country. Finally, 
their investigation ignores other institutional pressures that have pushed MNEs 
toward a higher level of CSR.  
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Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015) investigated the negative relationship 
between family businesses and CSR disclosure and the negative effect of family 
members on the positive relationship between independent directors and CSR 
disclosure. They also used stakeholder and agency theory in developing their 
hypotheses. They took as their sample 575 non-financial listed companies, with 
3,068 observations, from several countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK 
and the US, over the period 2003-2009. Secondary data was taken from 
published CSR reports which can be accessed on the companies‘ websites and 
the Thomson One Analytics database. They measured CSR disclosure by means 
of disclosure analysis. Family ownership was a dummy variable (e.g. value 1 if a 
member of the founding family had at least 10% of the ownership). Independent 
director was measured as the percentage of independent directors to total board 
members. They used some control variables that predict an effect on CSR 
disclosure (board size, percentage of women and foreign directors, activity of 
board, company size, annual ROA, country, industry and year). Finally, the 
generalised method of moment was used as the analysis tool. 
The results of the study conducted by Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015) 
confirm that independent directors improve the quality and quantity of published 
CSR information, as they are more sensitive to social demands. However, this 
positive relationship is weakened in family firms, as outside directors usually have 
close connections with family members, and might be more influenced by family 
interests than other stakeholders‘ interests. Family members will be less 
concerned with the CSR disclosures, as they have large investments in the 
company and will be more interested in profitability and financial issues than 
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social and environmental action. The contributions of their study include reliance 
on family firms, particularly in analysing their role in the independent directors-
CSR disclosure relationship. Limitations include the fact that their study sample 
was restricted to specific countries and years, it used only the limited information 
available from different databases, and it employed categorical measurement 
(dummy variable) to differentiate between family and non-family businesses. 
Finally, for future research, they suggest including other corporate characteristics 
(e.g. audit committees and CEO duality, country characteristics such as legal and 
institutional factors), addressing relevant shareholders for instance institutions, 
government and foreign investors as control variables, and considering the firm‘s 
reputation as a moderating factor in the independent director-CSR disclosure 
relationship of family firms.   
Jizi et al. (2014) investigated the impact of governance characteristics, 
especially in relation to the key features of the board of directors, on CSR 
disclosure. They used agency theory to explain the CG-CSR disclosure 
relationship. Their study sample was 98 US listed national commercial banks in 
the period 2009-2011, or 291 observations. CSR disclosure as the dependent 
variable was measured by conducting content analysis on annual reports. 
Indicators of CSR consisted of four categories: community involvement, 
environment, employees, and product and customer service quality. Independent 
variables were board of directors‘ characteristics, including board independence, 
board size and CEO duality. Additionally, data concerning board characteristics 
was collected from the bank‘s annual reports. The study used control variables, 
such as the number of audit committee and board meetings, profitability, 
leverage, firm size and firm risk. The authors employed Tobit regression as the 
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analysis tool. The results indicate that board independence and board size are 
positively related to CSR disclosure. Furthermore, CEO duality, which was 
expected to have a negative impact, surprisingly had a positive impact on CSR 
disclosure. Therefore, their study has contributed to explaining the effect of 
characteristics of the board of directors on CSR disclosure in the banking sector, 
which had been largely overlooked in previous studies. However, the results still 
need to be expanded to a wider range of industries and countries with different 
levels of public scrutiny, regulation and competitive pressure.  
Park, Chidlow and Choi (2014) examined how specific stakeholder groups 
influence MNEs‘ CSR practices in South Korea. Their results show that both 
primary stakeholders (e.g. consumers, internal managers and employees, and 
business collaborators) and secondary stakeholders (e.g. government, media, 
local community and NGOs) positively influence MNEs‘ CSR. Their study 
employs institutional theory, particularly organisational sociological neo-
institutionalism, and stakeholder theory. The sample for their study was 1,531 
MNE subsidiaries operating in South Korea, and their data collection technique 
was a postal survey to CEOs. From a total of 312 responses only 300 were 
useable. The dependent variable CSR was measured by 12 items. Independent 
variables were consumers (3 items), internal manager and employees (4 items), 
business collaboration (3 items), government (3 items), media (3 items), local 
community (3 items), and NGOs (3 items). All items, both dependent and 
independent variables, were measured by Likert-type responses on a 1-5 scale. 
Based on OLS regression analysis, Park et al. (2014) ascertained that 
both primary and secondary stakeholders positively influence MNEs‘ CSR, 
except for business collaborators. Their research offers a framework for MNEs in 
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considering stakeholders‘ impact on creating MNEs‘ CSR strategy. Their study 
also contributes to current knowledge in the CSR literature by proposing 
fulfilment of CSR practices and satisfaction of stakeholder demands. This finding 
may help MNEs in strengthening their subsidiaries within the MNE network, 
particularly in emerging economies. Their study has several limitations, including 
only focusing on a single country; they do not control the subsidiary size and type 
of consumer (consumer-related subsidiary vs. non-consumer oriented subsidiary) 
or industry; nor do they investigate the influence of stakeholders in each 
dimension of CSR. Nevertheless, although they identified a moderating effect of 
consumers on other stakeholders‘ relationships with CSP, further explanation is 
still required.      
 Similarly, Lien and Li (2013) investigated the effect of diversification on 
companies‘ value and the role of CG as a moderating variable in emerging 
economies, particularly in Taiwanese firms. CG is reflected by block ownership, 
family controlling ownership and bank ownership. They argue that controlling-
family ownership in emerging economies tends to promote the extent of 
corporate diversification; driven by the altruism motive in agency theory, these 
firms disregard optimal scale to pursue a wider range of diversification, even 
though this decision might destroy their firm‘s value. The authors therefore argue 
that controlling-family ownership in emerging economies negatively moderates 
the diversification-performance relationship. Bank ownership, however, appears 
to be active in CG, limiting the entrenchment of the controlling family on decisions 
which tend to preclude corporate diversification. However, the role of the bank as 
the structural link between the holders of surplus capital and those in need of 
financial resources, and the relationship between bank and government in 
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emerging economies, enable investor firms to find various opportunities by using 
a diversification strategy. Hence, the relationship between diversification and 
companies‘ performance can be moderated positively by bank ownership.   
In their study, Lien and Li (2013) sampled 205 companies listed on the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) from 1999 to 2003, excluding financial firms, 
classified into three industrial groups: consumer products (food, textiles, paper 
and general commodities), electronic products (electric equipment, cable lines 
and information technology) and other industries (cement, steel, chemicals, 
plastics and transportation). Tobin‘s Q (market price to book value) was applied 
to measure performance and the entropy index to measure diversification. 
Independent variables which were also moderating variables (e.g. controlling-
family ownership and bank ownership), were measured as the sum of the 
percentage of shares held by individual investors who have the same family 
name as the largest owner, and the percentage of shares held by domestic 
banks. The authors controlled the economic conditions by means of four annual 
dummies (2000-2003) and the industrial sector with two dummy variables 
(consumer and electronics). They also control firm-specific variables with issued 
capital (the sum of all long-term equity and debts that are issued by the firm in 
each year) and experience gained by means of the company‘s age.  
To test their argument, Lien and Li (2013) applied the Tobit model of panel 
data analysis (the effect of controlling-family ownership and bank ownership on 
diversification) and the random-effect model of panel data analysis (diversification 
performance and moderation of block shareholders; controlling-family ownership 
and bank ownership). All their hypotheses were supported. The results of the 
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Tobit model of panel data analysis showed that controlling-family owners tend to 
promote the extent of corporate diversification, but that bank ownership tends to 
limit corporate diversification. Moreover, the random effect model of panel data 
analysis implied that family-controlling shareholders have a negative moderating 
effect on the relationship between corporate diversification and performance. 
Conversely, bank ownership positively moderates the diversification-performance 
relationship.   
 Lien and Li (2013) offered three theoretical contributions. First, their 
research filled the gap in traditional diversification studies by connecting CG 
efficiency. Second, their research framework considered the issues of both 
diversification decisions and performance. Ultimately, their research used family 
control and bank ownership as variations regarding the ownership of the 
organisation. Their study was limited by only focusing on ownership structure in 
investigating the role of CG; thus, future research must investigate other parts of 
CG, such as board composition in diversification decisions and diversification 
performance. It should also consider the rapid transition of most emerging 
economies and how family owners deal with that.    
Kang (2013) conducted a study on the relationship between corporate 
diversification and CSP in large US companies from 1993 until 2006. Corporate 
diversification meant industry diversification (level of related and unrelated 
diversification) and global diversification (level of global diversification). He 
developed four hypotheses, three of them based on stakeholder theory and one 
on the short-term profit orientation of the diversified firm. Diversified companies 
are more likely to face pressure from stakeholders‘ demands and social issues 
than focused firms which only operate in one industry or country. Therefore, a 
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diversified company tends to respond better to stakeholders‘ demands and social 
issues than focused firms. Kang‘s hypotheses were based on stakeholder theory. 
For example, the level of diversification is positively associated with CSP; the 
level of unrelated diversification is more positively associated rather than the level 
of related diversification; and the level of international diversification is positively 
associated with CSP. From these three hypotheses, he argued that the level of 
diversification is positively associated with CSP, and the positive association is 
stronger for unrelated diversification than for related diversification. The last 
hypothesis is built on the time horizon of performance, where short-term 
performance will obstruct long-term performance; short-term profit is negatively 
moderated by the positive relationship between the level of diversification and 
CSP.  
The dependent variable in Kang‘s research, CSP, was measured by the 
sum of all strength items minus all concern items, obtained from the KLD social 
rating database. Explanatory variables were related, unrelated and international 
diversification, and concentrate on short-term profit. The entropy measure was 
applied in measuring the related and unrelated diversification, while the level of 
international diversification was measured by the sales ratio of foreign sales 
divided by total sales. Additionally, businesses‘ focus on short-term profit was 
measured by return on equity. Kang also used firm-specific characteristics: 
intangible assets (market to book ratio), company size (number of employees), 
firm profitability (ROE), financial leverage, free cash flow, CEO compensation, 
and both bonus-based (percentage of earning-based compensation) and stock-
based compensation (percentage of stock-based compensation). Financial data 
in measuring diversification and other variables were collected from Compustat‘s 
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North America database and Executive Compensation (Execucomp) databases. 
Based on the availability and suitability of three sources of data, the final sample 
comprised 511 large businesses in terms of market capitalisation, with 3,044 
observations over the period 1993 to 2006. All of Kang‘s hypotheses were tested 
by nine models of multiple regression with contemporaneous lag structure for 
one-year lag. All hypotheses were supported. However, the moderating effect of 
short-term profit was not fully supported, except in unrelated diversification. Kang 
concluded that the level of diversification was positively associated with CSP, and 
stronger for the level of unrelated diversification than related diversification. He 
also argued that short-term profit orientation could reduce the positive association 
between the level of diversification and CSP. 
Limitations to Kang‘s study include not capturing the relatedness activity 
among firms‘ segments and geographical diversification. He made several 
suggestions for further research: to investigate the possibility of a relationship 
between stakeholders‘ demands and the diversification discount; to investigate 
the effectiveness of CSP, as a predictor of long-term performance and viability; to 
define and evaluate social welfare resulting from corporate action, in measurable 
monetary value or non-measurable qualitative aspects; and to investigate the 
possibility of a relationship between the level of related or unrelated 
diversification and corporate crime. 
Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) investigated the relationship between CG 
and CSR and the role of CG as a moderating effect on CSR and corporate 
financial performance. They argued that high-quality CG is positively associated 
with the extent of CSR practice and may positively moderate the CSR-CSP 
relationship based on neo-institutional theory. Therefore, they proposed seven 
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hypotheses to investigate the CG–CSR relationship, six CG mechanisms 
individually and one in total. Furthermore, they proposed one hypothesis for 
moderating the effect of CG on the CSR-CFP relationship. CSR practice in their 
study covers six broad areas. They are specific to the South African context: 
HIV/Aids, general conventions, environment, ethics, health and safety, and social 
conditions, measured by disclosure analysis and a word count index. Their study 
used the mechanisms of ownership, such as government or institutional 
ownership; board of directors (board size, independent director and board 
diversity); and CG overall mechanism measured by the CGC index. They 
employed Tobin‘s and further measurements: total share return and ROA. It also 
employed control variables, for instance audit firm size, capital expenditure, cross 
listing, the presence of a CG and CSR committee, leverage, company size, risk, 
sales growth, industry dummies and year dummies.   
Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) used 75 large non-financial listed 
corporations over 2002 to 2009 in South Africa, with a total of 600 observations, 
as the sample. Financial/utility organisations are subject to different regulatory 
oversight and capital structure restrictions that can impact differently on CG, CFP 
and CSR, and were therefore excluded from the sample. Based on the result of 
multivariate regression analysis, they established that on average better 
governance practice in a business increases CSR practice, and CG positively 
moderates the CSR-financial performance relationship. They performed 
additional analysis to ascertain the robustness of their findings. Their study offers 
theoretical and academic contributions to explain why and how better-governed 
corporations are more likely to pursue a more socially responsible agenda, and 
providing evidence of why and how CG might strengthen the link between CSR 
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and CFP. Their study also encourages corporate regulators and policy makers to 
develop a more explicit agenda of jointly pursuing CG and CSR reforms, instead 
of solely attracting CSR as a minor component of CG or as an independent 
corporate activity.   
   Chen and Yu (2012) investigated the diversification-performance 
relationship in an emerging market, Taiwan, examining the inter-relationship 
between managerial ownership, corporate diversification and firms‘ performance. 
They proposed two principal hypotheses and three subsidiary hypotheses. The 
first was that the non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and the 
level of diversification has a negative slope in lower managerial ownership and a 
positive slope in higher managerial ownership. The level of relationship between 
unrelated diversification and performance is higher than the relationship between 
related diversification and performance. This hypothesis was developed from the 
self-interest perspective of the owner-manager agency theory. The second 
hypothesis was the positive relationship between diversification and performance. 
The positive relationship and diminishing return associated with performance are 
higher with unrelated diversification than related diversification. This hypothesis 
was developed from strategic theory, specifically the reason for diversification 
and the condition of the emerging market. Their study sample consisted of 98 
companies from 1996 to 2001, with the following criteria: listed on TSE; financial 
institutions, real estate companies and insurance companies were excluded; and 
experience in increased or decreased diversification. Corporate diversification 
was measured by entropy measure; firms‘ performance was by ROE (earnings 
before interest and after taxes, to total assets); and managerial ownership by 
using the percentage of officers and directors. They employed multiple regression 
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analysis to test the hypotheses, and verified the findings by means of the 
simultaneous equation model (SEM).  
Each of Chen and Yu‘s hypotheses were supported by statistical analysis. 
There was a U-shaped nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and 
diversification. Lower levels of managerial ownership, below the critical level of 
control, reflect the interest alignment of owner-managers with minority 
shareholders; therefore, the slope of this relationship is negative. Higher 
managerial ownership, exceeding the critical level of control, reflects greater 
agency problems and agency costs; hence, the slope of the relationship is 
positive. Moreover, the U-shaped non-linear relationship is stronger for unrelated 
diversification, showing that diversification is a better strategy to increase 
performance over a short time, especially unrelated diversification, when it 
escapes the low profitability of the company‘s current industry. The finding also 
shows that the performance of diversified firms diminishes over time. However, 
their research has a few limitations. First, it only used data from Taiwan, which 
may not reflect all emerging markets. The second is the lack of data to estimate 
the level of corporate diversification properly, needing consolidated financial 
statements. Finally, their research does not consider the preference behaviours 
of decision makers. 
Walls et al. (2012) investigated the association between corporate 
governance and environmental performance (EP), as part of CSR. Specifically, 
they highlighted the relationship between ownership and EP, the effect of the 
board of directors on EP, the effect of management aspects on EP and the 
interaction of ownership, the role of the board of directors and managerial 
aspects in achieving EP. The dependent variable is EP, given the difficulty of 
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measuring and drawing insightful conclusions about associative patterns of CSR. 
EP was measured by using the KLD database separately. Independent variables 
are ownership (institutional ownership, investment turnover, shareholder activism 
and shareholder concentration), board of directors (board independence, 
environmental committee, board diversity and board size) and management 
aspects (CEO duality, managerial control, CEO salary and bonus as short-term 
pay incentives, and CEO stock options as long-term pay incentives). The control 
variable is companies‘ performance. 
Institutional ownership was measured by the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors, using data from Thompson/Reuters. Investment; turnover, 
as the inverse of the investment horizon, was measured by the annual portfolio 
turnover of each investment institution, weighted by institutional shares in a firm. 
Shareholder activism was measured using the number of shareholder proxies 
filed related to environmental issues. Shareholder concentration was measured 
by the percentage of shares held by a firm‘s top five institutional investors. Board 
independence was measured by the number of outside directors to total 
directors. Environmental committee was a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if 
the company had an environmental committee and 0 otherwise. Board diversity 
was measured as a percentage of women on the board of directors, and board 
size as the total number of board directors. All data about board directors‘ 
variables was gathered from the Risk Metrics database. CEO duality was a 
dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the CEO was also the chair-person of the 
board. Managerial control was measured as a percentage of shares held by 
inside directors. CEO salary, CEO bonus, and CEO stock option were measured 
as the percentages of each item to total CEO compensation. All data about 
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management was obtained from the ExecuComp database. Control variables 
were performance indicators, such as ROA, firm size (log of total assets), sales 
growth (change in sales over the previous year), leverage (total debt to total 
assets), capital intensity (capital expenditure to sales), R&D intensity (research 
and development expenditure to sales), advertising intensity (advertising 
expenditure to sales), year dummy and industry dummy.  
Walls et al. (2012) employed 2,002 observations, with the number of 
companies ranging from 119 in 1997 to 298 in 2003. They ran five main effects 
model regressions for environmental strengths and concern. For environmental 
strengths, only shareholder activism (-), shareholder concentration (-), and 
environmental committee (+) were associated with EP. In contrast, for 
environmental concern, shareholder activism (+), independence (+), 
environmental committee (+), diversity (-), board size (+) and CEO salary (+) 
were significantly related to EP. The authors concluded that many CG variables 
are associated with EP, although many directions had not been predicted in past 
research. They also ran 112 different models to test interaction effects between 
the three groups of CG variables, environmental strength and concern, and 
established that interaction across CG variables played a significant role in EP, 
which had not been captured in previous studies. They concluded that ownership 
aspects are essential for EP strength, while board aspects are more relevant for 
environmental concern. Ownership-board interactions are critical for EP concern, 
whereas interactions between ownership-management and board–management 
are pertinent to environmental strength.   
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Limitations of the research were, first, since their dependent variable was 
EP, the findings could not be used to generalise the relationship between CG and 
CSR. Second, their sample was limited to large organisations and primary and 
manufacturing industries, and moreover, the results could be different in small 
and medium-sized firms, in the service industry, or under different governance 
and environmental regimes. Third, their study relied heavily on secondary data to 
measure the variables; primary sociological and behavioural data obtained via 
survey or case study investigation will be necessary. Finally, their research 
cannot depict the temporal order of the variables; they did not use lag regression 
analysis because some governance aspects were only relevant to the current 
year; hence, future research might test the temporal order.  
 Jo and Harjoto (2011) investigated the effect of internal and external CG 
mechanisms, including board characteristics (e.g. independent outside board 
proportion), board ownership and board leadership on CSR engagement and the 
value of the company engaging in CSR activities. They argued that CG and 
monitoring have a positive association with CSR engagement based on the 
conflict-resolution hypothesis. Alternatively, association will be negative in the 
over-investment hypothesis. They also argued that CSR engagement has a 
positive association with firms‘ value and a negative association in the over-
investment hypothesis. CSR activities were measured by the KLD indicators and 
database. Internal corporate mechanism was measured by independent outside 
board proportion, board ownership and board leadership. External CG 
mechanism was measured by using institutional ownership and the number of 
security analysts. Firms‘ value was measured by industry-adjusted Tobin‘s Q. 
Their study consists of 1,175-1,777 businesses and 5,639-7,750 observations 
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from several countries based on a combination of all the databases (KLD, 
Compustat, risk metric database and Centre for Research Security Prices data). 
Jo and Harjoto (2011) employed Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as the 
data analysis. Their study determined that CSR choice has a positive association 
with the internal and external CG and monitoring mechanisms (i.e. board 
leadership, board independence, institutional ownership, analyst following, and 
anti-takeover provisions), after controlling for various company characteristics. 
Their study also reveals that CSR engagement is positively related to the 
company value. The strength of their study is that it relies on the use of a full 
spectrum of CG measurements and the use of security analyst monitoring to 
determine CSR engagement. However, future studies need to address the 
weaknesses of the KLD database, such as subject to binary response, selection 
sample bias and the qualitative nature. Large-scale survey data from various 
stakeholders should be considered in future research. 
Kang, Lee and Yang (2011) investigated the impact of the degree of 
product diversification on financial market and accounting-based performance, 
and complementarities between products, arguing that the impact of is U-shaped, 
based on the benefit and cost of the diversification strategy. Product 
diversification complementary to the casino industry, such as gaming and hotels, 
gaming and Foods and Beverages (F&B) or hotels and F&B, may contribute to 
performance. In their research, company performance was measured by Tobin‘s 
Q and ROA, and product diversification by modified HI. To test their hypotheses, 
they used multiple regression analysis. Their study strengthens the diversification 
literature by using substantial variations in the level of product diversification 
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among casino firms; however, the results cannot be generalised therefore, they 
suggested conducting future research in several countries.         
Bobillo et al. (2010) examined the relationship between the institutional 
framework and a firm‘s competitive advantage, and the role of competitive 
advantage in the relationship between international diversification and 
performance. Institutional framework focused on the financial system, specifically 
financial market development, measured by annual increment securities to 
increase net fixed assets. Competitive advantage was explained by capital 
intensity and labour intensity and international diversification was measured by 
foreign sales to total sales. Their study also used control variables including 
company size and ownership structure. All data was collected from the 
Worldscope and BACH databases.   
The sample for the study of Bobillo et al. (2010) was more than 1,500 
manufacturing firms in five EU countries: Germany, Denmark, Spain, France and 
the UK, from 1991-2001, with a total of 16,588 observations. Their study 
employed two analysis tools: canonical correlation analysis; and multiple 
regression analysis, quadratic and cubic model regression. The results show that 
national institutional factors have an impact on internal and external competitive 
advantage. Moreover, the relationship between international diversification and 
performance is S-shaped in relation to the competitive advantage of different 
types of firms. Although this research gives an obvious result of the effect of 
institutional factors and competitive advantage, and the role of competitive 
advantage on the international diversification-firm performance relationship, it still 
has limitations. The study is limited to developed countries, so future research 
needs to explore emerging and less-developed countries. Additionally, analysis 
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at firm level would also be interesting. Future research should also consider 
interviews as a source of primary data, combined with the secondary data from 
databases. 
Qian, Qian, Khoury and Peng (2010) analysed how the level of intra- and 
inter-regional diversification affected firms‘ performance, compared to the impact 
of the total level of geographic diversification on performance. They argued that 
intra-regional diversification has a positive impact on MNEs‘ performance, but 
that the relationship between interregional diversification and performance and 
total geographical diversification and performance are inverted U-shapes. 
Hypotheses were developed based on the cost and benefit of diversification in 
general and on different types of diversification. Their sample consisted of 861 
observations of 123 Fortune-500 global US manufacturing MNEs from 1999 to 
2005. The data was collected from several sources, including the firms‘ 10-K 
filling, Moody‘s Industrial Manuals, Mergent Online and the World Bank‘s annual 
world development reports. The independent variable was performance 
measured by ROA, and the dependent variables geographical diversification in 
total, and intra- and inter-geographical diversification. They employed an entropy 
index based on sales and subsidiaries as the geographical diversification‘s 
measurement. Intra-diversification captures geographical diversification across 
countries within regions (Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe and America), and inter-
diversification captures diversification across different regions. Their study also 
applied several control variables, such as company size, research and 
development intensity, advertising intensity, firms‘ leverage, product 
scope/product diversification, regional macro-economic indicators and industry.  
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The results of (OLS) regression analysis demonstrated that all 
hypotheses were supported. Intra-geographical diversification has a positive 
impact on performance; while inter- and total geographical diversification have an 
inverted-U relationship with performance. Additionally, a study by Qian et al. 
(2010) has contributed to frameworks on geographic diversification, by clarifying 
how intra- and inter-geographical diversification strategies face unique 
performance limits. Four limitations can be used as suggestions for future 
research. First, the study failed to test the stability of the relationship between 
geographic diversification and performance by way of time-series analysis. 
Secondly, it only focused on four regional areas to capture intra- and inter-
geographic diversification, so a future study might use different regional 
definitions in terms of geographical, cultural and institutional distance. Third the 
generalisability of the findings was unacceptable, as only a single country‘s 
MNEs were studied. Finally, the study cannot differentiate the type of MNEs‘ 
investments that could have a different impact on performance. Furthermore, 
future research also needs to investigate the effect of national versus regional 
versus global strategy in geographical diversification.  
Gaur and Kumar (2009) examined the impact of business group affiliation 
on the relationship between international diversification and performance in 
Indian companies. They argued that the relationship between international 
diversification and performance is U-shaped in emerging economies. This is 
based on the benefit and cost of diversification at every stage of 
internationalisation (early, growth and mature). They also predict that the U-
shaped relationship would be negatively moderated by group affiliation. To test 
their argument, they investigated 240 Indian manufacturing and service firms, 
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1997-2001. Performance, the dependent variable, was measured by ROS and 
ROA. International diversification and group affiliation, as explanatory variables, 
were measured by foreign sales to total sales and dummy group affiliation. 
Control variables included size, age of the company and type of industry. All data 
was taken from the ISI Emerging Market database. By using a general linear 
square random-effect model, the results revealed that international diversification 
has a positive relationship with performance, although group affiliation negatively 
moderated this relationship. Despite robust results for the international 
diversification-performance relationship in an emerging country context, future 
studies will need to consider several factors, such as other emerging countries for 
the generalisability issue, additional market-based performance measurements, 
other context-specific factors on this relationship, and the use of specific 
industries.        
Chiao, Yu, Li and Chen (2008) conducted a study to explore 
diversification strategy, both international and product diversification, in 
Taiwanese subsidiaries in China. They argued that internationalisation has a 
positive relationship with the performance of subsidiaries. In terms of type of 
product diversification, a subsidiary is more engaged in related diversification 
than in unrelated diversification. Their arguments are based on the resource-
based view (RBV). Performance as a dependent variable measured three 
categories: incurred losses, break-even and earned profit. Diversification as the 
independent variable was divided into internationalisation and product 
diversification. The former comprised the outward (exporter activities) and inward 
(importers activities) internationalisation of subsidiary firms. Product 
diversification was divided into related and unrelated diversification. Control 
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variables included industry and parental ownership. The data collection technique 
was a survey by mailed questionnaire, telephone interview, or both, with a total 
sample of 920 Taiwanese subsidiary businesses in China. Using path analysis, 
they ascertained that subsidiaries with a higher level of outward 
internationalisation demonstrate better performance than their less-
internationalised peers. However, the relationship between inward 
internationalisation and performance was insignificant. Firms with unrelated 
diversification performed better than those with related diversification.  
A study conducted by Chiao et al. (2008) extended RBV to the level of 
subsidiaries and the results suggest to the host country how to increase 
performance through the diversification strategy of their subsidiary. The 
limitations of the study are: difficulty in measuring subsidiary size from their 
source of data; lack of generalisation of findings because only Taiwanese 
subsidiaries in China were investigated; no control over other institutional 
variables, for instance competitive pressure and autonomy changes; and the use 
of only cross-sectional data. Future research might consider these limitations for 
better results. 
Jamali et al. (2008) investigated the interrelationship between CG and 
CSR in a developing country, Lebanon. They used a qualitative interpretive 
research methodology, collecting data from in-depth interviews with the senior 
management of eight corporations in Lebanon. Their study aimed to explore the 
link between CG and CSR. Interview guidelines comprised three sections: CG 
(ownership structure, composition of board of directors, board committees, codes 
of conduct for governance, executive compensation schemes, required 
disclosure and motives for good CG practice); CSR (conception of CSR, formality 
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of CSR programme, CSR value, principles motivating CSR, anticipated benefits 
of CSR, most important stakeholders and measurement of CSR); and the 
interrelationship of CG and CSR (CG as a pillar of CSR, CSR dimensions of CG, 
and the corporate-CSR relationship as a continuum).  
The results showed that most managers conceived CG as a necessary 
pillar of sustainable CSR. This finding is significant and interesting, implying that 
recent preoccupation with CG in developing countries is starting to be 
counterbalanced by attention to CSR. Moreover, CG is more broadly recognised, 
and the need to move beyond CG conformance toward voluntary CSR 
performance has also increased. The study makes the case for considering them 
jointly and systematically. Hence, it contributes to the salient two-way relationship 
and increasing overlap between CG and CSR. It also outlines a number of 
theoretical propositions that can serve as inputs for future study on CG and CSR, 
particularly in developing countries. The study‘s limitations are also suggestions 
for future research. The first limitation is that the findings stem from a single-
country investigation. Secondly, the sample is small, suggesting a lack of 
generalisation, although the findings are likely to have wider relevance and 
applicability, particularly in developing countries. Third, the study was from self-
reported data, raising the possibility of response bias.  
Surroca and Tribó (2008) investigate the relationship between managerial 
entrenchment practices and financial performance, and the moderating role of 
CG on this relationship. CSP was measured by SiRi PRO‘s ratings and financial 
performance by ROA, Tobin‘s Q and abnormal return. Then, managerial 
entrenchment was measured by five indicators: internal CG mechanism 
(specifically audit committee, nomination audit committee, remuneration 
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committee, non-dual CEO), board independence, performance evaluation, state 
ownership and ownership concentration. Their study also used control variables 
such as financial structure (gearing ratio), dividends (pay-out ratio), size (value of 
fixed assets), firm‘s age, performance (ROA), investment (fixed asset to total 
asset), growth opportunity (dummy increasing sales), intangibility (intangible 
asset to fixed asset), industry, country and year. Financial data were extracted 
from the OSIRIS database and Bloomberg on the MSCI word index. The final 
sample was 358 industrial companies and 448 observations from 22 different 
countries, all included at least once during 2002-2005.  
Using the panel data technique, Surroca and Tribó (2008) determined that 
the relationship between managerial entrenchment and CSP was positive and 
significant, especially in those firms with an efficient internal CG mechanism. This 
result was more pronounced in countries with less efficient financial markets (civil 
law countries) and more developed internal corporate control. They also found 
that the employee is a powerful stakeholder, and entrenched managers should 
pay particular attention to employees‘ interest. Even though their study has 
contributed to connecting the CG literature and stakeholder theory, future 
research is needed to investigate the different effects of the relationship over time 
and to consider differentiation of the institutional contexts that may influence top 
management‘s orientation across countries.  
Chakrabarti et al. (2007) analysed the impact of diversification strategy on 
the performance of the organisations operating in different institutional 
environments both during a relatively stable period and during a major economy-
wide shock. They conducted their study in six East Asian countries: Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand. They argued that the 
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less institutionally developed the economy, the greater the benefit of 
diversification for a company‘s performance. However, diversified businesses 
suffered from a greater decline in performance during economy-wide shock, 
particularly in less developed environments. Their argument was developed from 
the internal market hypothesis. Diversification was measured using entropy and 
HI, and performance by ROA. The institutional environment was measured by the 
EIU indicator, Euromoney, country‘s creditworthiness, composite ICRG risk 
rating, and GNI per capita. Economy-wide shock was measured by industry 
average market capitalisation, ROA and per capita GNI per industry in each 
country. Control variables included company size, current ratio, debt ratio and 
age. Data for all variables was collected from the Osiris database. Their sample 
consisted of 3,117 firms and 49,033 observations from 1998-2003. To test the 
hypothesis, the study applied OLS with a fixed-effect model. Diversification was 
found to increase performance in less developed institutional environments but to 
decrease it in more developed environments. Moreover, diversification did not 
alleviate the impact of economy-wide shock on performance. Furthermore, 
variation between business group affiliations affected the outcomes of 
diversification. The study was limited by the absence of an empirically validated 
measure of institutional environment.  
Chang and Wang (2007) investigated the effect of product and 
international diversification on performance in US firms, extending previous work 
by investigating the differential impact of product diversification strategies on the 
link between international diversification and performance. They argued that 
interaction between product and international diversification is stronger than with 
unrelated diversification. Their arguments were developed from the benefit and 
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cost of each type of diversification; the industrial organisation view, RBV and the 
role of finance were used to explain benefit and cost. Their sample consisted of 
936 firms in the service sector and 1,380 manufacturing firms in the period 1996-
2002, a total of 2,402 firms and 8,047 observations. The dependent variable was 
corporate performance measured by Tobin‘s Q, and independent variables were 
product diversification and international diversification. Product diversification 
consists of three variables: total, related diversification and unrelated 
diversification, all measured by the entropy index. International diversification was 
measured by the entropy index based on regional markets, due to the 
unavailability of data on the level of countries in HI. Control variables included 
company size, leverage, research and development intensity, number of foreign 
countries in which a firm has an operating subsidiary, and type of industry.  
The results of regression analysis indicated that international 
diversification has a positive relationship with performance, in a linear shape, 
although it also supports inverted-U and horizontal-S shapes. Product 
diversification in total and unrelated diversification had a negative effect on 
performance, while unrelated diversification had a negative not significant effect. 
The interaction effect of product diversification and international diversification 
was more favourable under related diversification than unrelated diversification. 
Hence, the empirical results not only provide valuable support for the hypothesis, 
but also suggest positive interaction between related product diversification and 
performance, and negative interaction between unrelated product diversification 
and performance. 
The study has several limitations. First, it assumed that every type of 
diversification effect occurs independently and contributes equally to 
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performance. Future research could investigate the magnitude of these factors 
and their interactions. Second, even though the SIC code had been extensively 
used in prior studies, it may not have fully captured the fundamental differences 
in product diversification strategies. Future research could examine the validity of 
the findings using the resource-based approach to measure relatedness. Third, 
the empirical approach did not allow for possible changes in the relationships 
across time. Fourth, their sample was limited to publicly listed firms in the US; it 
would be interesting to examine these phenomena in other economies or small-
to-medium sized businesses. Finally, given the availability of the data, they 
measured the degree of international diversification by grouping countries into 
four global regions. This approach, however, may not be satisfactory, and future 
researchers should be encouraged to investigate detailed country-specific data. 
Brammer et al. (2006) conducted research into the relationship between 
CSP and geographical diversification in large businesses in the UK. Their data, 
from 2002, was acquired from EIRIS and annual reports. Initial samples were 
derived from the FTSE All-Share Index, market-capitalisation weighted index of 
the largest companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The final 
sample consisted of 420 companies from various sectors. CSP was measured 
from scores related to community performance, employee performance and 
environmental performance dimensions from EIRIS. Geographical diversification 
was calculated from the total number of countries listed in the annual report of the 
company‘s operations, with a binary variable for each operation across the 
regions of the world: Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North America, Central 
and South America, Africa, Middle East, Central Asia, East Asia and Australia. 
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Brammer et al. (2006) proposed four hypotheses to describe the CSP-
geographical diversification relationship. First, CSP and geographical 
diversification have a positive relationship, because multinational firms are 
becoming the subject of various stakeholder pressures to achieve social 
performance. Second, this positive relationship will be stronger for community 
and environmental performance than for employee performance, because the 
former is better regulated rather than the latter, which tends to be determined by 
the degree of compliance. The remaining two hypotheses were developed to test 
the variability of CSP based on the pressure of stakeholders‘ demands, and on 
strongly focused social issues in each region. All hypotheses were tested using 
eight models of OLS regression. The result of their research supports the first 
hypothesis, except for the employee performance dimension, which automatically 
provides support for the second hypothesis. The third hypothesis was supported 
for Western Europe, but the last hypothesis was rejected.  
These authors recognised that their research had several limitations. For 
example, it is cross-sectional analysis, social performance measurement is only 
at the company level and cannot describe any variation between countries or 
regions, and geographical diversification cannot describe the type of business 
activity. Suggested future study includes longitudinal analysis to gain a sharper 
insight, aggregating data concerning CSP, global distribution of firms‘ activities, 
extending companies‘ responses to local stakeholders‘ and institutional pressure, 
and using similar analysis in various countries. 
Strike et al. (2006) investigated the effect of international diversification on 
CSR. They argued that international diversified firms might create value by acting 
responsibly or destroying it by acting irresponsibly, based on RBV. The study 
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sample was 222 US companies, 1993-2003, with 2,442 observations. Dependent 
variables were CSR and Corporate Social irresponsibility (CSiR). CSR was 
measured by seven qualitative KLD categories, for both CSR strength and 
concern; the seven categories became the central core of social issues and were 
relatively free from industrial bias. Additionally, CSiR was measured by seven 
categories related to CSR concerns. The independent variable was international 
diversification measured by using international depth and international breadth 
components. The international depth component was measured by means of two 
aspects, foreign market penetration (foreign sales/total sales) and foreign market 
presence (number of foreign subsidiaries held by a firm). International breadth 
was defined as the dispersion of a firm‘s international activities across multiple 
markets (total number of foreign countries in which the company had a 
subsidiary). Finally, their study employed control variables, including research 
and development intensity and advertising intensity, firm risk, firm size, previous 
financial performance, slack resources, and type of industry.  
They used generalised least squares (GLS) on panel data analysis. The 
result reveals that international diversified firms can be simultaneously socially 
responsible and socially irresponsible. The authors concluded that CSR and 
CSiR need to be considered separately in the international diversification context. 
Limitations include the exclusion of global and multi-domestic strategies, due to 
the paucity of archival data; failure to explore the possibility of interaction 
between CSR and CSiR; and using only American companies as a sample. In 
addressing these issues, future research needs to consider the limitations of the 
KLD database. 
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Tongli, Ping and Chiu (2005) examined the impact of product 
diversification and international diversification on performance. They argued that 
unrelated diversified firms performed less well than undiversified firms, and that 
international market diversified companies performed better than undiversified 
ones, based on the benefit and cost of diversification. Both diversification 
strategies, product and international, were measured using an entropy measure 
based on the proportion of developed market revenue to emerging market 
revenue. Firms‘ performance was measured by ROA, share price and Tobin‘s Q. 
Control variables included firm size, age, leverage, risk, industry, and GNP. The 
source of data was Worldscope, Datastream, company handbooks, business 
times-firm classification and the statistical yearbook of Singapore. 
Tongli et al. (2005) made 626 observations in the period 1995-1999. GLS 
multiple regression and MANOVA were applied to prove their arguments, that 
product diversification strategy, particularly unrelated diversification, negatively 
affects performance; and that international diversification has a positive impact on 
performance. Their research was a pioneer in international diversification studies 
in Singapore. However, they failed to investigate the joint effect of diversification 
strategy on performance, the study was only conducted in Singapore, and it was 
only undertaken over a short time period.  
Christmann (2004) analysed the determinants of global standardisation of 
environmental policies in multinational companies (MNCs). Based on stakeholder 
theory, environmental policies are part of CSR and relate to CSP. He argued that 
external stakeholders, such as government, industry and customer pressure, 
have a positive impact on global standardisation of environmental policies in 
MNCs. He also asserted that MNC‘s characteristics affect environmental policy 
137 
 
standardisation, and to test this argument he collected primary data through a 
mail questionnaire from MNCs in the US chemical industry. The respondents 
were the head of business units of MNCs and the CEOs of single divisions. The 
first sample consisted of 512 business units or headquarters, whereas the final 
sample comprised 87 respondents from 72 different companies. 
To test his hypothesis, Christmann (2004) applied OLS regression. The 
results showed that the pressure from different external stakeholders contributed 
to the global standardisation of different dimensions of MNCs‘ environmental 
policies. Internal company characteristics were also important determinants of 
MNCs‘ global environmental policy standardisation. However, his study used only 
the chemical industry in the US, and ignored reverse causality between 
stakeholder pressure and policy.  
Capar and Kotabe (2003) highlighted the relationship between 
international diversification and performance in service industries in Germany. 
They proposed a hypothesis that the relationship between international 
diversification and performance would be a curvilinear U-shape, due to the 
combination of the benefit and cost of diversification and the unique 
characteristics of service firms. Their study employed ROS and ROA as the 
performance measurement. International diversification as the independent 
variable was measured by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales, and control 
variables included firm size and type of industry. Their data sources for all 
variables were collected from Die Welt‘s annual survey, directories and annual 
reports. 
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To test their hypothesis, Capar and Kotabe (2003) used regression 
analysis with linear and curvilinear models. The result supported the hypothesis. 
For example, internal diversification will reduce performance up to a certain point, 
then the higher level of diversification will increase it. Their study provided 
evidence that the relationship between international diversification and 
performance is a curvilinear U-shape. Limitations included measuring 
international diversification only by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales, which 
cannot capture the international activities of firms comprehensively; given that 
they studied only the service industry in Germany, the results are not widely 
generalisable.  
Wan and Hoskisson (2003) investigated the relationship between 
corporate diversification strategy and performance based on the home country‘s 
environment. They argued that the relationship between product diversification 
and inbound international diversification and performance would be negative in a 
more generous environment, the direction of this relationship being positive in a 
less charitable domestic environment. Conversely, the relationship between 
outbound international diversification and performance would be positive in more 
magnanimous domestic environments, and negative in less generous ones. They 
further argued that interaction between product diversification and outbound 
international diversification was negatively related to performance, while 
interaction between product diversification and inbound international 
diversification would be positively related to performance. The country 
environmental variable was measured by means of six indicators: endowed, 
advanced, human, political institutions, legal and societal, with data collected 
from the World Competitive Report. Performance was measured by ROA and 
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Earnings before interest and tax divided by asset (EBITOA). Product 
diversification was measured by a weighted measure. Outbound diversification 
was measured by the number of foreign countries in which the company had 
subsidiary or cooperative ventures. Inbound diversification was measured by the 
number of the domestic company‘s foreign partners in cooperative ventures with 
the local business. Control variables included firm size, leverage, sales growth 
and block holders. Financial information was collected from the Worldscope 
database.  
 In this case, 722 companies from 16 Western European countries were 
the sample. The results of OLS analysis demonstrated that relationship between 
product diversification and performance was negative in more liberal home 
country environments, and positive in less generous societies. The relationship 
between outbound international diversification and performance was positive in 
more magnanimous home country environments. For future research, they 
suggested using additional classification of countries‘ environment and 
investigating the possibility of the CG structure affecting the relationship.     
Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) highlighted the relationship between global 
and industrial diversification and the relationship between diversification and 
firms‘ value. The latter was developed from the benefit and cost of diversification. 
Industrial diversification was measured by using the proportion of firm-years 
industrially diversified, the number of segments and HI, and global diversification 
by the proportion of firm-years globally diversified and of foreign sales. Firms‘ 
value was measured by excess value. Data for all the variables was collected 
from the Compustat database.  
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Therefore, 7,520 US firms were covered and 44,288 observations from 
1984 to 1997 were used. To test their argument, they applied correlation and 
univariate and multivariate analysis, particularly t test and OLS. The results 
showed that there is a relationship between global diversification and industrial 
diversification. Furthermore, globally or industrially diversified companies 
experienced downward revisions in their excess value, while companies that 
ceased to be either globally or industrially diversified experienced an increase in 
excess value. The study was limited by being conducted only in the US. 
Alesón and Escuer (2001) explored the relationship between international 
diversification and performance in Spanish companies. They argued that 
international diversification positively affects performance in terms of accounting 
and market performance, and is negatively related to performance in terms of 
economic risk. Moreover, when international diversification is divided into related 
and unrelated, they contended that an unrelated international diversified firm had 
better accounting and market performance than a related international diversified 
firm. Alternatively, the unrelated international diversified firm had the lower 
economic risk.  
Here, 103 firms from 1991-1995 were the sample, with data collected 
from annual auditors‘ reports. International diversification was measured by HI 
and categorical measure: low international diversification, related international 
diversification, unrelated international diversification and high international 
diversification. ROA (accounting performance), Tobin‘s Q (market performance) 
and standard deviation of ROA (economic risk) were the indicators of 
performance. Their research has no control variable. The results of GLS analysis 
indicated that a positive relationship between international diversification and 
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economic performance only occurred when performance was measured by 
Tobin‘s Q. Furthermore, there was no difference between performance of 
unrelated international diversification and related international diversification. 
However, their research was subject to sample selection bias.   
Dooley and Fryxell (1999) examined the relationship between corporate 
diversification strategy and corporate environmental performance within the US 
chemical industry. They argued that subsidiaries of unrelated diversified 
companies had lower environmental performance than subsidiaries of related 
diversified firms. Furthermore, they contended that variance of environmental 
performance among subsidiaries of unrelated diversified firms was higher than 
the variance of environmental performance among subsidiaries of related 
diversified companies. Their argument was developed from synergy and financial 
control between the two types of diversification. Diversification strategy was 
measured by two-dimensional categorical measures of diversity developed by 
Varadarajan and Ramanujam. Environmental performance was measured by 
direct release of toxic substances, with data collected from the TRI database. 
Their sample consisted of 555 diversified parent companies operating 
2,952 facilities in the US. To test their argument, they employed two-way and 
one-way ANOVA, and their argument was supported. The subsidiaries of 
unrelated diversified companies showed poorer environmental performance than 
subsidiaries of related diversified firms, and variance of environmental 
performance among subsidiaries of unrelated diversified firms was higher than 
among those of related diversified firms. Their study suffers from limitations, 
however, such as inability to generalise the results to other industries and other 
countries, no weighting scheme to determine the relative levels of toxicity in the 
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database, and a lack of control for production processes and products across 
firms. 
Delios and Beamish (1999) investigated the relationship between 
geographic scope, product diversification and performance in Japanese MNEs. 
They argued that product diversification has a negative relationship with 
corporate performance, and geographic scope has a positive relationship with 
corporate performance. Diversification in their study was measured by entropy 
based on the 3-digit SIC classification, and geographic scope by the amount of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and number of FDI countries. Their sample 
consisted of 399 Japanese MNEs. Data for all variables was collected from the 
Directory of Japanese firms‘ overseas operation. Partial Least Square (PLS) was 
applied to test their argument. The results revealed that product diversification 
has no significant relationship with corporate performance and geographic scope 
has a positive and significant impact on corporate performance. However, this 
applies only in high-product diversification companies. Accordingly, their study 
has several limitations, for instance the generalisability issue given that the 
sample was limited to MNEs and PLS in Japan, and cannot capture the non-
linear relationship. 
Wan (1998) investigated the relationship between international 
diversification, industrial diversification and MNEs‘ performance in Hong Kong. 
He argued that international diversification has a negative relationship with 
company performance and industrial diversification has a positive relationship 
with it, based on the benefit and cost of diversification in emerging countries. 
International diversification and industry diversification were measured by an 
entropy index, and performance by ROE, standard deviation of ROE and sales 
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growth. Data was collected from annual reports and the Pacific-Basin Capital 
Market Database (PACAP) for 81 Hong Kong MNCs over the period 1990-1991. 
By applying t test and hierarchical regression, the results showed that only 
industrial diversification has a significant relationship on corporate performance, 
and in a negative way. The study was limited to MNEs in Hong Kong and 
collected over a short time horizon. 
Simerly (1997) investigated the relationship between a business‘s 
diversification and CSP. He used the term firm‘s diversification to describe 
product diversification. His research was conducted with regards to US firms 
which had adopted a conglomerate diversification strategy in the past, 
specifically 157 firms from 20 industries in 1994. CSP as the dependent variable 
was measured by the multiplied scores of five dimensions of CSP from the KLD 
social rating database: community relations, employee relations, environment, 
product quality and liability. The independent variable, product diversification, 
was measured by sales HI. The researcher hypothesised a negative relationship 
between a company‘s diversification and its CSP, based on the traditional view 
of objective and specific asset consideration. Firms only pursue the maximum 
stakeholders‘ wealth if they choose unrelated diversification, which cannot share 
specific assets, and tends to overlook other social issues. The result of one 
model of multiple regression was that the level of product diversification had a 
negative relationship with CSP, meaning that the more related activities in the 
firm, the higher the CSP. Based on his research limitations, Simerly (1997) 
suggested not only using product diversification but also market (geographical) 
diversification for future research. He also suggested investigating the role of 
institutional investors on CSP. 
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Finally, Servaes (1996) examined the value of corporate diversification 
during the wave of US conglomerate mergers in the period 1961-1976. He 
argued that the value of diversification was related to the benefit and cost of 
diversification and the motive of diversification itself. Diversification was 
measured by using categorical measurement: single segment and multi-segment. 
Firm value was measured by the Q ratio. He used secondary data from 
Compustat and Dun & Bradstreet‘s Million Dollar Directory, for 266 companies in 
the period 1961-1976. Using pair-wise comparison and regression analysis, he 
established that diversified businesses were more likely to be valued at a 
discount than single segment firms during the 1960s, although the diversification 
discount decreased in the early and mid-1970s and reached the level of zero. 
Firms with high insider ownership remained focused in the diversification discount 
period (1961-1970) but diversified as the discount declined (1973-1976). 
Diversified firms did not reduce their diversification level in the earlier period. 
Further research is required to investigate the reason behind the change in 
diversification value over time, and why the results of diversification studies are 
different for different firms. 
4.3 Key themes and Potential Areas for Contribution 
A review of 68 studies on corporate diversification, corporate governance 
and CSP from 1995 to 2016 provides information on four themes. First, as 
illustrated in the analysis of variables, which is shown in Figure 4.1, 45 studies 
investigated the association between corporate diversification and organisational 
performance (Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2015; Gao and Chou, 2015; Hashai, 2015; 
Su and Tsang, 2015; Kang, 2013). More specifically, 35 studies investigated the 
effect of corporate diversification on financial performance and 10 explored the 
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relationship between corporate diversification and CSP. For example, Aguilera-
Caracuel et al. (2015) examined the relationship between international 
diversification and CSP, and Oh et al. (2015) addressed the link between 
corporate diversification and financial performance. Figure 3.1 also indicates that 
19 studies examined the relationship between CG and organisational 
performance, mostly in CSP (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Li, K. et al., 
2015; Jizi et al., 2014; Mason and Simmons, 2014). Only three studies 
investigated corporate diversification, corporate governance and financial 
performance. (Lien and Li, 2013; George and Kabir, 2012; Chen and Ho, 2000; 
Lins and Servaes, 1999). However, there is no single study which examines 
corporate diversification, corporate governance and CSP.  
 
Figure 4.1 Number of studies relating to the link between corporate 
diversification, corporate performance and corporate governance 
 
Second, Figure 4.2 provides the number of key contributors by the 
country in which the study was conducted. The largest group, 30, were 
conducted in the US (e.g. Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2015; Gao and Chou, 2015; 
Su and Tsang, 2015; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Park and Jang, 2013b), and 11 in 
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other developed countries, such as the UK, Germany, Canada, Australia and 
Israel (Brammer et al., 2006; Fauver, Houston and Naranjo, 2004; Li and 
Greenwood, 2004). Only 19 studies were conducted in emerging countries, such 
as China, Taiwan, other Asian countries (Chen and Yu, 2012; Chiao et al., 2008; 
Lins and Servaes, 2002) and Africa. Hence, it may be argued that studies of 
corporate diversification, CG and CSP have been largely neglected in emerging 
countries. 
 
Figure 4.2 Number of Studies by Country 
 
Third, Figure 4.3 provides the number of key contributors based on CSR 
and CSP indicators. In line with a number studies in developed countries, 19 of 
27 studies on CSP used CSP indicators from agencies, such as KLD (Aguilera-
Caracuel et al., 2015; Jizi et al., 2014), EIRIS (Dam and Scholtens, 2013; 
Brammer et al., 2006), IVA (Ho and Wang, 2012), and SIRI (Surroca and Tribó, 
2008). The most popular agency is KLD (9 studies), followed by EIRIS (2 
studies). Availability data of CSP value in agency database make most of these 
studies use CSP value which is measured by agency. Only Cuadrado-Ballesteros 
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et al. (2015) use disclosure analysis obtained from a company‘s annual report to 
measure CSP value. Furthermore, eight of 27 studies used CSP indicators from 
previous studies. Three of eight studies use disclosure analysis taken from a 
company‘s annual report to measure CSP value (Ma et al., 2016; Jizi et al., 2014; 
Khan et al., 2013) and others use a survey method to measure CSP.               
 
  
Figure 4.3 Number of studies by CSP Indicators  
Based on four key themes related to reviewing previous studies, the 
researcher highlighted four academic gaps that can be address as contributions 
to this study.  
First, studies on corporate diversification and CSP relationship are still 
limited and tend to neglect the industrial diversification. From 45 studies which 
investigated the relationship between corporate diversification and corporate 
performance, only 10 studies investigated the relationship between corporate 
diversification and CSP. Of 10 studies, 9 of these were empirical studies. Only 
Sharfman, Shaft and Tihanyi (2004) proposed a preposition. More detail 
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concerning 9 empirical studies on the corporate diversification-CSP relationship 
are described in Table 4.1. Table 4.1 reveals that most of the studies on the 
corporate diversification-CSP relationship focused on the relationship between 
international diversification and CSP.  
Only three studies, Kang (2013); Dooley and Fryxell (1999); Simerly 
(1997), investigated the relationship between product diversification and CSP. 
However, Simerly (1997) did not differentiate between product diversification in 
related and unrelated diversification. Conversely, Dooley and Fryxell (1999) used 
related and unrelated diversification to reflect specific types of industry 
diversification, although, they only used environmental performance as a CSP 
measurement and applied uni-dimensional indicators. Only Kang (2013) applied 
related and unrelated types of industry diversification and used multi-dimensional 
indicators to measure CSP. Therefore, it may be concluded that research on the 
relationship between corporate diversification and CSP remains limited, 
particularly regarding product diversification and CSP. This study contributes to 
addressing this gap by investigating the relationship between corporate 
diversification and CSP, both industrial diversification and international 
diversification.  
Secondly, to the best of the researcher‘s knowledge, there is no single 
study which investigates the role of corporate governance as moderating variable 
in studies on the relationship between corporate diversification and CSP, 
particularly by using board composition and ownership structure. Several authors 
explored the role of corporate governance as a moderating variable on corporate 
diversification-CFP relationship (Lien and Li, 2013; George and Kabir, 2012; 
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Chen and Ho, 2000; Lins and Servaes, 1999). However, investigation of the 
moderating effect of CG on the corporate diversification-CSP relationship is still 
missing.  
Several authors investigated the direct impact of CG mechanisms such as 
ownership and board of directors on CSP (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Jizi 
et al., 2014; Lahouel et al., 2014; Dam and Scholtens, 2013; Hafsi and Turgut, 
2013; Khan et al., 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Dam and Scholtens, 2012; 
Walls et al., 2012; Zhang, 2012). Several also considered the CG mechanism as 
a moderating effect on the relationship between CSP and other variables, for 
instance managerial entrenchment, earnings management, and family firm 
(Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Choi et al., 2013; McGuire et al., 2012; 
Surroca and Tribó, 2008). However, the effect of board structure and ownership 
structure, such as independent directors and ownership concentration, continues 
to be debated. More details of empirical studies that investigate role of between 
corporate governance CG as antecedent of CSP and moderating variables on 
the relationship of CSP and other variables are presented in Table 4.2. However, 
examination of the moderating effect of CG on the corporate diversification-CSP 
relationship is still missing. Furthermore, according to Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. 
(2015); Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) specific board composition and ownership 
concentration, for example board independence and ownership concentration 
could improve company‘s commitment on CSP. Therefore, the researcher argues 
that board composition and ownership concentration in a diversified company can 
moderate the corporate diversification-CSP relationship, as in the corporate 
diversification-CFP relationship. Accordingly, this study will contribute to the role 
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of CG as a moderating variable, particularly board dependency and ownership 
concentration, on the corporate diversification-CSP relationship.   
Thirdly, studies on the corporate diversification-CSP relationship in 
developing economic setting are inadequate. In terms of country, most of the 
studies on the corporate diversification-CSP relationship were conducted in 
developed countries (e.g. seven in the US and one in the UK). Only one study by 
Ma et al. (2016), conducted the research in a developing economy (see 
Table4.1). According to Reimann et al. (2015), every country has differences in 
local rules, regulations, and governmental control which lead to different CSR 
requirements. Most emerging economies countries suffer from these weak 
institutions (Ma et al., 2016), for example low local labour rights or poor working 
standards. This condition leads to lower requirements for CSR in developing 
economies than in developed economies (Reimann et al., 2015) (Yang and 
Rivers, 2009). Therefore, the result of a study on the relationship between 
corporate diversification and CSP in a developing economy could differ from that 
of a developed economy. Moreover, the unique characteristics of a company in 
emerging developing economies, such as family dominance, could result in the 
failure of corporate governance mechanisms increasing CSR (Khan et al., 2013). 
Moreover, Purkayastha et al. (2012) suggested that research of corporate 
diversification in emerging economies needed to broaden the scope outside 
China, Korea and East European countries. Indonesia meets this requirement. 
Accordingly, the researcher argues that an opportunity to investigate the 
relationship between corporate diversification, corporate governance and CSP is 
wide open in emerging economies such as Indonesia.    
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Fourthly, only limited studies apply GRI guidelines for CSP indicators. 
According to Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015); Bouten et al. (2011), GRI 
guidelines could be an adequate standard for CSR achievement which reflect the 
CSP, particularly performance indicators of GRI. Therefore, Cuadrado-
Ballesteros et al. (2015) admitted that using GRI as a measurement of CSP 
would be appropriate in future studies. However, most previous studies on CSP 
and CSR use KLD indicators to measure CSP (see Figure 4.3) and no study on 
the corporate diversification-CSP relationship (see Table 4.1). Of nine studies, 
only Ma et al. (2016); Brammer et al. (2006) employed other indicators regarding 
CSP, such as EIRIS. Therefore, the researcher argues that this is an opportunity 
to contribute to the corporate diversification-CSP relationship by using GRI 
indicators on CSP measurement.  
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Table 4.1 Studies on corporate diversification and CSP 
Source: Adapted from several studies 
 
Diversification CSR 
 
CSP 
 
CEP 
 
 Author, (relationship), 
Country 
Measurement 
/indicators 
Author, (relationship), 
Country 
Measurement
/ indicators 
Author, (relationship), 
Country 
Measurement 
/indicators 
 
Industry  
      
   Total   1. Simerly (1997), (-), 
US 
1. Ethical 
rating/ KLD 
  
Related   1. Kang (2013), (no), 
US 
1. Ethical 
rating/ KLD 
1. Dooley and Fryxell 
(1999) (UD<RD), US 
1. Uni-
dimensional/ 
TRI 
Unrelated   1. Kang (2013) (+ and 
UD>RD), US 
1. Ethical rating 
/ KLD 
1. Dooley and Fryxell 
(1999) (UD<RD), US 
1. Uni-
dimensional/ 
TRI 
International  1. Attig et al. (2016), (+), 
US 
2. Ma et al. (2016), (+), 
   China 
3. Strike et al. (2006) (+ 
and -), US 
1. Ethical rating 
/ KLD 
 
2. Disclosure 
Analysis 
3. Ethical rating 
/ KLD 
 
1. Aguilera-Caracuel et 
al. (2015), (+), US 
2. Kang (2013), (+), US 
3. Brammer et al. 
(2006), (+), UK 
- Ethical rating 
/ KLD 
- Ethical rating 
/KLD 
- Ethical rating 
/EIRIS 
1. Christmann (2004) 
(+), US  
1. Survey 
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Table 4.2  Studies on Corporate Governance and CSP 
 CSR CSP CEP 
Corporate 
Governance 
Author/Country Result Author/Country Result Author/Country Result 
A. Direct 
Relationship 
      
- Board 
structure 
1. Cuadrado-
Ballesteros et al. 
(2015)/ Europe, 
UK, US 
 
2. Jizi et al. (2014)/ 
US 
 
3. Khan et al. 
(2013)/ 
Bangladesh 
 
4. Ntim and 
Soobaroyen 
(2013)/South 
Africa 
 
 
5. Jo and Harjoto 
(2011)/  Several 
- Independent 
Director (+) 
 
 
- Independent 
Director (+) 
- Board size (+) 
- CEO duality (+) 
 
- Independent 
Director (+) 
- CEO duality (no) 
 
- Independent 
director (+) 
- Board size (+) 
- Board diversity 
(+) 
 
- Outside 
independence 
director (+)  
- CEO duality (+) 
 
 
 
1. Hafsi and Turgut 
(2013)/ US 
- Board size (no) 
- Outside director 
(no) 
- Age (-)  
1. Walls et al. 
(2012)/ US 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Post, Rahman 
and Rubow 
(2011)/ US 
- Board 
Independent (no) 
on CEP strength 
and (+) on CEP 
concern 
- Board size (no) 
on CEP strength  
and (+)  on CEP 
concern 
- Board diversity 
(no)  on CEP 
strength and (-)  
on CEP concern 
- Environmental 
committee (+) 
 
- CEO duality (no) 
- Outside director  
(+) 
- Female Director 
(no) 
- Board age 
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- Ownership 
structure 
1. Dam and 
Scholtens (2013)/ 
Europe 
 
2. Khan et al. 
(2013)/ 
Bangladesh 
 
 
 
3. Ntim and 
Soobaroyen 
(2013)/ South 
Africa 
 
 
4. Jo and Harjoto 
(2011)/ Several 
- Ownership 
concentration (-) 
 
- Managerial 
ownership (-) 
- Public ownership 
(+) 
- Foreign 
ownership (+) 
 
- Government 
ownership (+) 
- Block ownership 
(-) 
- Institutional 
ownership (-)  
 
- Managerial 
ownership (no) 
- Institutional 
ownership (+) 
- Ownership 
concentration (-) 
1. Hafsi and Turgut 
(2013)/ US 
- Outside directors 
ownership (no) 
1. Walls et al. 
(2012)/US 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Institutional 
ownership (no)  
- Investment 
turnover (no) 
- Shareholder 
activism (-) on 
CEP strength and 
(+) on CEP 
concern 
- Shareholder 
concentration (-) 
on CEP strength 
and (no) on CEP 
concern 
B. Moderation       
- Board 
structure 
1. Cuadrado-
Ballesteros et al. 
(2015)/  Europe, 
UK, US 
 
2. Ntim and 
Soobaroyen 
(2013)/ South 
- Independent 
Director* Family 
firm (-) 
 
- Independent 
director*CSR (+) 
FP 
1. Surroca and 
Tribó (2008)/ 22 
countries 
- Board 
Independence* 
Managerial 
entrenchment (no) 
- Non dual CEO* 
Managerial 
entrenchment (+) 
1. Walls et al. 
(2012)/ US 
- Board 
Independence * 
Investor turn over 
(-) 
- Board 
Independence * 
CEO salary and 
bonus (+) 
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Source: Adapted from several studies 
Africa 
 
 
- Board size* CSR 
(no) to FP 
- Board diversity* 
CSR (+) to FP 
- Board 
Independence * 
CEO duality (-) 
- Ownership 
structure 
1. Choi et al. (2013)/ 
Korea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Ntim and 
Soobaroyen 
(2013)/ South 
Africa 
- Ownership 
concentration* 
earning 
management (+) 
- Institutional 
Ownership* 
earning 
management (-) 
- Foreign 
ownership* 
earning 
management (no) 
 
- Government 
ownership*CSR 
(+) to FP 
- Block ownership* 
CSR (no) to FP 
- Institutional 
ownership* CSR 
(no) to FP 
 
1. Peng and Yang 
(2014)/Taiwan 
 
 
 
2. Surroca and 
Tribó (2008)/ 22 
countries 
- Ownership 
concentration*CSP
(-) to financial 
performance 
 
- Ownership 
concentration* 
managerial 
entrenchment (no)  
- State ownership* 
managerial 
entrenchment (no)  
 
 
1. Walls et al. 
(2012)/ US 
- Shareholder 
concentration* 
managerial 
control (-) 
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4.4 Hypothesis Development 
 
According to a variety of previous studies on corporate diversification, 
corporate governance and CSP, this part describes the relationship of all the 
variables to develop four hypotheses. The relationship between corporate 
diversification and CSP is discussed first, and subsequently it is followed by the 
moderating effect of CG on the corporate diversification-CSP relationship, 
particularly via independent commissioners and ownership concentration. 
4.4.1  Relationship between Corporate Diversification and CSP 
 
Corporate diversification may influence CSP (Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 
2015; Kang, 2013), but empirical evidence for the relationship is remains 
inadequate (except for international diversification (Kang, 2013), particularly in 
emerging countries. The relationship between corporate diversification and CSP 
relates to stakeholder theory. A positive relationship between the level of 
diversification and the range of social issues is inferred from the fact that 
stakeholders in different industries and geographic markets attach different levels 
of significance to different social issues (Kang, 2013; Brammer and Millington, 
2008). For example, business will be conducted smoothly only when the needs 
and desires of customers, suppliers, employees, communities and financiers are 
satisfied over time. Hence, to survive, a company must satisfy all stakeholders, 
including customers, shareholders and employees. Stakeholder theory gives an 
insight into why firms respond to the demands of stakeholders (Kang, 2013). 
According to Kacperczyk (2009), CSP might reflect the company‘s response to 
these demands and to social issues. Therefore, stakeholder theory contributes to 
the concept of CSP.  
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The relationship between diversification and CSP is not necessarily positive 
(Kang, 2013). For example, when a diversified firm ignores the stakeholders‘ 
demands and social issues, the level of diversification might be negatively related 
to CSP. However, according to the literatures, a diversified firm is more likely to 
pay attention to stakeholder demands and social issues for several reasons. 
First, diversification strategy relates to managerial risk aversion, a major issue in 
stakeholder demands and social issues (Deckop, Merriman and Gupta, 2006; 
McGuire, Dow and Argheyd, 2003). Second, diversification strategy may reduce 
managerial employment risk (Kacperczyk, 2009). Third, a diversified business 
can distribute the costs and benefits of CSP-related investments across its 
subsidiaries. Hence, a diversified firm will have a stronger economic incentive to 
invest in social issues than a focused firm (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). 
Accordingly, this study concentrates on two types of diversification, industrial 
diversification (related and unrelated) and international diversification. The next 
section starts with the association between related diversification and CSP. 
4.4.1.1 Related Diversification and CSP 
 
 Several studies have considered the relationship between related 
diversification and organisational performance (Su and Tsang, 2015; Park and 
Jang, 2013a; Miller, 2006; Gary, 2005), most authors arguing that related 
diversification relates positively to performance (Park and Jang, 2012; Miller, 
2006; Palich, Cardinal, et al., 2000; Markides and Williamson, 1994). Miller 
(2006), for example, noted that related diversification has a significantly positive 
impact on company performance, employing market-based measures of 
performance. Although there is a broader agreement that related diversification 
increases a company‘s performance, the empirical results are inconsistent (Park 
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and Jang, 2013b). For example, Su and Tsang (2015) concluded that product 
diversification relates to financial performance, following investigation of 391 
Fortune 500 firms from 1996 to 2003 with 2,364 firm-year observations. They 
also determined that related diversification has no impact on financial 
performance. In contrast, Gary (2005) revealed that a stronger related 
diversification strategy might lead to poorer performance, arguing that the 
diversification-performance relationship depends on complex interactions among 
variables. Hence, a potential synergy effect might need more investment in 
common resources and will affect organisational performance. Even though none 
of the studies conducted by Su and Tsang (2015); and Miller (2006) employed 
CSP as an organisational performance measurement, they argue that related 
diversification has an impact on organisational performance. Consequently, it 
might be assumed that related diversification is related to CSP as part of 
organisational performance.  
 Kang (2013) asserted that related diversification is an antecedent of CSP, 
arguing for a positive relationship based on the KLD database as a source of 
CSP indicators. However, his findings confirmed no significant relationship 
between related diversification and CSP. He accepted that the relationship 
between the level of diversification and CSP does not necessarily have to be 
positive. If an unrelated diversified company cannot maintain a good relationship 
under pressure from increasing stakeholder demands and social issues, an 
increasing level of diversification might affect CSP negatively (Kang, 2013). The 
argument of Su and Tsang (2015) also implies that related diversification leads to 
lower CSP. Su and Tsang (2015); Kang (2013) believed that related diversified 
companies face a less narrow range of stakeholders, given the similarity of 
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stakeholder demands and social issues. Narrow range stakeholder demand may 
not encourage a company to extend its social responsibility to other areas. 
However, similarity in stakeholder demands and social issues enables companies 
to identify their stakeholders accurately and manage them effectively (Su and 
Tsang, 2015; Post, Preston and Sachs, 2002). Therefore, related diversified 
companies may have less difficulty in maintaining the relationship with their 
stakeholders, particularly secondary stakeholders, avoiding a waste of resources 
(Su and Tsang, 2015).  
Although there is disagreement vis-à-vis this relationship, the researcher 
concludes that related diversification is an antecedent of CSP. Hence, this study 
proposes a hypothesis that: 
H1a: There is a significant relationship between related diversification and 
corporate social performance. 
 
4.4.1.2 Unrelated Diversification and Corporate Social Performance 
Previous researchers have argued that related and unrelated 
diversification have a correlation with organisational performance (Su and Tsang, 
2015; Kang, 2013; Park and Jang, 2013a; Park, 2002; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 
1991; Kim, 1989b; Palepu, 1985). For example, Kim et al. (1989) investigated the 
relationship between global diversification strategy (related, unrelated and 
international diversification) on performance. They studied 62 multinational 
companies randomly selected from Dun and Bradstreet‘s America‘s Corporate 
Families and International Affiliates database, and discovered that unrelated 
diversification strategy might be associated with organisational performance 
when companies are well diversified globally. In contrast, Park (2002) examined 
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the reverse relationship between diversification strategy and organisational 
performance. He asserts that there are systematic ex ante performance 
differences between firms diversifying into related business and those diversifying 
into unrelated business (p.1003). This means that performance will lead to the 
decision of the organisation to diversify (related or unrelated). The debate takes 
place in this context: although there are two views regarding the relationship 
between organisational performance and diversification strategy, most 
researchers argue that diversification strategy, related or unrelated, is an 
antecedent of organisational performance (Su and Tsang, 2015; Kang, 2013).  
Purkayastha (2013) argued that there are very few studies that address 
the impact of diversification strategy (related and unrelated) on business 
performance. He noted that unrelated diversification has a negative and 
significant relationship with ROA as one of the indicators of organisational 
performance. Conversely, Su and Tsang (2015) stressed that product 
diversification (related and unrelated) has a relationship with financial 
performance. They also suggested that the moderating effect of secondary 
stakeholders will be stronger in unrelated than related diversification. Hence, from 
the discussion above, the researcher argues that unrelated diversification relates 
to organisational performance. Moreover, given that one of the organisational 
performance dimensions is CSP, the researcher assumes that unrelated 
diversification strategy has a relationship with CSP. 
However, to the best of this researcher‘s knowledge, studies on the link 
between diversification and CSP have been neglected (Kang, 2013; Brammer et 
al., 2006; Simerly, 1997). For example, although Brammer et al. (2006) examined 
the association they only addressed geographical/international diversification. 
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Simerly (1997) only investigated the link between total diversification and CSP. 
Only Kang (2013) observed the relationship between unrelated diversification 
strategy and CSP, while Su and Tsang (2015) argued that unrelated diversified 
companies faced more diversified stakeholders, both primary and secondary, 
than did related diversified company, concluding that the former need to maintain 
good relationships with their stakeholders to gain legitimacy and enhance 
company reputation. These arguments imply a positive relationship between 
unrelated diversification and CSP. However, according to Kang (2013), the 
relationship between the level of diversification and CSP does not necessarily 
have to be positive. If an unrelated diversified company cannot maintain good 
relationships with stakeholders, an increasing level of diversification may impact 
on CSP negatively (Kang, 2013). In accordance with the above discussion, it can 
be argued that unrelated diversification is an antecedent of CSP, although 
research on this relationship remains limited and requires further study. The 
direction of the relationship depends on the ability of unrelated diversified 
companies to accommodate all their stakeholder demands and social issues. 
Taken together, the researcher posits a hypothesis that: 
H1b: There is a significant relationship between unrelated diversification and 
corporate social performance.  
 
4.4.1.3 Related diversification, unrelated diversification and Corporate Social 
Performance  
 
Different industries and geographic markets affect social issues to various 
extents (Brammer and Millington, 2008). Firms which adopt an unrelated 
diversification strategy have a presence across industries that are widely 
different. Accordingly, these firms should deal with a wider range of stakeholders‘ 
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demands and social issues (Kang, 2013). Conversely, companies which adopt a 
related diversification strategy are faced with more consistent coherent 
stakeholder demands, and can focus on a relatively narrow range of social 
concerns (Kang, 2013). A diversified firm is more likely to pay attention to 
stakeholders‘ demands and social issues due to increased managerial risk 
aversion (Deckop et al., 2006; McGuire et al., 2003), reduced managerial 
unemployment risk (Kacperczyk, 2009), and increased ability to distribute the 
costs and benefits of CSP-related investments across subsidiaries. Furthermore, 
according to Kang (2013); Hoskisson and Hitt (1988) the increased managerial 
risk aversion will be higher in unrelated than in related diversified companies, and 
the managerial unemployment risk will be reduced more effectively (Kang, 2013; 
Kacperczyk, 2009). Moreover, the incentive of brand transfer and the insurance 
effect are stronger in the unrelated diversified companies (Kang, 2013). 
Therefore, unrelated diversified companies are predicted to have a higher CSP 
than related diversified companies.  
However, in contrast to the arguments of Kang (2013); Kacperczyk 
(2009); Hoskisson and Hitt (1988), Simerly (1997) asserted that companies which 
adopt a diversification strategy distant from their core business interests are 
motivated by traditional or stakeholder perspectives that only pursue financial 
objectives. Therefore, the CSP of the business would be lower for unrelated 
diversification than for related diversification. Dooley and Fryxell (1999) argued 
that the intention of spreading environmental risk and concern with building 
reputational capital for environmental performance could lead to board spectrum 
diversification, including unrelated diversification. Accordingly, this demonstrates 
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lower environmental performance than related diversification. Hence, in regard to 
the first argument, the researcher proposes the hypothesis that:    
H1c: The relationship between unrelated diversification and CSP is more positive 
than the relationship between related diversification and CSP.  
 
4.4.1.4 International diversification and Corporate Social Performance 
Some previous researchers, such as Attig et al. (2016); Ma et al. (2016); 
Aguilera-Caracuel et al. (2015); Kang (2013); Brammer et al. (2006); Christmann 
(2004); Sharfman et al. (2004), have argued that international diversification has 
a positive relationship with CSP. In contrast, according to Strike et al. (2006), 
international diversification can be simultaneously socially responsible and 
irresponsible. Only Aguilera-Caracuel et al. (2015); Kang (2013); Brammer et al. 
(2006) have investigated the effect of international diversification on CSP. 
Specific authors, such as Christmann (2004), Sharfman et al. (2004), only 
employed some of the CSP indicators, for instance environmental performance, 
while others focused on CSR rather than CSP. Moreover, there were several 
reasons for the positive relationship between international diversification and 
CSP, as follows.  
 First, international diversification increases the number and variety of 
stakeholder pressures derived from the different legal, regulatory, economic, 
cultural and social circumstances in each country (Ma et al., 2016; Aguilera-
Caracuel et al., 2015; Park et al., 2014; Kang, 2013; Brammer et al., 2006; 
Gardberg and Fombrun, 2006; Christmann, 2004; Sharfman et al., 2004). As 
stakeholders in various groups and countries have different priorities, 
international diversified companies must deal with a wider range of demands and 
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social issues (Kang, 2013). Thus, pressure from stakeholders will drive an 
international diversified company to adopt a higher standard of performance in 
order to deal with a wider range of demands (Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2015; 
Brammer et al., 2006; Sharfman et al., 2004). For example, Japanese and 
Korean electronics companies in Indonesia have adopted and developed various 
strategies to link their CSR with specific Indonesian social issues (Park et al., 
2015). Moreover, businesses from developing economies face a higher level of 
requirements of social behaviour in host countries (Ma et al., 2016). Therefore, 
international diversified firms tend to respond well to stakeholder demands and 
social issues.     
Secondly, international diversified firms have a greater opportunity for 
organisational learning, as they receive new and valuable ideas from the more 
diverse context (Ma et al., 2016; Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2015). By creating 
mutual learning with their stakeholders and using these ideas and resources, 
firms can communicate effectively with different stakeholders concerning their 
expectations, manage complex regulations in different countries, and negotiate 
with governments to influence regulations to improve CSP (Ma et al., 2016; 
Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2015; Strike et al., 2006) 
Thirdly, international diversification increases managerial incentive to 
respond to stakeholders‘ demands and social issues (Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 
2015; Kang, 2013). It can mitigate managerial employment risk by lessening the 
risk of bankruptcy and augmenting management entrenchment (Attig et al., 2016; 
Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2015; Kang, 2013; Montgomery, 1994; Shleifer and 
Vinishny, 1989; Fatemi, 1984). As a result, management in international 
diversified firms tend to take notice of stakeholders‘ demands and social issues.  
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Fourthly, international diversification provides economic incentives for a 
company to respond to its stakeholders‘ demand and social issues. These rise 
from the ability of the company to spread the cost and benefit of CSP investment 
among their subsidiaries (Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2015; Kang, 2013; McWilliams 
and Siegel, 2001). For instance, a positive brand image generated from 
investment in social issues can be efficiently used across a company‘s global 
market (Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2015); Kang (2013); (Lichtenstein, Drumwright 
and Braig, 2004). 
Alternatively, there might be a negative relationship between international 
diversification and CSP (Brammer and Millington, 2008). Internationally 
diversified companies or MNEs may select a country in such a way as to 
minimise stakeholder pressure (Brammer et al., 2006), and transfer corporate 
socially irresponsible practice to their subsidiary (Surroca, Tribó and Zahra, 
2013). In line with this, Muller and Kolk (2009) argue that developed countries‘ 
traditional beliefs regarding CSR implementation are left behind in emerging 
economies. Ho and Wang (2012) assert that emerging countries tend to have 
lower CSP than developed nations, in Europe, North America and the Asia-
Pacific region. This is because emerging countries have a different culture (Ho 
and Wang, 2012), less social regulation (Reimann et al., 2012), or endure 
ineffective control and enforcement mechanism in social regulation (Sharfman et 
al., 2004). Therefore, according to Reimann et al. (2015), an international 
diversified company tends to exploit the emerging economies‘ conditions. For 
example, it will permit low local labour rights or poor working standards. However, 
governments in emerging economies are beginning to insist on CSR as part of 
MNEs‘ development objectives (Reimann et al., 2012). Hence, with regards to 
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strong pressure from various stakeholders and motivated by managerial and 
economic incentives, a more internationally diversified company may have higher 
CSP. Therefore, the researcher proposes the hypothesis that: 
H2:  The relationship between international diversification and corporate social 
performance is positive. 
 
4.4.2 Moderating Effects of Corporate Governance on the Relationship 
between Corporate Diversification and CSP  
 
Several studies have argued that CG dimensions, such as an independent 
commissioner or ownership concentration, have an impact on CSP (Mason and 
Simmons, 2014; Young and Thyil, 2014; Choi et al., 2013; Khan et al., 2013; Ntim 
and Soobaroyen, 2013; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006). For example, Khan et al. 
(2013) asserted that CG mechanisms, for example ownership structure and 
board composition may influence CSR disclosure. They argued that CSR 
disclosure is affected by the motives and values of those involved in decision-
making processes in the organisation. Hence, the board of directors, as part of 
CG, may have an impact on CSR decisions.  
According to Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013), good CG promotes a better 
relationship between a company and its stakeholders, such as shareholders, 
bond holders, consumers, labourers, community and society. Therefore, they 
argued, good CG leads to improved CSP. In addition, Jamali et al. (2008) 
emphasise the importance of CG in ensuring that stakeholder and management 
interests are reconciled. Accordingly, a company with high CG will lead to a 
better relationship with stakeholders, which is important in implementing 
corporate diversification strategy. Hence, the author argues that the impact of 
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diversification strategy on CSP may be greater in a company which practises a 
better CG. Although, several studies have addressed the direct relationship 
between CG and CSP (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Li, Song and Wu, 
2015; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013), this researcher 
argues that CG may also have an impact on corporate diversification-CSP 
relationship and proposing a moderating effect of CG dimensions, specifically 
independent commissioner and ownership concentration on the relationship 
between corporate diversification and CSP.    
4.4.2.1 Moderating effect of independent commissioners on the corporate 
diversification-CSP relationship 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, Indonesian companies have a two-tier board 
or dual system (Nur'ainy et al., 2013). The dual system has unique supervisory 
and executive management bodies (Utama and Utama, 2014), respectively the 
board of commissioners and board of directors. The former is responsible for 
supervising management policy and its implementation, and advising the board of 
directors (Nur'ainy et al., 2013). The board of commissioners consists of 
independent and delegated commissioners (Waagstein, 2011), the former being 
similar to independent or non-executive directors in the US and UK systems.  
Three dominant theories explain the relationship between board 
independence and CSP: agency theory, stakeholder theory and resources 
dependent theory (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Majocchi and Strange, 
2012; Zhang, 2012; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
First, from the agency theory perspective, separation of control and ownership in 
modern companies could generate agency conflict if the managers‘ interest is not 
aligned with the stakeholders‘ (Zhang, 2012; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen 
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and Meckling, 1976). The role of the board of directors from the agency 
perspective covers, inter alia, approving strategic initiatives recommended by the 
senior management team and monitoring their implementation, along with 
preserving the interests of stakeholders (Majocchi and Strange, 2012; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). The board of directors consists of internal and outside directors. 
The outside directors are not closely tied to the senior management and have no 
claim on the company‘s earnings (Zhang, 2012), and consequently, reflect the 
independence of the board (Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Zhang, 2012); their 
judgments should be free of bias and more objective (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et 
al., 2015). Their decisions are more likely to be driven by non-profit goals rather 
than being profit orientated, so they are more capable of representing not only 
shareholders‘ interests, but also those of other important stakeholders 
(Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Zhang, 2012; Ibrahim, Howard and Angelidis, 
2003). The presence of an independent director in a company should increase 
the open governance process which is critical in developing the firm‘s 
commitment to CSP; reflect the strong willingness of the firm to monitor any 
opportunistic behaviour by senior management and to promotion of stakeholders‘ 
benefit (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Khan et al., 2013; Chang et al., 2012). 
Second, stakeholder theory criticises those management models that 
focus on the maximisation of shareholder value. Stakeholder theory views a 
business as a system of primary stakeholder groups (Clarkson (1995) or a set of 
relationships between groups of stakeholders in the activities that make up the 
business (Freeman, 2010; Freeman, Harrison and Wicks, 2008). Shareholders 
are only one group of stakeholders, and a business cannot survive if the interests 
of other primary stakeholders are neglected. Business is about value creation 
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and the interaction among stakeholders: manager, customer, supplier, employee, 
financier and community. Dissatisfaction among any of the primary stakeholder 
groups will make them withdrawn from the corporate system and disrupts the 
continuity of the firm as a going concern (Freeman, 2010; Clarkson, 1995). 
Therefore, a manager‘s task is how to manage the relationship between 
stakeholders so as to create as much value as possible for them without resorting 
to a trade-off and distributing the value (Freeman, 2010; Parmar et al., 2010; 
Freeman et al., 2008). The board of directors serves as a representative and 
safeguard for a wide range of stakeholders (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992) and has 
to make sure that the managers are undertaking their tasks correctly. The 
independence of the outside director enables the board to represent all other 
important stakeholders‘ interests (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Zhang, 
2012; Ibrahim et al., 2003; Wang and Dewhirst, 1992). Their strong knowledge 
and relationship with different groups of stakeholders beyond a company‘s 
boundary can enable them to bring more stakeholders‘ interests into the 
boardroom and eventually satisfy their demands (Chang et al., 2012).  
Finally, in line with stakeholder theory, resource dependence theory views 
organisations as consisting of external and internal coalitions in order to survive 
in an environment with limited valuable resources. Hence, an organisation needs 
to gain external resources rather than depend on them (Chang et al., 2012; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Wang and Dewhirst, 1992). From this theory, it is the 
duty of the board of directors to link the firm to its external environment and 
obtain critical resources (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Chang et al., 2012; 
Zhang, 2012; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). A valuable contribution of the board is 
its social network, used to build and extend the firm‘s external legitimacy and to 
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improve its relationship with relevant stakeholders (Zhang, 2012). Independent 
directors can cross boundaries, providing critical tangible and intangible 
resources for managers and protecting them from outsiders (Chang et al., 2012; 
Zhang, 2012; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Independent directors are themselves 
a valuable resource because of their knowledge, experience and networks (Hafsi 
and Turgut, 2013). They can improve the quality of an organisation‘s strategic 
decision making by providing expert advice and counselling executives, 
enhancing stakeholder expectations and acquiring external resources (Chang et 
al., 2012; Zhang, 2012).  
Agency, stakeholder and resource dependence theories suggest a 
positive relationship between independent directors and CSP. Hence, the 
existence of an independent commissioner in a company may increase CSP. 
Authors who support the positive relationship between independent 
commissioners and CSR include Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015); Jizi et al. 
(2014); Hafsi and Turgut (2013); Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013); Jo and Harjoto 
(2011). Walls et al. (2012) ascertained that board independence could strengthen 
the positive relationship between CEO‘s salary/bonus, and CEP. However, the 
effectiveness of independent directors in increasing CSP is influenced by the 
legal environment, their own expertise/experience, and their degree of 
independence (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). In line with this argument, Hafsi and 
Turgut (2013) established that outside directors may have no effect on CSP, and 
according to  Surroca and Tribó (2008) they cannot strengthen the positive effect 
of managerial entrenchment on CSP. However, Walls et al. (2012) demonstrated 
that independent commissioners contributed to CEP, while Cuadrado-Ballesteros 
et al. (2015) found that they may weaken CSR disclosure in family firms. As the 
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unique characteristics of a company in emerging economies, such as family 
dominance, could result in the failure of corporate governance mechanism to 
increase CSP (Khan et al., 2013).  
However, to the best of this researcher‘s knowledge, no single study has 
addressed the role of the independent commissioner in increasing the positive 
effect of corporate diversification and CSP, or weakening its negative effect. With 
regard to the agency, stakeholder and resource dependence theories in the 
Indonesian context, the researcher proposes that the presence of an 
independent commissioner as an internal controlling and monitoring mechanism 
in diversified firms is expected to eliminate managers‘ opportunistic behaviour 
and to represent all stakeholders‘ interests in the board room. Moreover, with 
their outside contacts, independent commissioners can improve strategic 
decision making in diversified firms by their knowledge and use of networks to 
obtain valuable resources resulting in higher value for all stakeholders. Hence, 
this study proposes the following hypotheses: 
H3a: The relationship between related diversification and CSP is moderated by 
independent commissioners. 
H3b: The relationship between unrelated diversification and CSP is moderated by 
independent commissioners. 
H3c: The relationship between international diversification and CSP is moderated 
by independent commissioners. 
 
4.4.2.2 Moderating Effect of Ownership Concentration on Corporate 
Diversification-CSP Relationship 
 
Agency theory is dominant in explaining the relationship between 
ownership concentration and CSP (Ducassy and Montandrau, 2015; Peng and 
Yang, 2014; Dam and Scholtens, 2013), although institutional and stakeholder 
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theories have some relevance (Khan et al., 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). 
According to agency theory, agency conflict arises because of a lack of control by 
the owners of a firm. Major shareholders can eliminate agency problems between 
owner and agent due to their stronger incentive or more effective monitoring than 
those of minority shareholders (Dam and Scholtens, 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013; Jo and Harjoto, 2011). However, the interests of concentrated ownership 
as majority shareholders may differ from those of minority shareholders, in which 
case they may pursue their own interest resulting in expropriation of the minority 
shareholders‘ interest (Surroca and Tribó, 2008). That is, ownership 
concentration can reduce investor protection for small or diversified groups of 
shareholders (Dam and Scholtens, 2013).  
In line with the negative relationship between ownership concentration 
and CSP in agency theory explanation, there is a legitimation perspective: due to 
their limited and less powerful outside interests of companies with a high 
ownership concentration, the institutional pressure to adopt CSR is low (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). Dam and Scholtens (2013); Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) 
argued that majority shareholders may support social initiatives as long as the 
cost is not more than the benefit that might be received. Similarly, Khan et al. 
(2013) suggest that, from the stakeholder perspective, a company with dispersed 
ownership and a large number of stakeholders may face increased pressure for 
voluntary disclosure including CSR activity.  
Several studies have examined the correlation between ownership 
concentration and CSP and other related terms, such as CSR and CEP (Choi et 
al., 2013; Dam and Scholtens, 2013; Khan et al., 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013; Jo and Harjoto, 2011). With respect to agency, institutional and stakeholder 
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theory, empirical studies have determined a negative effect of ownership 
concentration on CSP. For instance, Dam and Scholtens (2013) found that the 
more concentrated the ownership, the poorer the CSR policies in a company 
because the majority shareholder group tended to disagree with the CSR 
activities if the cost outweighed the benefit. Similarly, according to Choi et al. 
(2013), the ownership structure of a company has a significant effect on its 
motivation to promote CSR activities which are in line with its interests. Khan et 
al. (2013) noted that public ownership has a positive impact on CSR disclosures, 
and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) that block ownership correspondingly has a 
strong negative pressure on CSR. Whether positive or negative, ownership 
concentration as part of CG is an influential factor on CSP.  
However, although most of the CSP studies addressed ownership 
concentration as an antecedent of CSP, few saw ownership concentration as a 
moderating variable on CSP. For instance, Choi et al. (2013) argued that CSR 
can be used by managers or controlling shareholders to cover their opportunistic 
behaviour, such as earnings management. They proposed that CSR 
manipulation would be more common in a company with greater agency conflict, 
such as a company with highly concentrated ownership. They ascertained that a 
positive association between the extent of earnings management and CSR was 
strengthened by ownership concentration. Walls et al. (2012) similarly found that 
the interaction of ownership concentration and managerial control produced a 
negative effect on CEP. Hence, it may be argued that ownership concentration 
moderates the relationship between corporate diversification and CSP in a 
negative way.  
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Summarising the above discussion, a positive relationship between 
corporate diversification and CSP will be weakened under a higher concentration 
of ownership. In other words, a positive relationship with corporate diversification 
will be strengthened by dispersed ownership. This study proposes the following 
hypotheses: 
H4a: The relationship between related diversification and CSP is moderated by 
ownership concentration. 
H4b: The relationship between unrelated diversification and CSP is moderated by 
ownership concentration. 
H4c: The relationship between international diversification and CSP is moderated 
by ownership concentration. 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
 This chapter reviewed the literature on the relationship between corporate 
diversification, CG and CSP (see Appendices 1 and 2). Potential areas for future 
research were identified, for instance investigating the role of CG on the 
corporate diversification-CSP relationship, including product and international 
diversification in an emerging country setting. This chapter also describes the 
theories that explain the relationship between corporate diversification and CSP. 
These theories are used to develop the argument for each hypothesis on the 
relationship between corporate diversification and CSP, and the role of 
independent commissioner and ownership concentration as a moderating 
variable on this relationship. Accordingly, four principal hypotheses are proposed. 
Furthermore, the next chapter describes the methodology of this study 
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CHAPTER 5  METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The chapter which refers to the methodology, discusses the use of an 
alternative research method, which would generally answer the research 
question(s). The first part is research philosophy, which describes the 
philosophical position of this research. The first part is followed by the research 
approach, research design, population and sample, variable, data collection, 
variable definition and data analysis.    
5.2 Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy deals with knowledge development and the nature 
of knowledge (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). Research philosophy helps 
the researcher to gain insight and choose the appropriate research approach and 
research design. Research philosophy is a multi-dimensional concept. According 
to Saunders et al. (2012), research philosophy can be divided into three 
concepts, including ontology, epistemology and axiology. However,  philosophers 
have different point of views in understanding ontology and epistemology 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012). Ontology deals with the nature of 
reality and existence (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Saunders et al., 2012; Holden 
and Lynch, 2004; Hay, 2002). Accordingly, the researcher‘s ontological position 
helps to answer questions regarding the nature of social reality, phenomena or 
object to be  investigated (Hay, 2002). Moreover, epistemology refers to a 
common set of assumptions which focus on the most appropriate ways of 
enquiring into the nature of the world (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Hay, 2002). In 
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a simple way, epistemology refers to theory of knowledge, including the principles 
and rules to determine the social phenomena and how to apply knowledge 
(Mason, 2002). Axiology is based on assumptions or the researcher‘s view about 
the value role in undertaking research (Saunders et al., 2012), such as free, 
laden or bond.  
There are two continuums regarding research philosophy, including 
positivism and interpretivism. However, certain researchers define another term 
in between two continuums. Saunders et al. (2012) termed it ‗realism‘ and 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) defined it as relativism.  Positivism assumes that the 
social world exists externally and an objective method must be used to measure 
its elements (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). This suggests that an objective reality 
exists that is free from human behaviour (Crossan, 2003). Interpretivism refers to 
a research philosophy which assumes reality does not exist (ontology), 
phenomena have a subjective meaning and focus on detailed situations 
(epistemology), and it is not value free, seeing as the researcher is a part of what 
is being researched (axiology).  Finally, realism is a research philosophy which 
refers to a point of view that reality exists but is obscured (ontology), observable 
phenomena give credible evidences (epistemology) and the study is value laden 
(axiology). This study employed positivism research philosophy.  
This research used an objective method to measure the link between 
corporate diversification, corporate governance and CSP. Accordingly, this study 
deployed an objective measurement to measure each variable. The ontology of 
this research assumes the reality exists in an objective way. Additionally, this 
paper also investigates causality in the relationship between corporate 
diversification, corporate governance and CSP. Hence, it is the epistemology of 
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this study. Finally, from an axiological point of view, this study is a value free 
study. Hence, the researcher is independent to interpret the findings in objective 
way.    
5.3 Research Approach 
 
Research approach deals with the role of theory in research (Bryman and 
Bell, 2011). There are three types of research approach: deduction, induction and 
abduction (Saunders et al., 2012). The deductive approach begins with theory, 
and subsequently tests theory by using research strategy (Saunders et al., 2012; 
Bryman and Bell, 2011). In contrast, the inductive approach deals with creating a 
conclusion based on observation of phenomena. Accordingly, the inductive 
approach begins with data collection to explore a phenomenon which is valuable 
with regards to building or generating theory (Saunders et al., 2012; Bryman and 
Bell, 2011). A comparison of research approaches is shown in Table 5.1:  
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Table 5.1 Research Approach Comparison  
 Deduction Induction Abduction 
Logic In a deductive 
inference, when the 
premise is true, the 
conclusion must 
also be true 
In a deductive 
inference, known 
premises are used 
to generated an 
untested conclusion 
In a deductive inference, 
known premises are used 
to generate a testable 
conclusion 
Generalisability Generalising from 
the general to the 
specific 
Generalising from 
the specific to the 
general   
Generalising from 
interaction between the 
specific to the general   
Use of Data Data collection is 
used to evaluate a 
proposition or 
hypotheses related 
to existing theory 
Data collection is 
used to explore a 
phenomenon, 
identify the themes 
and patterns and 
create a conceptual 
frame work  
Data collection is used to 
explore a phenomenon, 
identify the themes and 
patterns, locate these in a 
conceptual framework 
and test this through sub 
sequent data collection, 
so on and so forth 
Theory Theory falsification 
or verification 
Theory generation 
and building 
Theory generation or 
modification; 
incorporating existing 
theory where appropriate, 
to build new theory or 
modify existing theory. 
Sources: Adapt from Saunders et al. (2012) 
The research approach pertaining to this study is the deductive approach. This 
research used positivism research philosophy, which has several characteristics, 
such as logic, generalisability, use of data and moreover, it fits the deductive 
approach.   
5.4 Research Design 
The research design should match the research philosophy and relate its 
methods and technique to data collection and data analysis (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2012; Saunders et al., 2012; Bryman and Bell, 2011; Grix, 2002). According 
to Saunders et al. (2012), research design consists of research method 
(quantitative, qualitative, mix method and multi method), research strategy which 
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can be divided into several forms (e.g., experiment, survey, archival, case study, 
ethnography, research action, grounded theory and narrative inquiry) and  time 
horizon (e.g., cross sectional and longitudinal).  
The researcher can choose the appropriate research method which is 
suitable with their research philosophy and approach. According to Saunders et 
al. (2012), the researcher can choose the mono method, which consists of 
quantitative and qualitative studies, or a multiple method which comprises multi 
methods and mixed methods. In a specific way, differentiating between 
quantitative research from qualitative research relies on type of data and data 
analysis (Saunders et al., 2012). Quantitative method research design is a 
research method that employs numerical data (numbers) generated from certain 
data collection techniques, such as questionnaires (Saunders et al., 2012). In 
contrast, qualitative method research design is a research method that applies 
non-numerical data (words, images, video clips and others) produced from 
certain data collection techniques, such as an interviews (Saunders et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, Saunders et al. (2012); Bryman and Bell (2011) compare the 
differences between these methods, which are outlined in the table 5.2 
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Table 5.2 Fundamental differences between quantitative and qualitative research 
 Quantitative Research Qualitative Research 
Research 
Philosophy 
Associated with positivism Interpretivism/ constructivism 
Research 
approach 
Associated with Deductive Associated with Inductive 
Characteristic 
- Type of study 
 
- Type of data 
- Data collection 
- Sampling 
techniques 
 
- Data analysis 
techniques 
 
- Examines relationship 
between variables 
- numerical data  
- Standardised 
- Usually use probability 
sampling 
 
- Statistical techniques 
 
- Studies participants‘ 
meaning and relationship 
between them 
- non-numerical data 
- Non-standardised 
- Typically use non-
probability sampling  
- Categorising data  
 
Sources: adapted from Bryman (2012); Saunders et al. (2012) 
This research applies positivist research which uses the deductive 
research approach. Moreover, this study aims to investigate the relationship 
between Corporate Diversification and CSP and to investigate the role of 
corporate governance on the corporate diversification-CSP relationship. In 
addition, this study also used numerical data and statistical analysis. Accordingly, 
the research methodological choice in relation to this study is quantitative. 
According to Saunders et al. (2012), research strategy consists of 
experiment, survey, archival research, case study, ethnography, action research, 
grounded theory and narrative inquiry. Experiment and survey are associated 
with quantitative research, while archival research and case study could fit both 
quantitative and qualitative research. Other strategies are associated with 
qualitative research. Survey strategy is a form of research that collects data from 
a range of respondents by asking numerous questions (Bryman and Bell, 2011) 
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and archival research strategy is a form of research that gathers data from 
administrative records and documents, both historical and recent, as the foremost 
sources of data (Saunders et al., 2012). It should be noted that both strategies 
were applied in previous research in corporate diversification, corporate 
governance and CSP.  
Even though survey and archival fit with this research, most previous 
studies on CSP prefer to use archival research. For example, Ma et al. (2016); 
Dam and Scholtens (2013); Kang (2013); Walls et al. (2012); Bouten et al. (2011) 
have employed archival as the research strategy. Only a small number of studies 
concerning the CSP relationship, such as Park et al. (2014); Christmann (2004) 
used a questionnaire survey strategy in CSP studies. However, according to Ma 
et al. (2016) many authors contend that self-information disclosure vis-à-vis CSP, 
largely reflects companies‘ social performance and most third parties (e.g. KLD, 
CASS, SNAI, etc.) believe that companies‘ self-reports are significant evidence in 
relation to corporate social performance.  
A cross sectional research time horizon has been applied to this study. 
This design requires collecting data on more than one case and at a single point 
in time (Bryman, 2012). Data was collected from numerous companies which 
were listed on the Indonesia Capital Market (IDX) in 2012 and 2013. All data for 
independent variables were collected from year 2012 databases, whereas data 
for dependent variables were gathered from year 2013 reports. The difference in 
the data collection period happened because the effect of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable did not occur in the same period but in the 
next period. This study used a cross sectional research time horizon owing to 
government regulations in corporate social responsibility pertaining to Indonesian 
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limited companies. Although Indonesian company law states that social and 
environmental responsibility is obligatory for companies that have activities in 
natural resources and/or related to that (Indonesia Company Law no.40 of 2007, 
article 74(1)), government regulation for implementation of this law was issued on 
4 April 2012. Therefore, 2013 is chosen as the basis of measurement for CSP. 
5.5 Population and Sample 
 
The population in relation to this study is public companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The reason for choosing public companies was 
the accessibility of data, particularly from annual reports. This study used a 
purposive sampling method. According to Saunders et al. (2012) purposive 
sampling allows the researcher to use judgement in selecting specific cases that 
are particularly informative with respect to answering the research question. 
Therefore, to secure the best result, this sampling method has been used based 
on several sample criteria. There are four criteria of sampling in this study, which 
are as follows.  
First, the company must have been listed on the IDX in 2012 and 2013. 
This criterion has been chosen because this study employed a one-year lag 
regression model as the data analysis. According to several previous studies on 
CSP, the impact of antecedents on CSP might not occur at the same time 
(Fischer and Sawczyn, 2013; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006). Hence, one-year lag 
regression is suitable for this study. Moreover, this study used listed companies 
taken from 2012-2013 because the Indonesian government‘s regulations on 
corporate social and environmental responsibility applying to limited companies 
(Indonesia Government Regulation no 47 of 2012) did not come into effect until 
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2012. To make sure of a company‘s adoption of this law, this study utilised 
annual reports from 2013 as the source of data.  
The second criterion was a non-financial company. This criterion was 
applied as financial companies are subject to different regulatory oversight and 
capital structure restrictions (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013); hence, corporate financial performance, CSR and CG in 
financial companies are different with companies in other sectors (Lahouel et al., 
2014; Li, Luo, Wang and Wu, 2013; Lien and Li, 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013).  
The third criterion was that the company belongs to an industry which has a 
history of diversification, both industry diversification and international 
diversification. This criterion was utilised to capture the effect of different types of 
diversification on CSP in every industry (Simerly (1997). The final criterion was 
that the company had published its annual report for 2013 and the report should 
contain all data required for this research.  
Furthermore, Table 5.3 has summarised the number of samples. First, this 
study used 459 companies listed in 2012, as the population. Based on the first 
criterion, the number of companies was reduced to 450 companies. The second 
criterion eliminated 83 companies, while the third criterion reduced the number of 
samples to 277 companies. Finally, the fourth exclusion criterion lowered the 
number of samples to 234 listed companies. Furthermore, many data outliers will 
be excluded as a requirement of multiple regression analysis. The process of 
verifying the outliers and the result are present in the data analysis and finding, 
particularly in the descriptive statistics part.      
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 Table 5.3 Sample Based on Selection Process 
Description Number of Companies 
Company listed on IDX at 2012  
Not listed on IDX at 2013 
459 
(9) 
Company listed on IDX from 2012-2013 450 
Financial company (83) 
Non-financial company 367 
No diversification history in 2-digit ISIC (90) 
Has diversification history in 2-digit ISIC 277 
No annual report 2013 or incomplete data  (43) 
Final sample for analysis 234 
Source: Author, based on IDX figures from 2012-2013  
 
5.6 Data collection  
 
Data collection in this study can be divided into two parts, including data 
source and data gathering processes. This study applied secondary data as a 
source of data. According to Saunders et al. (2012) secondary data is acceptable 
as long as the data enables the research questions to be answered and meets 
the research objectives. Additionally, the benefits associated with their use will be 
greater than the costs, plus the data are accessible to the researcher. All 
research questions in this study can be answered by using secondary data, such 
as annual reports as sources of information for self-information disclosure about 
CSP and corporate diversification, Indonesia Capital Market Directory (ICMD) 
and Osiris data based on corporate governance and financial information. Annual 
reports and ICMD are already exist on the IDX website and can be accessed 
easily by the researcher. Moreover, according to (Jizi et al., 2014) the reliability of 
the information in annual reports is high as a result of audited reports. Moreover, 
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having a number of possible secondary data sources benefits the validity and 
reliability aspect.  
Several previous studies, for instance Ma et al. (2016); Dam and Scholtens 
(2013); Kang (2013); Walls et al. (2012); Bouten et al. (2011) also employed 
secondary data, such as annual reports and specific data bases. Therefore, this 
study used secondary data as sources of data. The sources of data were the 
2013 annual reports of the companies on the IDX website; the 2013 Indonesia 
Capital Market Directory (ICMD), which summarised key financial information 
from 2012 and the previous two years, in addition to the Osiris database. All 
variables in this study, excluding CSP, used two sources of data, such as annual 
reports and ICMD, annual reports and Osiris, and furthermore, the ICMD and 
Osiris. Table 5.4 describes sources of data in more detail.   
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Table 5.4 Sources of Data 
Source of Data Variables 
Annual Report (2013) 
 
Corporate Social Performance 
- Disclosure index derived from content 
analysis 
- CSP industry  
Annual Report (2013) and 
Osiris Database 
 
Related Diversification 
- Entropy Measure by sales based on two 
and four digit ISIC 
Unrelated Diversification 
- Entropy Measure by sales based on two 
digit ISIC 
International Diversification  
- Proportion of foreign sales to total Sales 
Independent commissioners 
- Number of independent commissioners in 
the company 
Company Size 
- Number of Employees 
Company age 
- Number of years‘ business establish 
ICMD (2013) and Osiris 
Database 
 
Firm Profitability 
- Return on Asset 
Liquidity 
- Current Ratio  
Financial Leverage 
- Debt to Total Asset 
Intangible asset  
- Market to Book Ratio  
Ownership concentration 
- % public ownership 
Source: compiled by Author 
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The data gathering process consists of four stages. First, the researcher 
determined the type of corporate diversification, product and international 
diversification. This stage was associated with the second selection criterion; the 
companies in an industry which have a history of both product and international 
diversification were included in the study. For product diversification, this study 
collected data from the company‘s sales for every industry based on four- and 
two-digit ISIC codes.  For international diversification, this study employed data 
from company‘s sales based on geography areas, including Indonesia and 
foreign countries. However, the company‘s classification in terms of industry is 
not always the same as ISIC. Consequently, every segment in the annual report 
had to be reclassified based on ISIC codes to measure product diversification.  
The second stage concerning data collection was determining CSP by 
means of content analysis. The data were collected from 2013 annual reports. 
The content analysis, which used CSP indicators, is adapted from the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI). The GRI disclosure items consist of economic, 
environmental and social performance indicators. Companies which have not 
published their annual report, automatically have no CSP data and were 
excluded from the list. The third stage was collecting data pertaining to type of 
industry variable. It was conducted by means of grouping each company‘s CSP 
based on the two-digit ISIC into its industry, and subsequently measuring the 
average CSP for each industry.  
The final stage was data collection of other variables. Data for 
independent commissioners and companies‘ ages was gathered from annual 
reports. Additionally, this study also verified the data accuracy by using Osiris. 
Conversely, data concerning company size (number of employees) was collected 
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from Osiris and confirmed with the annual report. Other variables, such as 
profitability, financial leverage, intangible assets and public ownership were 
collected from ICMD, whilst, other sources were used only for confirmation.  
5.7 Definition of variables and their measurements 
 
The four types of variables are dependent, independent, moderating and 
control variable. The dependent variable is CSP. The independent variables are 
total corporate diversification, related diversification, unrelated diversification and 
geographical diversification. The moderating variable is the independent 
commissioner. To control other variables which are predicted to have an 
influence on the dependent variable, this research applied company size, 
profitability, liquidity, financial leverage, intangible assets, company‘s age, type of 
industry and ownership concentration as the control variables.  
5.7.1 Dependent variable: Corporate Social Performance 
CSP is a company‘s performance in response to stakeholder‘s demands 
and social issues based on multi-dimensional indicators of GRI. It was measured 
by way of occurrence disclosure analysis, as part of content analysis and 
presented in the quantity disclosure index. In line with the definition of occurrence 
disclosure by (Bouten et al., 2011; Hooks and Van Staden, 2011; Joseph and 
Taplin, 2011), this occurrence disclosure analysis was compiled by counting the 
number of CSP items disclosed in companies‘ annual reports against a checklist, 
without considering the amount of disclosure in each item. The checklist of 
disclosure items for CSP indicators was adapted from the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI). However, this study was conducted in the transition period 
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between GRI versions 3 (G3) and (G4); therefore, the checklist adopted relevant 
indicators from both versions. 
In total, there are 80 indicators in the disclosure checklist. Nine indicators 
related to economic performance dimension, 30 indicators used for 
environmental performance dimensions and the remaining 41 indicators for social 
performance dimension, which consists of human rights (11), labour practices 
and decent working conditions (13), product responsibility (9) and society (8). The 
result of the CSP disclosure was presented as a percentage. All indicators are 
shown in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 CSP Indicators in this research 
No GRI Indicators 
 G3 G4  
   1. Economic 
   a. Economic Performance 
1 EC1 EC1 Direct economic value generated and distributed, 
including revenues, operating costs, employee 
compensation, donations and other community 
investments, retained earnings, and payments to capital 
providers and governments 
2 EC2 EC2 Financial implications and other risks and opportunities 
for the organisation's activities due to climate change 
3 EC3 EC3 Coverage of the organisation's defined benefit plan 
obligations.  
4 EC4 EC4 Significant financial assistance received from 
government.  
   b. Market Present 
5 EC5 EC5 Range of ratios of standard entry level wage by gender 
compared to local minimum wage at significant locations 
of operation. 
6 EC7 EC6 Procedures for local hiring and proportion of senior 
management hired from the local community at 
significant locations of operation.  
190 
 
No GRI Indicators 
 G3 G4  
   c. Indirect Economic Impact 
7 EC8 EC7 Development and impact of infrastructure investments 
and services provided primarily for public benefit through 
commercial, in-kind, or pro bono engagement.  
8 EC9 EC8 Understanding and describing significant indirect 
economic impacts, including the extent of impacts.  
   d. Procurement Practice 
9 EC6 EC9 Policy, practices, and proportion of spending on locally-
based suppliers at significant locations of operation.  
   2. Environmental 
   a. Materials 
10 EN1 EN1 Materials used by weight or volume.  
11 EN2 EN2 Percentage of materials used that are recycled input 
materials.  
   b. Energy 
12 EN3 EN3 Direct energy consumption by primary energy source.  
13 EN4 EN3 Indirect energy consumption by primary source. 
14 EN5 EN6 Energy saved due to conservation and efficiency 
improvements. 
15 EN6 EN7 Initiatives to provide energy-efficient or renewable 
energy based products and services, and reductions in 
energy requirements as a result of these initiatives.  
16 EN7 EN6 Initiatives to reduce indirect energy consumption and 
reductions achieved.  
   c. Water 
17 EN8  EN8 Total water withdrawal by source.                   
18 EN9  EN9 Water sources significantly affected by withdrawal of 
water. 
19 EN10 EN10 Percentage and total volume of water recycled and 
reused.  
   d. Biodiversity 
20 EN11 EN11 Location and size of land owned, leased, managed in, or 
adjacent to, protected areas and areas of high 
biodiversity value outside protected areas.        
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No GRI Indicators 
 G3 G4  
21 EN12 EN12 Description of significant impacts of activities, products, 
and services on biodiversity in protected areas and 
areas of high biodiversity value outside protected areas.  
22 EN13 EN13 Habitats protected or restored.  
23 EN15 EN14 Number of IUCN Red List species and national 
conservation list species with habitats in areas affected 
by operations, by level of extinction risk.  
   e.  Emission, effluents and waste 
24 EN16 EN15 Total direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions by 
weight. 
25 EN16 EN16 Total direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions by 
weight. 
26 EN17 EN17 Other relevant indirect greenhouse gas emissions by 
weight.  
27 EN18 EN19 Initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
reductions achieved. 
28 EN19 EN20 Emissions of ozone-depleting substances by weight.  
29 EN20 EN21 NOx, SOx, and other significant air emissions by type 
and weight.                                             
30 EN21 EN22 Total water discharge by quality and destination.  
31 EN22 EN23 Total weight of waste by type and disposal method.  
32 EN23 EN24 Total number and volume of significant spills.  
33 EN24 EN25 Weight of transported, imported, exported, or treated 
waste deemed hazardous under the terms of the Basel 
Convention Annex I, II, III, and VIII, and percentage of 
transported waste shipped internationally.  
34 EN25 EN26 Identity, size, protected status, and biodiversity value of 
water bodies and related habitats significantly affected 
by the reporting organisation's discharges of water and 
runoff 
   f. Product and service 
35 EN26 EN27 Initiatives to mitigate environmental impacts of products 
and services, and extent of impact mitigation. 
36 EN27 EN28 Percentage of products sold and their packaging 
materials that are reclaimed by category.  
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No GRI Indicators 
 G3 G4  
   g. Compliance 
37 EN28 EN29 Monetary value of significant fines and total number of 
non-monetary sanctions for non-compliance with 
environmental laws and regulations.  
   h. Transport 
38 EN29 EN30 Significant environmental impacts of transporting 
products and other goods and materials used for the 
organisation's operations, and transporting members of 
the workforce.  
   i. Overall 
39 EN30 EN31 Total environmental protection expenditures and 
investments by type. 
   3. Social: Labour practice and decent work 
   a. Employment 
40 LA2 LA1 Total number and rate of new employee hires and 
employee turnover by age group, gender, and region.  
41 LA3 LA2 Benefits provided to full-time employees that are not 
provided to temporary or part-time employees, by major 
operations.  
42 LA15 LA3 Return to work and retention rates after parental leave, 
by gender. 
   b. Labour/Management relation 
43 LA5 LA4 Minimum notice period(s) regarding significant 
operational changes, including whether it is specified in 
collective agreements.  
   c. Occupational Health and safety 
44 LA6 LA5 Percentage of total workforce represented in formal joint 
management-worker health and safety committees that 
help monitor and advice on occupational health and 
safety programmes.  
45 LA7 LA6 Rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days, and 
absenteeism, and number of work-related fatalities by 
region and gender. 
46 LA8 LA7 Education, training, counselling, prevention, and risk-
control programmes in place to assist workforce 
members, their families, or community members 
regarding serious diseases. 
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No GRI Indicators 
 G3 G4  
47 LA9 LA8 Health and safety topics covered in formal agreements 
with trade unions.  
   d. Training and Education 
48 LA10 LA9 Average hours of training per year per employee by 
gender and by employee category.  
49 LA11 LA10 Programmes for skills management and lifelong learning 
that support the continued employability of employees 
and assist them in managing career endings.  
50 LA12 LA11 Percentage of employees receiving regular performance 
and career development reviews by gender. 
   e. Diversity and equal opportunity 
51 LA13 LA12 Composition of governance bodies and breakdown of 
employees per employee category according to gender, 
age group, minority group membership, and other 
indicators of diversity. 
   f. Equal remuneration for women and men 
52 LA14 LA13 Ratio of basic salary of men to women by employee 
category. 
 
   3 Social: Human Right 
   a. Investment and procurement practices 
53 HR1 RH1 Percentage and total number of significant investment 
agreements and contracts that include human rights 
clauses or that have undergone human rights screening.  
54 HR2 RH10 Percentage of significant suppliers, contractors, and 
other business partners that have undergone human 
rights screening and actions taken.  
55 HR3 RH2 Total hours of employee training on policies and 
procedures concerning aspects of human rights that are 
relevant to operations, including the percentage of 
employees trained.  
   b. Non discrimination 
56 HR4 RH3 Total number of incidents of discrimination and 
corrective actions taken. 
 
 
 
194 
 
No GRI Indicators 
 G3 G4  
   c. Freedom of association and collective 
bargaining 
57 HR5 RH4 Operations and significant suppliers identified in which 
the right to exercise freedom of association and 
collective bargaining may be at significant risk, and 
actions taken to support these rights.  
   d. Child labour 
58 HR6 RH5 Operations and significant suppliers identified as having 
significant risk for incidents of child labour, and 
measures taken to contribute to the elimination of child 
labour.  
   e. Prevention of forced and compulsory labour 
59 HR7 RH6 Operations and significant suppliers identified as having 
significant risk for incidents of forced or compulsory 
labour, and measures to contribute to the elimination of 
all forms of forced or compulsory labour.  
   f. Security practice 
60 HR8 RH7 Percentage of security personnel trained in the 
organisation's policies or procedures concerning aspects 
of human rights that are relevant to operations.  
   g. Indigenous practice 
61 HR9 RH8 Total number of incidents of violations involving rights of 
indigenous people and actions taken. 
   h. Assessment 
62 HR10 RH9 Percentage and total number of operations that have 
been subject to human rights reviews and/or impact 
assessments. 
   i. Remediation 
63 HR11 RH12 Number of grievances related to human rights filed, 
addressed, and resolved through formal grievance 
mechanisms. 
   3 Social: Society  
   a. Local communities 
64 SO1 SO1 Percentage of operations with implemented local 
community engagement, impact assessments, and 
development programmes. 
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No GRI Indicators 
 G3 G4  
65 SO9 SO2 Operations with significant potential or actual negative 
impacts on local communities 
   b. Corruption 
66 SO2 SO3 Percentage and total number of business units analysed 
for risks related to corruption.  
67 SO3 SO4 Percentage of employees trained in organisation's anti-
corruption policies and procedures.  
68 SO4 SO5 Actions taken in response to incidents of corruption. 
   c. Public Policy 
69 SO6 SO6 Total value of financial and in-kind contributions to 
political parties, politicians, and related institutions by 
country. 
   d. Anti-competitive behaviour 
70 SO7 SO7 Total number of legal actions for anti-competitive 
behaviour, anti-trust, and monopoly practices and their 
outcomes.  
   e. Compliance 
71 SO8 SO8 Monetary value of significant fines and total number of 
non-monetary sanctions for non-compliance with laws 
and regulations.  
   3  Social: Product responsibility 
   a. Customer health and safety 
72 PR1 PR1 Life cycle stages in which health and safety impacts of 
products and services are assessed for improvement, 
and percentage of significant products and services 
categories subject to such procedures.  
73 PR2 PR2 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with 
regulations and voluntary codes concerning health and 
safety impacts of products and services during their life 
cycle, by type of outcomes.  
   b. Product and service labelling 
74 PR3 PR3 Type of product and service information required by 
procedures, and percentage of significant products and 
services subject to such information requirements.  
75 PR4 PR4 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with 
regulations and voluntary codes concerning product and 
service information and labelling, by type of outcomes.  
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No GRI Indicators 
 G3 G4  
76 PR5 PR5 Practices related to customer satisfaction, including 
results of surveys measuring customer satisfaction.  
   c. Marketing communication 
77 PR6 PR6 Programmes for adherence to laws, standards, and 
voluntary codes related to marketing communications, 
including advertising, promotion, and sponsorship.  
78 PR7 PR7 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with 
regulations and voluntary codes concerning marketing 
communications, including advertising, promotion, and 
sponsorship by type of outcomes.  
   d. Customer policy 
79 PR8 PR8 Total number of substantiated complaints regarding 
breaches of customer privacy and losses of customer 
data.  
   e. Compliance 
80 PR9 PR9 Monetary value of significant fines for non-compliance 
with laws and regulations concerning the provision and 
use of products and services.  
Source: adapted from Global Reporting Initiative (2013, 2011) 
To measure the quantity of the disclosure index concerning CSP, a binary 
coding system is used. All CSP indicators in Table 6.1 score 1 if disclosed and 0 
if not disclosed. The CSP indices in this research will have 0 for a minimum score 
in the index and 100 for a maximum score. The higher score reflects the greater 
extent and quality of the disclosure, which denotes that the company has a 
higher CSP level. 
Equation 5.1 CSP measurement 
     
                              
  
       (5.1)        
         
Furthermore, the complete information vis-à-vis disclosure analysis in this study 
is described in the data analysis, particularly in the content analysis section. 
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5.7.2 Independent variable 
 
The independent variable in this study is corporate diversification, 
including product and international diversification. As stated in Chapter 2, 
corporate diversification is a company strategy related to operating in multiple 
businesses or different businesses, in terms of product or industry, market or 
resources. The differentiation in business is only represented by various products 
and markets. In terms of product, corporate diversification is divided into related 
and unrelated diversification; whilst in terms of market, this study employed 
international diversification.  
Related diversification is defined as corporate strategy to operate in a 
related business in the same industry group, which is reflected in the same two-
digit ISIC code, although they have a different industry segment under four-digit 
ISIC codes. Unrelated diversification is corporate strategy, which operates the 
business in a different business or industry group based on two-digit ISIC codes. 
These definitions are strongly associated with the business count approach. This 
approach is suitable for measuring diversification variables in this study. The 
advantages of the business count approach are objectivity, reliability, availability 
of information, ease of calculation and it is less time consuming (Martin and 
Sayrak, 2003; Sambharya, 2000; Montgomery, 1982; Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). 
The business count approach has several measurement approaches, including 
number of segments, HI and entropy measures. However, only the entropy 
measure can capture the distribution of a company‘s involvement in each 
business and simultaneously measure the relatedness of the business based on 
industry. Therefore, this study applies this method to measure corporate 
diversification, as do several previous studies (Ataullah et al., 2014; Erdorf et al., 
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2013; Kang, 2013; Lien and Li, 2013; Park and Jang, 2013b, 2013a; Chen and 
Yu, 2012; Park and Jang, 2012). 
 Entropy measurement needs an established product classification system 
code to identify product or industry diversification. This study uses the new 
version of the ISIC All Economic Activities, ISIC Rev.4 (Nation, 2009). ISIC is a 
coherent and consistent classification based on international agreement about 
concepts, definitions, principles and classification rules, adopted internationally 
and used by the majority of countries, including Indonesia, to develop a national 
classification (Nation, 2009). The last revision of this classification is ISIC Rev 4, 
used to develop Klasifikasi Baku Lapangan Usaha Indonesia (KBLI) or the 
Indonesian standard Industry classification of all economic activities (BPS (2009). 
The ISIC data consists of a two- to four-digit schema to define business or 
industry affiliation.  
Entropy measure, which was adopted from a study by Palepu (1985), is 
applied for both related and unrelated diversification. The entropy measure for 
related diversification consists of two formulas. The first measures the 
relatedness between segment industries based on four-digit ISIC codes, within a 
group industry based on 2-digit codes. As a company can operate in several 
industry groups, the second formula is applied to measure the total related 
diversification. The formulas for related diversification are as follows:  
Equation 5.2 Related Diversification in several segments 
    ∑   
 
     
 
  
                                                             (5.2)     
Equation 5.3 Total Related Diversification 
   ∑     
 
                                                   (5.3)  
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Where: 
    = The related diversification in several segments within an industry group 
  
    =  The share of the segment i of group j in the total sales of the group 
    =  The weighted average of total related diversification within the entire group 
share  
      =  The share of jth group sales in the total sales of the company 
The entropy measure for unrelated diversification is calculated by means of the 
following formula: 
Equation 5.4 Total Unrelated Diversification 
   ∑     
 
  
 
                                                              (5.4) 
Where: 
DU = The weighted average of unrelated diversification in all entire group shares.  
As the total product or industry-based corporate diversification is the sum 
of related diversification and unrelated diversification, related diversification can 
be measured by applying the following formula: 
Equation 5.5 Total Related Diversification 
DR = TD –DU            (5.5) 
Equation 5.6 Total Diversification 
   ∑     
 
  
 
              (5.6) 
   
Where: 
TD = Total diversification 
Pi   = The share of ith segment sales in the total sales of the company 
A few examples of entropy measure related to total, related and unrelated 
diversification in this research can be seen in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6 Diversification with Entropy Measure 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
Firm  Proportion Sales Proportion Sales 
Proportion 
Sales 
Total  Diversification 
code Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Proportion Total Related Unrelated 
  
Segment 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
Total 
 
1 
 
2 
 
Total  
 
Total 
Sales       
DVLA 1.00     1.00     0.00   1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
INKP 0.83 0.17   1.00     0.00   1.00 0.46 0.46 0.00 
SSTM 0.83 0.15 0.02 1.00     0.00   1.00 0.52 0.52 0.00 
CPIN 0.75 0.08 0.04 0.87 0.13   0.13   1.00 0.81 0.42 0.39 
MAIN 0.68     0.68 0.32   0.32   1.00 0.63 0.00 0.63 
PTRO 0.93     0.93 0.07 0.01 0.07   1.00 0.29 0.02 0.27 
SMAR 0.91     0.91 0.06   0.06 0.03 1.00 0.37 0.00 0.37 
SMSM 0.70 0.11   0.81 0.10   0.10 0.09 1.00 0.93 0.32 0.62 
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An additional independent variable in this study is international 
diversification. International diversification is a strategy employed by Indonesian 
companies which operate not only in Indonesia but also in other countries. 
Hence, they have foreign and domestic sales. This variable is measured by using 
the uni-dimensional measure, ratio of foreign sales to total sales (Kang, 2013; 
Majocchi and Strange, 2012). This measure was used because of the availability 
of data. Data related to company‘s sales based on geographical segments in 
audited financial reports are not uniform. Some companies, for instance 
Ekadharma International Ltd, Unggul Indah Cahaya Ltd and Trias Sentosa Ltd, 
report their sales in detail by country. Others, for instance Intikeramik Alamasri 
Ltd, PT Mulia Industrindo Ltd, and Alumindo Light Metal Industry Ltd, report their 
sales by region, e.g. the Middle East, Asia, South Africa and Europe. Other 
companies, such as PT. Surya Toto, Citra Turbindo, and Tembaga Mulia 
Semanan Ltd, only stated their sales as Indonesian or foreign. Therefore, a multi-
dimensional measure, such as Kim‘s entropy index (Kim, 1989a) cannot be 
applied in this research.   
5.7.3 Moderating Variable: independent commissioner and ownership 
concentration 
 
The moderating variables in this research are independent commissioner 
and ownership concentration. The definition of independent commissioner is 
derived from Indonesian Company Law no.40 of 2007, Articles 120(1`) and (2): a 
member of the Board of Commissioners, who has no affiliation either directly and 
indirectly to controlling shareholders, shareholders, management, and/or other 
members of the board, or has no business relationship with business activities of 
the company. This definition is similar to those for outside and non-executive 
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directors in Europe and other Asian countries. The independent commissioner in 
this research was measured by the number in a company. 
Ownership concentration is the mirror image of ownership dispersion or 
ownership diffusion in other studies (Kiliç, Kuzey and Uyar, 2015; Khan et al., 
2013; Jacoby and Zheng, 2010). Ownership concentration in this study is 
measured by the total share owned by shareholders who own less than 5%. In 
other words, the proportion of shares owned by the public or unknown. Based on 
this definition, a lower value reflects more concentrated ownership in a company. 
From the ownership dispersion or diffusion point of view, the higher the value of 
this variable, the greater the ownership dispersion. This measurement is in line 
with studies, such as Kiliç et al. (2015); Khan et al. (2013). The cut-off of 5% 
follows previous studies for example (Nguyen et al., 2015; Jacoby and Zheng, 
2010) to differentiate majority ownership from public ownership.           
5.7.4 Control Variables 
 
To control other variables which are predicted to have an effect on CSP, 
this study applies a number of control variables, based on previous studies: T 
company size, profitability, liquidity, financial leverage, intangible assets, 
company age, type of industry, in addition to ownership concentration. Company 
size is the number of employees, presented in logarithmic form. The 
measurement is generally used in CSP and CSR research area, such as Fischer 
and Sawczyn (2013); Kang (2013); Ho and Wang (2012); Zhang (2012). 
Neubaum and Zahra (2006) ascertained a strong correlation between the number 
of employees and other proxies of company size (e.g. natural log of total assets 
and total sales). Profitability in this research is measured by ROA, as in other 
studies, for instance Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013); McGuire et al. (2012); Walls et 
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al. (2012). ROA defines a company‘s ability to generate profit from company 
assets. It is expressed as a percentage of earnings before tax to total assets.  
Company liquidity is measured by using current ratio, a comparison 
between current assets and short-term liabilities (Neubaum and Zahra (2006). 
Regarding the financial leverage, debt to total asset ratio captures the proportion 
of debt in company financing as the measurement, as used by Li, S. et al. (2015); 
Lahouel et al. (2014); Kang (2013); Li et al. (2013); Ho and Wang (2012); 
McGuire et al. (2012); Brammer et al. (2006). The intangible asset is captured by 
using the market to book value ratio, as used by Kang (2013); Ho and Wang 
(2012). Company‘s age reflects the number of years since the company‘s 
establishment, represented as a logarithm, and employed by Li, S. et al. (2015); 
Surroca and Tribó (2008). Finally, type of industry is based on the two-digit ISIC 
code and measured by the average of CSP in the industry (Kang, 2013). This 
measurement is in line with prior studies, such as Kiliç et al. (2015); Khan et al. 
(2013).  
5.7.5 Summary of definition of variable and their measurement  
 
A summary of definitions, measurements and sources for every variable is given 
in Table 5.7.  
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Table 5.7 Operationalisation of  Variables  
Variables  Definitions Measurements Sources 
Dependent 
Variable 
   
Corporate 
Social 
Performance 
Company 
performance in 
response to 
stakeholder demand 
and social issues 
based on GRI 
indicators 
Disclosure index 
derived from content 
analysis by using 80 
social performance 
indicators of GRI 
 
Fischer and 
Sawczyn (2013); 
Haji (2013); 
Kang (2013); 
Bouten et al. 
(2011); Hooks 
and Van Staden 
(2011) 
Independent 
Variables 
   
Related 
Diversification 
Corporate strategy to 
operate in related 
business which is 
reflected in the same 
two digits ISIC, but is 
different regarding 
four digit ISIC  
Entropy Measure 
Based on four digit 
ISIC 
    ∑  
 
   
  
 
  
  
   ∑    
 
   
      
Kang (2013); 
Park and Jang 
(2013a); Chen 
and Yu (2012); 
Kranenburg et al. 
(2004); Palepu 
(1985); 
Jacquemin and 
Berry (1979) 
Unrelated 
Diversification 
Corporate strategy to 
operate in different 
business or industry 
based on two-digit 
ISIC 
Entropy Measure 
Based on two-digit 
ISIC 
   ∑    
 
  
 
   
 
 
Kang (2013); 
Park and Jang 
(2013a); Chen 
and Yu (2012); 
Kranenburg et al. 
(2004); Palepu 
(1985); 
Jacquemin and 
Berry (1979) 
International 
Diversification 
Corporate strategy of 
Indonesian company 
to operate in different 
countries 
Proportion of foreign 
sales to total sales 
 
Krapl (2015); 
Kang (2013) 
Independent 
commissioner 
or independent 
director 
Independent 
commissioner is a 
member of the board 
of commissioners 
which is 
not affiliated with the 
directors, other 
commissioners and 
controlling 
Number of 
independent 
commissioners in 
the company 
Ducassy and 
Montandrau 
(2015); Zhang 
(2012 
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stockholders, as well 
as free from the 
business relationship 
or other relationships 
that may affect its 
ability to act 
independently or act  
solely for the benefit 
of the company. 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Share portion which 
is owned by the 
largest shareholder in 
a company 
Percentage of Stock 
held by publict  
Kiliç et al. 
(2015); Khan et 
al. (2013) 
Control 
Variables 
   
Company size Company size based 
on total number of 
employees 
Natural Log of 
number of 
employees  
 
 
Kang (2013); Ho 
and Wang 
(2012); Zhang 
(2012) 
Fischer and 
Sawczyn (2013); 
Brammer et al. 
(2006); 
Neubaum and 
Zahra (2006) 
Profitability Company ability to 
generate profit based 
on company‘s asset.   
Return on Asset 
(ROA): Earning 
before tax to Total 
Asset 
Ducassy and 
Montandrau 
(2015); Ho and 
Wang (2012); J. 
McGuire et al. 
(2012); Zhang 
(2012); Surroca 
and Tribó (2008); 
Neubaum and 
Zahra (2006) 
Liquidity  Current Ratio: 
current asset to 
Short term liabilities 
Neubaum and 
Zahra (2006) 
Financial 
Leverage 
The proportion of 
debt on company‘s 
financing  
Debt to Total Asset Li, S. et al. 
(2015); Lahouel 
et al. (2014); 
(Peng and Yang, 
2014); Kang 
(2013); Li et al. 
(2013); Ho and 
Wang (2012); 
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McGuire et al. 
(2012); Brammer 
et al. (2006) 
Intangible 
asset 
Company‘s intangible 
asset which is 
reflected in market to 
book value 
Market to Book 
Ratio 
Ho and Wang 
(2012) 
Kang (2013) 
Company‘s 
age 
Number of years 
company established 
Number of years 
company 
established 
Li, S. et al. 
(2015); Surroca 
and Tribó (2008) 
Type of 
industry 
Type of industry 
based on two digit 
ISIC 
CSP industry based 
on two digit ISIC 
Kang (2013); Ho 
and Wang 
(2012); McGuire 
et al. (2012); 
Neubaum and 
Zahra (2006) 
Source: Adapted from several studies 
 
5.8 Data analysis 
 
This section explains the descriptive statistical analysis used to verify the 
data prior to the main analysis by way of multiple regression.  
5.8.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
 
Five descriptive statistical analyses checked the compatibility of the data 
set with the multiple regression analysis. The first was the outlier test, conducted 
to avoid serious distortion in statistical test results (Hair, Black, Babin and 
Anderson, 2010). This study used a univariate perspective with a cut-off standard 
score (ZScore) of 4 as the outlier test. Outliers which appear because of 
extraordinary events or with no explanation are eliminated. The second was the 
normality test of the error term, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. It was also 
employed to remedy any violation in the normality assumption, to increase 
confidence in interpretation and prediction in multiple regression, as suggested 
by Hair et al. (2010). The remedy was conducted via transformation of data 
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based on a normal probability model and distribution. The values related to 
dependent variables were transformed by using inverse density function normal 
(IDF Normal) (Weinberg and Abramowitz, 2008).  
The third was the multicollinearity test, conducted to ensure the reliability 
of the regression coefficient (Pallant (2013), to avoid the coefficient being 
imprecise, not significant, having an opposite sign and changing the number of 
observations (Asteriou and Hall, 2011). This study utilised two types of 
multicollinearity test. The first was the correlation matrix of independent variables 
using a correlation value below 0.90, as the cut-off (Hair et al., 2010). To produce 
robust findings, this study applied Pearson‘s parametric and Spearman‘s non-
parametric coefficients in the correlation matrix, as conduct by (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). The second test for multicollinearity was tolerance value and 
its inverse, as well as the variance inflation factors (VIF). Non-essential 
multicollinearity was established in five regression models: 6, 7, 8, 9 and 14. The 
non-essential multicollinearity is due purely to scaling of the interaction effect, 
which algebraically originated from multiplication of two of the predictors: 
diversification and independent commissioner variables. Therefore, as suggested 
by Cohen (2003), this research applied centred regression to eliminate the non-
essential muticollinearity. Centred regression was used in similar studies, such as 
Aguilera-Caracuel et al. (2015); Kang (2013). To discover the best centred 
regression model, this study compared three different models. The first model 
used only one centred variable, independent commissioner; the second model 
used diversification variables, the independent commissioner variable and 
interaction variables; and the third model centred all explanatory variables. 
Furthermore, to choose the best model, the value of tolerance, FIV and ease of 
interpretation were considered. 
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The fourth test was heteroscedasticity. The purpose of this test is to make 
certain the estimators of the regression efficient, and both F statistic and t 
statistic, are reliable for hypothesis testing (Asteriou and Hall, 2011). The 
heretoscedasticity test in this study was the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) test. The final test was linearity of model regression to make sure that the 
model is linear (Asteriou and Hall, 2011) and used the residual plot to test the 
linearity. All the tests and results met the requirements; therefore, multiple 
regression as the principal form of analysis was performed.   
5.8.2 Content Analysis 
 
CSP is defined as a company‘s performance in response to stakeholder 
demands and social issues based on multi-dimensional indicators of GRI and 
measured by content analysis. In CSP context, some authors agree that content 
analysis  describe as quantifying the extent or quality of CSP disclosure in the 
published company documents, printed and/or online (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et 
al., 2015; Jizi et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2013; Bouten et al., 2011; Hooks and Van 
Staden, 2011; Joseph and Taplin, 2011). The definition of content analysis is 
relates with disclosure, therefore these authors refers content analysis as 
disclosure analysis. CSP disclosure was used to measure CSP because the 
assumption that the more information a company discloses its CSP activities, the 
greater its CSP (Fischer and Sawczyn (2013); Clarkson et al. (2008).  
Content analysis also relates to company‘s channel of information. In this 
research the annual report was chosen for CSP disclosure as publication of the 
report is a legal obligation, and CSP information is part of the report. According to 
Indonesia Company Law no.40 of 2007, article 66(2), all limited companies have 
to report the implementation of social and environmental responsibility in their 
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annual report. This is supported by Indonesia‘s financial accounting standard, 
Pernyataan Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (PSAK) No 1 of 2009, on social and 
environmental responsibility disclosure. Moreover, according to (Jizi et al., 2014) 
the reliability of the information in annual report is high as the result of audited 
report.  
The type of disclosure analysis in this study is occurrence disclosure. An 
occurrence disclosure was compiled by counting the number of CSP items 
disclosed against a checklist, without taking into account the amount of 
disclosure in each item (Bouten et al., 2011; Hooks and Van Staden, 2011; 
Joseph and Taplin, 2011). This measurement is suitable for emerging countries, 
as Joseph and Taplin (2011) suggest that the extent of disclosure in such 
economies is low. It is, in any case, considered as a practical and valid research 
tool (Hooks and Van Staden, 2011), used extensively, e.g. by Haji (2013); Hooks 
and Van Staden (2011); Joseph and Taplin (2011); Clarkson et al. (2008); Al-
Tuwaijri et al. (2004).  
In line with previous study that used disclosure occurrence such (Jizi et 
al., 2014; Haji, 2013; Hooks and Van Staden, 2011), the disclosure occurrence in 
this study as  consists of three steps. First, a checklist of disclosure items is 
compiled and validated. The checklist of disclosure items for CSP was adapted 
from Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) indicators, with guidelines readily available 
on GRI‘s website. The reasons for using uses GRI as reference for CSP 
indicators are, first, that GRI is the most relevant organisation in economic, 
environmental and social performance disclosure or CSR disclosure 
(Gamerschlag, Möller and Verbeeten, 2011). Second, it has been drafted by a 
wide variety of experts based on stakeholder consultation (Bouten et al., 2011), 
reflecting stakeholder demands. Third, GRI is accepted internationally (Bouten et 
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al., 2011; Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Farneti and Guthrie, 2009). Fourth, GRI 
indicators are intended for all types of company, allowing for a derived coding 
structure to be used for different industries (Bouten et al., 2011; Willis, 2003). 
Therefore, the disclosure index in this study can be considered as valid.   
This study was conducted in the transition period between GRI versions 3 
(G3) and (G4), and it adopted relevant indicators from each version. There are 
six categories of change to standard disclosure from G3 to G4: no change to 
standard disclosure, new standard, data points added, content reduced, content 
from standard disclosure moved to guidance, and standard disclosure deleted. 
Indicators which have not changed are used, but those which are new or move to 
guidance or deleted were removed. Indicators with data points added in G4 
continued to use G3 as standard, but indicators which were reduced in G4 now 
used G4 as standard. After these adjustments had been made, all indicators 
were suitable for companies which still used G3 or which had adopted G4. In 
relation to numbers and numbering, there are cases where two indicators in G3 
were combined as one indicator in G4 and, one indicator in G3 was split to 
become two indicators in G4. In this case, complete number and numbering 
indicators are used as guidance in measuring CSP. 
80 indicators remained for use in this study. Nine indicators were for 
economic performance dimension, 30 for environmental performance dimension 
consists, and the remaining 41 for social performance divided into human rights 
dimension (11), labour practices and decent working conditions dimension (13), 
product responsibility dimension (9) and society dimension (8). For example, the 
development and impact of infrastructure investments and services supporting on 
communities and the local economy come under economic performance; the 
percentage of recycled material used under environmental performance; 
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programmes for skills management and lifelong learning that support continued 
employability and assist employees in managing their career endings, and 
operations with significant potential or actual negative impacts on local 
communities and practices related to customer satisfaction under social 
performance. 
The second step in disclosure occurrence determines the scoring and 
presentation of the disclosure index. Every item in the disclosure list was 
weighted equally to avoided subjectivity (Joseph and Taplin, 2011): an 
unweighted disclosure index. This study applied a binary coding system, each 
item scoring 1 if disclosed and 0 if undisclosed, whether stated in terms of quality 
or quantity. According to Hooks and Van Staden (2011), there is a debate related 
to the binary coding system and quality disclosure. Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) argue 
that quality disclosure may provide a better and more objective measure of 
disclosure, while Botosan (2004, 1997) argues binary coding is more objective 
than a quality index. Botosan (2004) also argued that no universally accepted 
point of view of quality exists. To test this argument, Hooks and Van Staden 
(2011) conducted a correlation test on both in evaluating environmental 
disclosure. They found their measurements were very highly correlated with R 
0.929 and p<0.001, and concluded that using either of them in future analysis 
would not result in any major difference.  
This study therefore uses quantity disclosure with binary coding, 1 for the 
presence of a CSP indicator and 0 otherwise. After scoring the information, all 
scores were summed arithmetically. The minimum score was zero and the 
maximum the same as the number of indicators or items, 79. The total score was 
divided by the sum of the maximum score for all items in the disclosure index, as 
a percentage, used in previous studies, e.g. Haji (2013); Khan et al. (2013).   
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The third step is the quantified process of compiling a disclosure index for 
CSP involved reading the annual reports and highlighting relevant sentences 
relating to CSP, and coding them in accordance with the items in the list: 1 for 
every disclose CSP is defined as a company‘s performance in response to 
stakeholder demands and social issues based on multi-dimensional indicators of 
GRI and measured by content analysis. From the context of CSP, specific 
authors agree that content analysis is described as quantifying the extent or 
quality of CSP disclosure in published company documents, printed and/or online 
(Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Jizi et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2013; Bouten et 
al., 2011; Hooks and Van Staden, 2011; Joseph and Taplin, 2011). The definition 
of content analysis is related to disclosure; therefore, these authors refer to 
content analysis as disclosure analysis. CSP disclosure was used to measure 
CSP because the assumption that the more information a company discloses 
with respect to its CSP activities, the greater its CSP (Fischer and Sawczyn 
(2013); Clarkson et al. (2008).  
Content analysis also relates to a company‘s channel of information. In 
this research, the annual report was chosen concerning CSP disclosure as 
publication of the report is a legal obligation, and CSP information is part of the 
report. According to Indonesia Company Law no.40 of 2007, Article 66(2), all 
limited companies have to report the implementation of social and environmental 
responsibility in their annual report. This is supported by Indonesia‘s financial 
accounting standard, Pernyataan Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (PSAK) No 1 of 
2009, on social and environmental responsibility disclosure. Moreover, according 
to (Jizi et al., 2014) the reliability of the information in an annual report is high, 
seeing as it is the result of the audited report.  
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The type of disclosure analysis in this study is occurrence disclosure. An 
occurrence disclosure was compiled by counting the number of CSP items 
disclosed against a checklist, without considering the amount of disclosure in 
each item (Bouten et al., 2011; Hooks and Van Staden, 2011; Joseph and Taplin, 
2011). This measurement is suitable for emerging countries, as Joseph and 
Taplin (2011) suggest that the extent of disclosure in such economies is low. It is, 
in any case, considered as a practical and valid research tool (Hooks and Van 
Staden, 2011), used extensively by Haji (2013); Hooks and Van Staden (2011); 
Joseph and Taplin (2011); Clarkson et al. (2008); Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004).  
In line with previous studies that used disclosure occurrence such as (Jizi 
et al., 2014; Haji, 2013; Hooks and Van Staden, 2011), the disclosure occurrence 
in this study consists of three steps. First, a checklist of disclosure items is 
compiled and validated. The checklist of disclosure items for CSP was adapted 
from Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) indicators, with guidelines readily available 
on GRI‘s website. The reasons for using GRI as a reference for the CSP 
indicators are first that GRI is the most relevant organisation in economic, 
environmental and social performance disclosure or CSR disclosure 
(Gamerschlag et al., 2011). Second, it was drafted by a variety of experts based 
on stakeholder consultation (Bouten et al., 2011), reflecting stakeholder 
demands. Third, GRI is accepted internationally (Bouten et al., 2011; 
Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Farneti and Guthrie, 2009). Fourth, GRI indicators are 
intended for all types of companies, allowing for a derived coding structure to be 
used for different industries (Bouten et al., 2011; Willis, 2003). Therefore, the 
disclosure index in this study can be considered as valid.   
This study was conducted in the transition period between GRI versions 3 
(G3) and (G4), and it adopted relevant indicators from each version. There are 
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six categories of change regarding standard disclosure from G3 to G4: no change 
to standard disclosure, new standard, data points added, content reduced, 
content from standard disclosure moved to guidance and standard disclosure 
deleted. Indicators which have not changed are used; nevertheless, those which 
are new or move to guidance, or deleted were removed. Indicators with data 
points added in G4 continued to use G3 as standard, although indicators reduced 
in G4 now used G4 as standard. After these adjustments had been made, all 
indicators were suitable for companies which still used G3 or which had adopted 
G4. In relation to numbers and numbering, there are cases where two indicators 
in G3 were combined as one indicator in G4 and, one indicator in G3 was divided 
to become two indicators in G4. In this case, complete number and numbering 
indicators are used as guidance in measuring CSP. 
It is worth mentioning that 80 indicators remained for use in this study. 
Nine indicators were related to economic performance dimension, 30 indicators 
for environmental performance dimension and the remaining 40 indicators for 
social performance dimension, which are divided into human rights dimension 
(11), labour practices and decent working conditions dimension (13), product 
responsibility dimension (9) and society dimension (8). For example, the 
development and impact of infrastructure investments and services supporting 
communities and the local economy come under economic performance; the 
percentage of recycled material used under environmental performance; 
programmes for skills management and lifelong learning that support continued 
employability and assist employees in managing their career endings, and 
moreover, operations with significant potential or actual negative impacts on local 
communities and practices related to customer satisfaction under social 
performance. 
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The second step in disclosure occurrence determines the scoring and 
presentation of the disclosure index. Every item in the disclosure list was 
weighted equally to avoided subjectivity (Joseph and Taplin, 2011): an 
unweighted disclosure index. This study applied a binary coding system, each 
item scoring 1 if disclosed and 0 if undisclosed, whether stated in terms of quality 
or quantity. According to Hooks and Van Staden (2011), there is a debate related 
to the binary coding system and quality disclosure. Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) argue 
that quality disclosure may provide an enhanced and more objective measure of 
disclosure, while Botosan (2004, 1997) argues binary coding is more objective 
than a quality index. Botosan (2004) also argued that no universally accepted 
point of view exists regarding quality. To test this argument, Hooks and Van 
Staden (2011) conducted a correlation test on both in evaluating environmental 
disclosure. They noticed their measurements were very highly correlated with R 
0.929 and p<0.001, and concluded that using either of them in future analysis 
would not result in any major difference.  
This study therefore uses quantity disclosure with binary coding, 1 for the 
presence of a CSP indicator and 0 otherwise. After scoring the information, all 
scores were summed arithmetically. The minimum score was zero and the 
maximum the same as the number of indicators or items, 79. The total score was 
divided by the sum of the maximum score for all items in the disclosure index, as 
a percentage, used in previous studies, e.g. Haji (2013); Khan et al. (2013).   
The third step is the quantified process of compiling a disclosure index for 
CSP that involved reading the annual reports and highlighting relevant sentences 
relating to CSP, and coding them in accordance with the items in the list: 1 for 
every disclosed indicator that was on the CSP checklist, otherwise 0. The 
researcher also recorded the page numbers on which the CSP indicators were 
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disclosed, to check for reliability. The scores were summed arithmetically, divided 
by 80 and multiplied by 100 to present the information as a percentage. In this 
step, the researcher read all the annual reports twice, as recommended by Haji 
(2013), and Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006) to guarantee the reliability and 
consistency. The second reading was conducted two weeks after the first, to 
avoid any influence the first scoring might have on the second. Where differences 
occurred between the first and second scores, the annual report was read 
again.d indicator that was on the CSP checklist, otherwise 0. The researcher also 
recorded the page numbers on which the CSP indicators were disclosed, to 
check for reliability. The scores were summed arithmetically, divided by 80 and 
multiplied by 100 to present the information as a percentage. In this step, 
researcher read all the annual reports twice, as recommended by Haji (2013) and 
Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006) to make sure the reliability and consistency. 
The second reading was done two weeks after the first, to avoid any influence the 
first scoring might have on the second. Where differences occurred between the 
first and second scores, the annual report was read again. 
5.8.3 Multiple Regression 
 
This study used multiple regression analysis, specifically multiple 
regression with one-year lag dependent variables, as the primary form of data 
analysis. Multiple regression was used because, according to Hair et al. (2010), it 
is a statistical technique that can be applied to investigate the relationship 
between a dependent variable and independent variables. The technique is 
appropriate to address two types of research problem: prediction and 
explanation. This study investigates the relationship between corporate 
diversification (related, unrelated and international) and CSP. Thus, multiple 
regression is suitable to explain these relationships.  
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However, in regression, not all the relationships between the dependent 
and independent variables are ―instantaneous‖ in nature (Studenmund, 2014). 
Studenmund argues that in such cases, there is the possibility that the economic 
or business situation requires time to change the dependent variables. Several 
studies in CSP have employed 1- or 2-year lag regressions (Fischer and 
Sawczyn, 2013; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006). For example, Fischer and Sawczyn 
(2013) consider CSP as a long-term orientated indicator that is not expected to 
undergo a significant change over a short time. Therefore, to accommodate the 
effect of independent variables on CSP that do not occur immediately or in the 
same period, multiple regression analysis with one-year lagged dependent 
variables was employed in this study. The lagged effect of independent variables 
toward CSP was also suggested by Walls et al. (2012), who investigated the 
effect of CG on CSP, and applied by Kang (2013) who investigated the 
relationship between corporate diversification and CSP. 
Fourteen multiple regression models were used to explain the 
relationships between corporate diversification and CSP. The first five were 
multiple regression without interaction, used to test hypotheses 1 and 2. The next 
eight models were multiple regression models with interaction, to test hypotheses 
3 and 4. Model 14 was the complete model regression. Model 1 only captured 
control variables as explanatory variables. Model 2 used one independent 
variable, related diversification and control variables as explanatory variables. 
Model 3 used one independent variable, unrelated diversification and control 
variables as explanatory variables. Similarly, model 4 used international 
diversification as the independent variable and control variables to explain CSP. 
Model 5 was a combination of models 2, 3 and 4.  
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Interaction variables between corporate diversification and independent 
commissioner were added one by one from model 5 to models 6, 7 and 8. Model 
6 added the interaction variable between related diversification and independent 
commissioner, model 7 the same for unrelated diversification and model 8 for 
international diversification. Model 9 was the complete model for interaction 
between corporate diversification and independent commissioner. As with models 
6 to 9, interaction variables between the several types of corporate diversification 
and ownership concentration were added one by one from model 5 respectively 
to models 10, 11 and 12. Model 10 added interaction variable between related 
diversification and ownership concentration. Model 11 added unrelated 
diversification and ownership concentration, and Model 12 added interaction 
variable between international diversification and ownership concentration. Model 
13 was the complete model for interaction between corporate diversification and 
independent commissioner. Finally, model 14 consisted of all the independent 
and interaction variables with control variables as explanatory variables. All of 
these models contributed to a single complete model as follows: 
Equation 5.7 Model Regression 
                                                  
                                                    
                                            
                                                      (5.7)  
The technique of entering independent variables and the interaction 
variable separately in different models and subsequently combining them in one 
model is termed hierarchical multiple regression or sequential regression (Pallant, 
2013; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). It is a technique that enters variables in 
steps or blocks in the order specified by the researcher based on logical or 
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theoretical consideration. Its purpose was to learn the effect of each type of 
corporate diversification toward CSP and each interaction variable one at a time 
and in accumulation. Other researchers have used this technique, such as Hafsi 
and Turgut (2013); (Kang, 2013); Khan et al. (2013). The individual effect and 
total effect of corporate diversification toward CSP were shown by R square 
change and its significance value between model 1 and models 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
Furthermore, the individual and total effect of interaction were reflected in the R 
square change and its significance between model 5 and the remaining models. 
The R square changes and significance were obtained by way of hierarchical 
regression.  
5.8.4 Additional Analysis 
A robustness test was conducted as additional analysis, changing the 
variable measurements and adding new variables to ascertain that the regression 
coefficients were not fragile. This test was conducted by Ducassy and 
Montandrau (2015); Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013); Dam and Scholtens (2012); 
Walls et al. (2012); Brammer et al. (2006). The robustness check was only 
applied to models 5 and 14, the complete regression models without and with 
interaction. There were three robustness tests. The first replicated the CSP 
measurement by using a quantitative and qualitative disclosure index based on 
quality of disclosure. The second replaced ownership concentration by largest 
ownership. The third added the institutional ownership variable argued to have an 
impact on CSP.         
5.9 Summary 
 
This chapter discussed the selection of Indonesian listed companies as 
the study sample, followed by the process of data collection, including disclosure 
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analysis for CSP measurement and using audited financial and corporate 
sustainability reports as sources of data. It explained the operationalisation of 
variables and their measurement. Finally, the data analysis was discussed in 
detail, including descriptive statistical analysis to screen the data and multiple 
regression as the principal analysis. The research methodology is summarised in 
Table 5.8. Summary 
Table 5.8 Summary of Research Methodology 
Research aims Research 
Questions 
Hypothesis Model 
regression 
To investigate 
the relationship 
between 
corporate 
diversification 
and CSP 
What is the 
relationship 
between product 
diversification and 
CSP? 
H1a: There is a significant 
relationship between related 
diversification and corporate 
social performance 
Model 2 
Model 5 
  H1b: There is a significant 
relationship between 
unrelated diversification and 
corporate social performance 
Model 3 
Model 5 
  H1c: The relationship 
between unrelated 
diversification and CSP is 
more positive than the 
relationship between related 
diversification and CSP 
Model 5 
 What is the 
relationship 
between 
international 
diversification and 
CSP? 
H2: The relationship between 
international diversification 
and corporate social 
performance is positive 
Model 4 
Model 5 
To examine the 
role of corporate 
governance on 
the relationship 
between 
corporate 
diversification 
and CSP 
What is the 
relationship 
between corporate 
diversification and 
CSP via an 
independent 
commissioner as a 
moderating 
variable? 
H3a: The relationship 
between related 
diversification and CSP is 
moderated by an 
independent commissioner 
Model 6 
Model 9 
Model 14 
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Research aims Research 
Questions 
Hypothesis Model 
regression 
  H3b: The relationship 
between unrelated 
diversification and CSP is 
moderated by an 
independent commissioner 
Model 7 
Model 9 
Model 14 
  H3c: The relationship 
between international 
diversification and CSP is 
moderated by an 
independent commissioner 
Model 8 
Model 9 
Model 14 
 What is the 
relationship 
between corporate 
diversification and 
CSP by means of 
ownership 
concentration as a 
moderating 
variable? 
H4a: The relationship 
between related 
diversification and CSP is 
moderated by ownership 
concentration 
Model 10 
Model 13 
Model 14 
  H4b: The relationship 
between unrelated 
diversification and CSP is 
moderated by ownership 
concentration 
Model 11 
Model 13 
Model 14 
  H4c: The relationship 
between international 
diversification and CSP is 
moderated by ownership 
concentration 
Model 12 
Model 13 
Model 14 
Source: Author 
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CHAPTER 6  FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter reports the empirical results and discusses the relationship 
between corporate diversification and CSP in the context of the research 
objectives. The research findings start with descriptive statistical analysis which 
describes the data screening and tests for multiple regression assumptions; it is 
followed by summary statistics for every variable in the research, and ends with 
the results of multiple regression analysis. Discussion of the findings are 
organised in accordance with the two principal research questions, the 
relationship between corporate diversification and CSP and the effect of CG, by 
means of an independent commissioner and ownership concentration, on the 
corporate diversification-CSP relationship.         
6.2 Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
The descriptive statistical analysis involved outlier, normality, 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and linearity tests to ensure the data set was 
compatible with the multiple regressions analysis.  
Derived from the first round of univariate outlier checking, original data 
and Z score values for all companies in the sample are presented in Table 6.1.  
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 Table 6.1 Table Initial descriptive statistics for original and Z score values 
  Original Value Z Score 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
CSP 234 3.75 95.00 -1.375 5.803 
Related Diversification 234 0.00 .81 -0.467 3.658 
Unrelated Diversification 234 0.00 1.07 -0.765 2.686 
International 
Diversification 
234 0.00 100.00 -0.633 2.900 
Size 234 .69 13.44 -3.305 3.432 
Profitability 234 -173.83 72.92 -9.205 3.386 
Liquidity 234 .02 1004.82 -0.146 12.224 
Financial Leverage 234 .03 8.25 -0.874 12.204 
Intangible Asset 234 -33.32 47.27 -6.815 8.569 
Age 234 0.00 4.71 -4.847 2.200 
CSP Industry 234 12.50 40.00 -1.439 3.094 
Ownership Concentration 234 1.00 89.00 -1.469 3.603 
Independent 
Commissioner 
234 1.00 4.00 -0.856 2.922 
Source: Author  
CSP, profitability, liquidity, financial leverage, intangible asset and 
company‘s age with a minimum Z score under -4 or a maximum Z score above 4 
were detected as outliers and excluded from the sample to avoid serious 
distortion of the statistical test results. This process was repeated four times (see 
Appendix 3). In total, 31 observations are omitted. The final sample to analyse 
consists of 203 observations, free from the outlier problem, as described in Table 
6.2.     
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Table 6.2 Final descriptive statistics for original and Z score values 
  Original Value Z Score 
Variable N Minimum Maximum 
Minimu
m 
Maximum 
CSP 203 3.75 53.75 -1.767 3.597 
Related Diversification 203 0.00 .81 -0.439 3.733 
Unrelated Diversification 203 0.00 1.07 -0.799 2.585 
International Diversification 203 0.00 100.00 -0.650 2.971 
Size 203 2.48 11.22 -2.634 2.520 
Profitability 203 -25.38 45.55 -3.128 3.726 
Liquidity 203 .23 7.73 -1.234 3.992 
Financial Leverage 203 .04 1.32 -2.144 3.769 
Intangible Asset 203 -3.16 9.65 -2.685 3.875 
Age 203 1.10 4.71 -3.355 2.318 
CSP Industry 203 12.50 40.00 -1.469 3.355 
Ownership Concentration 203 1.00 83.46 -1.463 3.350 
Independent 
Commissioner 
203 1.00 4.00 -0.836 3.049 
Source: Author  
In the normality test, the first results for all models had a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov‘s significant value of less than 0.05, signifying that the data was not 
normally distributed. After applying the remedy for violation of the normality 
assumption, all the models became normal (see Appendix 4). 
Two types of tests were conducted in relation to multicollinearity to ensure 
the reliability of the regression coefficient. Table 6.3 is the correlation matrix for 
both Pearson‘s parametric and Spearman‘s non-parametric coefficients as the 
first test of multicollinearity. Pearson‘s correlation values ranged between 0.64 
and 0.01 and Spearman‘s between 0.66 and 0.00. On average, the correlation 
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coefficients between variables are relatively low, with a few variables correlated 
moderately (> 0.25), such as independent commissioner and size, financial 
leverage and profitability, liquidity and profitability and financial leverage and 
liquidity. Overall, there is no correlation value greater than 0.90 for either 
Pearson‘s parametric or Spearman‘s non-parametric coefficients. The magnitude 
and direction of both coefficients are basically similar. Hence, these results 
indicate that there is no major multicollinearity issue and that the results are 
robust.  
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 Table 6.3 Pearson‘s and Spearman‘s Correlation Matrices of the Variables 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 CSP    -.052    .188**    .247**    .346**    .117   -.116  -.006    .064    .063    .396**    .243**   .333** 
2 Related Diversification   -.031    -.054    .046    .238**    .028    .050    .046   -.177    .060    .020    .128    .109 
3 Unrelated Diversification    .166**   -.051     .033    .248**    .194**    .061   -.004   -.014    .146*   -.085    .075   -.049 
4 International Diversification    .208**    .040   -.055     .177*   -.017   -.002    .033   -.172*    .184**    .216*   -.040    .151* 
5 Size    .389**    .240**    .241**    .104     .116   -.032*    .099    .056    .242**    .058    .143*   .401** 
6 Profitability    .107    .033    .145*   -.060    .127*    .411**   -.496**    .388**    .060    -.009   -.019    .118 
7 Liquidity   -.167**   -.010   -.044   -.055   -.124*    .325**    -.664**    .123    .124   -.063    .021    .046 
8 Financial Leverage   -.022    .041   -.018    .111    .076   -.477**   -.643**    -.118    .026   -.074   -.027    .038 
9 Intangible Asset    .020   -.103   -.021   -.146*    .010    .327**    .125*   -.131*    -.131    .003   -.181**    .168* 
10 Age    .078    .041    .126*    .046    .164**    .022    .106    .028   -.117*     .001    -.045    .121 
11 CSP Industry    .333**    .077   -.108    .138*    .094    .022   -.026   -.120*    .014    .019     .098    .153* 
12 Ownership Concentration    .251**    .160*    .049   -.043    .098   -.027   -.015   -.013   -.143*    .016    .078     .031 
13 Independent Commissioner    .322**    .118*   -.070    .125*    .413**    .085    .009    .039    .153*    .041    .136*   .064    
Notes: Pearson‘s parametric correlation coefficients are show in the bottom left half of the table and Spearman‘s non-parametric 
correlation coefficients in the upper right half. ***,**, and * denote correlation is significant at the ≤1%, 5%, 10% respectively 
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However, the second multicollinearity test with VIF value indicates a few 
multicollinearity problems in five regression models: models 6, 7, 8 and 9 for the 
moderating effect of independent commissioner and model 14 for the full model. 
The results for models 5 and 14 are shown in Table 6.4. Model 5 represents the 
regression model without interaction and free from the multicollinearity problem, 
while model 14 represents the regression model with interaction and at the same 
time with a multicollinearity problem.    
Table 6.4 Tolerance and VIF values of regression models 5 and 14 
 Model 5 Model 14 
 B Tolerance VIF B Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -.966   1.902   
Size 1.262 .673 1.485 1.254 .659 1.517 
Profitability .055 .657 1.522 .066 .656 1.525 
Liquidity -1.551 .537 1.863 -1.243 .525 1.904 
Financial Leverage -6.280 .463 2.159 -4.842 .440 2.272 
Intangible Asset .109 .800 1.249 .026 .768 1.302 
Age .598 .912 1.097 .729 .878 1.139 
CSP Industry .401 .901 1.110 .407 .883 1.133 
Ownership Concentration .121 .936 1.068 .058 .383 2.612 
Independent Commissioner 2.210 .756 1.323 .458 .411 2.433 
Related Diversification -7.706 .894 1.119 -7.304 .114 8.797 
Unrelated Diversification 3.308 .851 1.175 -7.928 .112 8.944 
International Diversification .053 .918 1.089 -.093 .119 8.437 
Independent Commissioner  
* Related Diversification  
   
-4.249 .105 9.493 
Independent Commissioner 
* Unrelated Diversification   
   
5.626 .152 6.598 
Independent Commissioner  
* International 
Diversification  
   
.072 .124 8.044 
Ownership concentration * 
Related Diversification 
   
.254 .210 4.768 
Ownership concentration *  
Unrelated Diversification 
   
.060 .218 4.588 
Ownership concentration * 
International Diversification 
   
.000 .298 3.356 
Source: Author  
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As revealed in Table 6.4, the highest value of VIF in model 5 is 2.159 and 
the lowest score of tolerance is 0.463. In model 14, the VIF values for 
independent and moderating variables range from 3.356 to 9.493. In line with 
VIF, tolerance values are between 0.298 and 0.105. Based on a cut-off level for 
tolerance below 0.1 and for VIF below 10, all the regression models are free from 
the multicollinearity problem. However, the direction of unrelated diversification 
and international diversification coefficients in model 5 change from a positive to 
a negative sign in model 14 (this also occurs in models 7, 8 and 9). This condition 
indicates that the data has a non-essential multicollinearity problem. To eliminate 
this problem and achieve an accurate explanation and estimation of regression 
analysis, centred regression was applied. All the explanatory variables were 
centred using a standardised value and the results for models 5 and 14 are 
presented in Table 6.5.  
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Table 6.5 Tolerance and VIF values of centered regression for models 5 and 14 
 Model 5 Model 14 
 B Tolerance VIF B Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 20.370   20.214   
Size 2.139 .673 1.485 2.192 .659 1.517 
Profitability .567 .657 1.522 .660 .656 1.525 
Liquidity -2.224 .537 1.863 -2.143 .525 1.904 
Financial Leverage -1.361 .463 2.159 -1.291 .440 2.272 
Intangible Asset .213 .800 1.249 .054 .768 1.302 
Age .381 .912 1.097 .263 .878 1.139 
CSP Industry 2.286 .901 1.110 2.123 .883 1.133 
Ownership Concentration 2.073 .936 1.068 1.929 .878 1.139 
Independent Commissioner 1.707 .756 1.323 1.795 .741 1.350 
Related Diversification -1.490 .894 1.119 -1.604 .822 1.217 
Unrelated Diversification 1.046 .851 1.175 .939 .829 1.207 
International Diversification 1.468 .918 1.089 1.201 .868 1.153 
Independent Commissioner* 
Related Diversification  
   
-.939 .790 1.266 
Independent Commissioner * 
Unrelated Diversification   
   
.968 .930 1.075 
Independent Commissioner * 
International Diversification  
   
1.225 .915 1.092 
Ownership concentration * 
Related Diversification 
   
1.046 .768 1.301 
Ownership concentration *  
Unrelated Diversification 
   
.218 .948 1.055 
Ownership concentration * 
International Diversification 
   
-.081 .900 1.111 
Source: Author 
The tolerance value and VIF remain the same for model 5; however, 
change significantly in model 14, ranging from 0.440 to 0.948 for tolerance and 
from 1.055 to 2.272 for VIF. The signs of the coefficients unrelated diversification 
and international diversification in model 5 are the same as in model 14. Thus, all 
of the regression models are free from the multicollinearity problem (see 
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Appendix 9 for all model regressions). Hence, after this stage, every test employs 
variables with centred values. 
The third descriptive statistical test is for heteroscedasticity. The Breusch-
Pagan LM ensures the efficiency of the estimators and reliability of both F 
statistic and t statistic for hypothesis testing. The results demonstrate that there is 
no heteroscedasticity in any of the regression models (see Appendix 5). The final 
descriptive statistical analysis is for linearity, using residual plot. The residual plot 
of each model shows that all have a linear relationship (see Appendix 6). 
Consequently, the results of all descriptive statistics confirm that the data set is 
compatible with the multiple regressions analysis. Prior to discussion of the 
multiple regression findings, a summary of the variables‘ statistics is given.  
Table 6.6 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics for variables with 
respect to the 203 companies.  
Table 6.6  Descriptive statistics for variables 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
CSP 203 3.75 53.75 20.222 9.322 
Related Diversification 203 0.00 0.81 0.085 0.193 
Unrelated Diversification 203 0.00 1.07 0.253 0.316 
International Diversification 203 0.00 100.00 17.943 27.622 
Size 203 2.48 11.22 6.950 1.695 
Profitability 203 -25.38 45.55 6.991 10.348 
Liquidity 203 0.23 7.73 2.003 1.434 
Financial Leverage  203 0.04 1.32 0.504 0.217 
Intangible Asset 203 -3.16 9.65 2.082 1.953 
Age 203 1.10 4.71 3.234 0.637 
CSP Industry 203 12.50 40.00 20.874 5.701 
Ownership concentration 203 1.00 83.46 26.067 17.130 
Independent Commissioner 203 1.00 4.00 1.645 0.772 
Source: Author 
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In general, the values of every variable varied, as shown by maximum, 
minimum, mean and standard deviation. CSP captures the company 
performance in response to stakeholder demands and social issues based on 79 
GRI indicators, as a percentage. The minimum score for CSP is 3.75%, whilst the 
maximum 53.75%. Thus, the company with the lowest CSP score disclosed only 
3 out of 80 indicators. Conversely, the company with the highest CSP score 
disclosed 42 of the 80 indicators. On average, companies disclosed 16 
indicators. This indicates that the CSP index in the sample is low. 
Industry diversification strategy, as reflected in related and unrelated 
diversification has a minimum entropy measure value of zero, indicating those 
firms which have not adopted a diversification strategy. The maximum value of 
related diversification is 0.81 with an average of 0.08, maximum and mean values 
of 1.07 and 0.25 respectively for unrelated diversification. The unrelated 
diversification value is therefore higher than the related diversification value, 
suggesting a higher level of unrelated diversification.  
In contrast, market diversification (international diversification), has a 
minimum value of 0 and a maximum of 100. Zero denotes that the company has 
no market diversification strategy, and 100 that all the company‘s sales are from 
foreign markets. However, the mean is 17.94%, representing the average of 
foreign sales as a percentage of total sales for all companies. In terms of 
company size, the minimum number of employees is 12 and the maximum 
74,686, giving an average of 3,808. The company profitability value, measured 
by return on total assets (earnings before tax to total assets) ranges from -
25.38% to 45.55%, average 6.99%. The negative sign in the minimum value 
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means the company lost 25.38% of total assets, while the maximum value, 
indicated profitability of 45.55% of total assets.  
This study employs current ratio as the liquidity measurement. This not 
only captures the ability of a company to meet its short-term liability but also 
reflects slack resources. The lowest liquidity value is 0.23, indicating that the 
company‘s current assets are insufficient enough to pay its short-term liability. 
The highest liquidity is 7.07, that is current assets are 7.07 times greater than the 
short-term liability. Thus, with a rule-of-thumb assumption of a ratio equal to two, 
several of the companies have slack resources up to 5.07 times the liability.  
The total debt to total asset ratio is used as the financial leverage 
indicator. The minimum financial leverage is 0.04 and the maximum 1.32. A 
company with the minimum leverage utilised only 4% of debt to cover its assets, 
indicating minimal risk. In contrast, the company with the highest level of leverage 
used debt funding 1.32 times greater than its assets, showing that the firm has 
negative equity and a higher debt risk. On average, 50% of company assets are 
funded by debt.      
For tangible assets, measured by market to book value ratio, the minimum 
value is -3.16, indicating negative equity. The maximum market to book value 
ratio is 9.65 and the average 2.08. Age of company is measured by the logarithm 
of the number of years since the company was established. The minimum age of 
company is 1.10 and the maximum is 4.71, with a mean of 3.23. The lowest 
average CSP in a given industry was 12.5% (10 indicators out of 79) and the 
highest was 40% (32 indicators).    
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The ownership concentration, measured by public ownership as a 
percentage, is relatively high. The company with the most concentrated 
ownership has only 1% regarding public ownership (ownership by public less 
than 5% of company shares). At the other extreme, in the lowest ownership 
concentration, 83.46% of the company‘s shares were owned by the public. The 
average is 26.07% in public ownership. For independent commissioners, every 
company has at least one; the most in any one company is four, and the average 
is fewer than two (1.45).  
6.3 Content Analysis 
 
This part describes the application of the occurrence disclosure analysis of 
CSP as a CSP measurement in this research. Table 6.7 shows an example of 
content analysis and the summary of the number of companies that disclose and 
do not disclose CSP indicators based on 80 indicators of GRI. 
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Table 6.7 The example and main characteristics of CSP disclosure 
 
CSP Dimension and Indicators 
  
Example Number of  
disclosing companies 
Number of non- 
disclosing companies 
Total Number of 
Companies 
 
A. Economic Dimension FPNI UNSP Total % Total % Total % 
 Economic performance         
1 EC1 G4 EC1 1 1 203 100,00  0 0,00 203 100 
2 EC2 G4 EC2 0 1 51 25,12  152 74,88 203 100 
3 
EC3 G4 EC3 
1 1 200 98,52  3 1,48 203 100 
4 EC4 G4 EC4 0 0 3 1,48  200 98,52 203 100 
 
Market presence  
        5 EC5 G4 EC5 0 1 82 40,39  121 59,61 203 100 
6 EC7 G4 EC6 0 0 52 25,62  151 74,38 203 100 
 
Indirect economic impacts 
        7 EC8 G4 EC7 0 1 178 87,68  25 12,32 203 100 
8 EC9 G4 EC8 0 1 113 55,67  90 44,33 203 100 
 
Procurement Practice 
        9 EC6 G4 EC9 0 1 30 14,78  173 85,22 203 100 
 Total Indicators in economic  
2 7 
        B. Environmental Dimension FPNI UNSP Total % Total % Total % 
 
Materials 
        1 EN1 G4 EN1 0 1 38 18,72  165 81,28 203 100 
2 EN2 G4 EN2 0 0 21 10,34  182 89,66 203 100 
 
Energy 
         3 EN3 G4 EN3 0 1 11 5,42  192 94,58 203 100 
4 EN4 G4 EN3 0 0 2 0,99  201 99,01 203 100 
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No Indicators   Example Number of  Number of non- Total Number of 
        disclosing companies disclosing companies Companies 
 B. Environmental Dimension FPNI UNSP Total % Total % Total % 
5 EN5 G4 EN6 0 1 36 17,73  167 82,27 203 100 
6 EN6 G4 EN7 0 1 39 19,21  164 80,79 203 100 
7 EN7 G4 EN6 0 0 15 7,39  188 92,61 203 100 
 
Water 
         8 EN8 G4 EN8 0 1 7 3,45  196 96,55 203 100 
9 EN9 G4 EN9 0 1 12 5,91  191 94,09 203 100 
10 EN10 G4 EN10 0 1 22 10,84  181 89,16 203 100 
 
Biodiversity 
         11 EN11 G4 EN11 0 1 11 5,42  192 94,58 203 100 
12 EN12 G4 EN12 0 1 12 5,91  191 94,09 203 100 
13 EN13 G4 EN13 0 1 39 19,21  164 80,79 203 100 
14 EN15 G4 EN14 0 0 9 4,43  194 95,57 203 100 
 
Emissions, effluents and waste 
        15 EN16 G4 EN15 0 0 13 6,40  190 93,60 203 100 
16 EN16 G4 EN16 0 0 0 0,00  203 100,00 203 100 
17 EN17 G4 EN17 0 0 1 0,49  202 99,51 203 100 
18 EN18 G4 EN19 0 1 37 18,23  166 81,77 203 100 
19 EN19 G4 EN20 0 0 2 0,99  201 99,01 203 100 
20 EN20 G4 EN21 0 0 3 1,48  200 98,52 203 100 
21 EN21 G4 EN22 0 1 10 4,93  193 95,07 203 100 
22 EN22 G4 EN23 0 1 63 31,03  140 68,97 203 100 
23 EN23 G4 EN24 0 1 5 2,46  198 97,54 203 100 
24 EN24 G4 EN25 0 1 14 6,90  189 93,10 203 100 
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No Indicators   Example Number of  Number of non- Total Number of 
          disclosing companies disclosing companies Companies 
 B. Environmental Dimension FPNI UNSP Total % Total % Total % 
25 EN25 G4 EN26 0 0 2 0,99  201 99,01 203 100 
 Products and services         
26 G4 EN27 G4 EN27 0 1 140 68,97  63 31,03 203 100 
27 EN27 G4 EN28 0 0 2 0,99  201 99,01 203 100 
 
Compliance 
        28 EN28 G4 EN29 0 0 10 4,93  193 95,07 203 100 
 
Transport 
         29 EN29 G4 EN30 0 0 5 2,46  198 97,54 203 100 
 
Overall 
         30 EN30 G4 EN31 0 1 33 16,26  170 83,74 203 100 
 
Total Indicators in 
Environmental  0 17 
       C. Social: Labor Practices and 
Decent Work Dimension 
FPNI UNSP Total % Total % Total % 
 
Employment 
         1 LA2 G4 LA1 0 1 112 55,17  91 44,83 203 100 
2 LA3 G4 LA2 1 1 195 96,06  8 3,94 203 100 
3 LA15 G4 LA3 0 0 3 1,48  200 98,52 203 100 
 
Labor/management relations 
        4 LA5 G4 LA4 0 0 2 0,99  201 99,01 203 100 
 
Occupational health and safety 
        5 LA6 G4 LA5 0 1 29 14,29  174 85,71 203 100 
6 LA7 G4 LA6 0 1 45 22,17  158 77,83 203 100 
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No Indicators   Example Number of  Number of non- Total Number of 
          disclosing companies disclosing companies Companies 
  C. Social: Labor Practices and 
Decent Work Dimension 
FPNI UNSP Total % Total % Total % 
 
Training and education 
        7 LA8 G4 LA7 0 1 118 58,13  85 41,87 203 100 
8 LA9 G4 LA8 0 0 22 10,84  181 89,16 203 100 
9 LA10 G4 LA9 0 1 179 88,18  24 11,82 203 100 
10 LA11 G4 LA10 0 0 9 4,43  194 95,57 203 100 
11 LA12 G4 LA11 0 0 54 26,60  149 73,40 203 100 
 
Diversity and equal opportunity 
  
      
12 LA13 G4 LA12 0 1 133 65,52  70 34,48 203 100 
 
Equal remuneration 
        13 LA14 G4 LA13 0 1 59 29,06  144 70,94 203 100 
 
Total Indicators in Labor 
practice and decent work 1 8 
       C. Social: Human Rights 
Dimension FPNI UNSP Total % Total % Total % 
 
Investment and procurement 
practices 
        1 HR1 G4 RH1 0 0 0 0,00  203 100,00 203 100 
2 HR2 G4 RH10 0 0 1 0,49  202 99,51 203 100 
3 HR3 G4 RH2 0 0 0 0,00  203 100,00 203 100 
 
Non-discrimination 
        4 HR4 G4 RH3 0 0 7 3,45  196 96,55 203 100 
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No Indicators   Example Number of  Number of non- Total Number of 
          disclosing companies disclosing companies Companies 
  C. Social: Human Rights 
Dimension FPNI UNSP Total % Total % Total % 
 
Freedom of association and 
collective bargaining 
        5 HR5 G4 RH4 0 0 17 8,37  186 91,63 203 100 
6 HR6 G4 RH5 0 0 5 2,46  198 97,54 203 100 
 
Prevention of forced and 
compulsory labor 
        7 HR7 G4 RH6 0 0 4 1,97  199 98,03 203 100 
 
Security practices  
        8 HR8 G4 RH7 0 0 0 0,00  203 100,00 203 100 
 
Indigenous rights  
  
      
9 HR9 G4 RH8 0 0 1 0,49  202 99,51 203 100 
 
Assessment  
        10 HR10 G4 RH9 0 0 2 0,99  201 99,01 203 100 
 
Remediation  
  
      
11 HR11 G4 RH12 0 0 1 0,49  202 99,51 203 100 
 
Total Indicators in Human 
Rights  0 0 
       C. Social: Society Dimension 
FPNI UNSP Total % Total % Total % 
 
Local communities  
        1 SO1 G4 SO1 0 1 180 88,67  23 11,33 203 100 
2 SO9 G4 SO2 0 1 29 14,29  174 85,71 203 100 
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No Indicators   Example Number of  Number of non- Total Number of 
          disclosing companies disclosing companies Companies 
 C. Social: Society FPNI UNSP Total % Total % Total %  
 Corruption          
3 SO2 G4 SO3 0 1 32 15,76  171 84,24 203 100 
4 SO3 G4 SO4 0 0 1 0,49  202 99,51 203 100 
5 SO4 G4 SO5 0 0 8 3,94  195 96,06 203 100 
6 SO6 G4 SO6 0 0 6 2,96  197 97,04 203 100 
 Anti-competitive behavior         
7 SO7 G4 SO7 0 1 14 6,90  189 93,10 203 100 
 Compliance          
8 SO8 G4 SO8 0 1 51 25,12  152 74,88 203 100 
 
Total Indicators in society 
0 5 
       C. Social: Product 
responsibility Dimension FPNI UNSP Total % Total % Total % 
 
Customer health and safety 
        1 PR1 G4 PR1 0 1 80 39,41  123 60,59 203 100 
2 PR2 G4 PR2 0 1 72 35,47  131 64,53 203 100 
 
Product and service labelling 
        3 PR3 G4 PR3 0 1 42 20,69  161 79,31 203 100 
4 PR4 G4 PR4 0 1 76 37,44  127 62,56 203 100 
5 PR5 G4 PR5 0 1 100 49,26  103 50,74 203 100 
 
Marketing communications 
        6 PR6 G4 PR6 0 0 12 5,91  191 94,09 203 100 
7 PR7 G4 PR7 0 1 74 36,45  129 63,55 203 100 
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No Indicators   Example Number of  Number of non- Total Number of 
    disclosing companies disclosing companies Companies 
  FPNI UNSP Total % Total % Total % 
 Customer privacy         
8 PR8 G4 PR8 0 0 0 0,00  203 100,00 203 100 
 
Compliance 
        9 PR9 G4 PR9 0 0 2 0,99  201 99,01 203 100 
 
Total indicators in product 
responsibility  0 6 
       80 Total All Indicators  3 43             
  %   3,75 53,75             
Source: Author 
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Disclosure analysis of two companies, FPNI and UNSP are used as an 
example of how to measure CSP disclosure. FPNI has the lowest CSP disclosure 
in the sample. Its only discloses 3 CSP indicators, 2 in economic indicators and 1 
in labour practice and decent work indicator, out of 80 indicators, while the 
disclosure index of FPNI is only 3.75%. Conversely, UNSP discloses 43 out of 80 
indicators or it specifies that the UNSP disclosure index is 53.75. UNSP has the 
highest disclosure index in the research sample. Based on the number of 
disclosing companies, most of the Indonesian listed companies in this sample 
reveal economic indicators related to CSP, especially regarding economic 
performance. For example, every company in the sample (203 firms or 100%) 
disclose direct economic value generated and distributed to capital providers and 
governments (EC1 or G4 EC1) and 200 companies, or 98.52% of the total 
sample divulge coverage of the organisation's defined benefit plan obligations 
(EC3, G4 EC3).   
A insignificant number companies reveal environmental indicators, except 
the indicator for Initiatives to mitigate environmental impacts of products and 
services, and the extent of impact mitigation (EN26 or G4 EN27). This indicator 
was divulged by 140 companies or 68.97% sample. Additionally, other indicators 
reveal less than 50% of companies in the sample. Five indicators from 13 
indicators in relation to labour practice and decent work were disclosed by more 
than 50% of companies. They are total number and rate of new employees hired 
and employee turnover by age group, gender and region (LA2 or G4 LA1), 
benefits provided to full-time employees that are not provided to temporary or 
part-time employees, by major operations (LA3 or G4 LA2), education, training, 
counselling, prevention and risk-control programmes in place to assist workforce 
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members, their families or community members regarding serious diseases (LA8 
or G4 LA7), average hours of training per year per employee by gender and by 
employee category (LA10 or G4 LA9), and the composition of governance bodies 
and breakdown of employees per employee category, according to gender, age 
group, minority group membership, and other indicators concerning diversity 
(LA13 or G4 LA12). 
It is worth noting that only a very small number of companies disclosed 
human rights indicators (11 indicators). The highest indicators, RH5 or G4 RH4, 
pertaining to operations and significant suppliers identified, where the right to 
exercise freedom of association and collective bargaining may be at significant 
risk, and actions taken to support these rights, are only divulged by 17 
companies. Three indicators are undisclosed by all companies. These entail the 
percentage and total number of significant investment agreements and contracts 
that include human rights clauses, or that have undergone human rights 
screening (RH1 or G4 RH1), total hours of employee training on policies and 
procedures concerning aspects of human rights that are relevant to operations, 
including the percentage of employees trained (RH3 or G4 RH2) and percentage 
of security personnel trained in the organisation's policies or procedures 
concerning aspects of human rights that are relevant to operations (RH8 or G4 
RH7).    
Virtually all indicators regarding society are disclosed by less than 50% of 
companies, except the indicator for percentage of operations with implemented 
local community engagement, impact assessments and development 
programmes (SO1 or G4 SO1). This indicator is revealed by 180 companies or 
88.67% of the sample. 
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Regarding the product responsibility indicators (9 indicators) less than 50% 
of companies disclose them. The highest indicators, PR5 or G4 PR5; practices 
related to customer satisfaction, including results of surveys measuring customer 
satisfaction, are disclosed by 100 companies.  
The numbers of companies that disclose CSP indicators indicates that in 
general most Indonesian listed companies in this sample reveal a small number 
of CSP indicators based on 80 indicators related to GRI. It means the CSP index 
in the sample is low.   
6.4 Multiple Regression 
 
The results of the 14 models of multiple regression are presented in two 
groups. The first is those models investigating the relationship between corporate 
diversification and CSP, whereas the second is those investigating the 
moderating effect of CG on the corporate diversification-CSP relationship.   
6.4.1 The Relationship between Corporate Diversification and CSP 
 
Five multiple regression models investigate the relationship between 
corporate diversification and CSP. The baseline model, model 1, consists of nine 
control variables: size, profitability, liquidity, financial leverage, intangible assets, 
age, CSP industry, ownership concentration and independent commissioner. 
Three models follow, introducing each type of diversification individually: model 2 
adds the related diversification variable; model 3 the unrelated diversification 
variable and model 4 the variable for international diversification. Model 5 is a 
complete model which consists of the control variables and all the corporate 
diversification variables concurrently. The results of R square, R square change 
and adjusted R square for the five models are presented in Table 6.8. 
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Table 6.8 Model summary for models 1-5 
     Change Statistics from Model 1 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjuste
d R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Chang
e 
df
1 
df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 .580 .337 .306 7.74478 .337 10.885 9 193 .000 
2 .604 .364 .331 7.60197 .028 8.319 1 192 .004 
3 .592 .350 .316 7.68618 .013 3.954 1 192 .048 
4 .599 .358 .325 7.63619 .022 6.528 1 192 .011 
5 .630 .396 .358 7.44548 .060 6.276 3 190 .000 
Source: Author 
The R square of model 1 is 33.7 %, signifying that all the control variables 
can explain 33.7% of the variance related to CSP. When related diversification is 
added in model 2, the R square increases to 36.4% (∆R2=2.8%); this is 
statistically significant (p<0.01). Conversely, when unrelated diversification is 
added as a new variable in model 3, the R square is 35.0% (∆R2=1.3%), which is 
statistically significant to the R square change (p<0.05). The R square of model 
4, with international diversification, increases to 35.8%, meaning that the R 
square change is 2.2%, which is statistically significant (p<0.05). The full model 
(model 5) has an R square value of 39.6%, which is an increase of 6.0% from 
model 1 with a significance of p<0.001. Hence, the statistically significant 
increase of R square in models 2-5 confirms that corporate diversification can 
explain the variance of CSP.  
Regarding the different number of explanatory variables in models 1-5, 
the value of adjusted R square is applied for a superior estimation. The ability of 
models 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 to explain the variance of CSP is respectively 30.6%, 
33.3%, 31.6%, 32.5% and 35.8%, denoting that the adjusted R square increased 
by 3.3% in model 2, 1% in model 3, 1.9% in model 4 and 5.2% in model 5. 
Furthermore, to illustrate the overall goodness of fit of the models, the F test 
245 
 
values for each model are presented in Table 6.9. Based on this table, the F 
values for models 1-5 are statistically significant (p<0.001). This means that all 
these models are eligible to predict the variance regarding CSP.  
Table 6.9 Anova for models 1 to 5  
Model Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5875.923 9 652.880 10.885 .000
b
 
 Residual 11576.460 193 59.982     
 Total 17452.383 202       
2 Regression 6356.699 10 635.670 11.000 .000
b
 
 Residual 11095.684 192 57.790     
 Total 17452.383 202       
3 Regression 6109.520 10 610.952 10.342 .000
b
 
 Residual 11342.863 192 59.077     
 Total 17452.383 202       
4 Regression 6256.605 10 625.660 10.730 .000
b
 
 Residual 11195.779 192 58.311     
 Total 17452.383 202       
5 Regression 6919.691 12 576.641 10.402 .000
b
 
 Residual 10532.692 190 55.435     
 Total 17452.383 202       
Source: Author 
 
The unstandardised coefficients and significance values of all variables 
are presented in Table 6.10, to illustrate individual relationships between the 
corporate diversification variables and CSP. For comparison of the related 
diversification-CSP relationship and the unrelated diversification-CSP 
relationship, a standardised coefficient (Beta) is also provided in model 5. Model 
1 indicates that CSP is positively and significantly related to company size 
(B=2.190, sig<0.01), CSP industry (B=2.282, sig<0.01), ownership concentration 
(B=1.805, sig<0.01) and independent commissioner (B=1.642, sig<0.01); and 
negatively and significantly related to liquidity (B=-2.351, sig<0.01) and financial 
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leverage (B=-1.340, sig<0.10). Models 2, 3 and 4 introduce the effects of several 
types of corporate diversification. Related diversification is negatively and 
significantly related to CSP (B=-1.621, sig<0.01) (H1a). However, the 
relationships between unrelated diversification and CSP (B=1.156, sig<0.05) 
(H1b) and between international diversification and CSP (B=1.431, sig<0.05) 
(H2) are positively and significantly related.  
Model 5 presents comparable results to models 2, 3 and 4 on the 
relationship between corporate diversification and CSP. For example, the 
relationship between related diversification and CSP is negative and significant 
(B=-1.490, sig<0.01) (H1a). The relationship between unrelated diversification 
and CSP is positive; nevertheless, the significance level in model 5 is weaker 
than in model 3 (B=1.046, sig<0.10) (H1b). Lastly, international diversification is 
positively related to CSP (B=1.448, sig<0.05) (H2). Moreover, the comparison 
between the standardised coefficient in model 5 reveals that the beta of unrelated 
diversification is higher than related diversification and has a positive sign 
(Beta=.113, sig<0.10 > Beta=-.160 sig<0.01) (H1c).  
Based on these results, it can be concluded that hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c 
and 2 are supported. 
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Table 6.10 Coefficient and Significance for models 1 to 5   
Independent Variable: CSP 
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
B p B p B p B    p B Beta p 
(Constant) 20.370 *** .000 20.370 *** .000 20.370 *** .000 20.370 *** .000 20.370 ***   .000 
 (.544)  (.534)  (.539)  (.536)  (.523) ***   
Size 2.190 *** .001 2.533 *** .000 1.862 *** .004 2.122 *** .001 2.139 .230 *** .001 
 (.626)  (.626)  (.643)  (.618)  (.638) .  
Profitability .657 .325 .765 .243 .493 .459 .616 .349 .567 .061 .382 
 (.665)  (.654)  (.665)  (.656)  (.646)   
Liquidity -2.351 *** .002 -2.222 *** .003 -2.243 *** .003 -2.438 *** .001 -2.224 *** -.239 *** .002 
 (.740)  (.728)  (.736)  (.730)  (.715)   
Financial Leverage -1.340 * .093 -1.175 .134 -1.288 .104 -1.554 * .050 -1.361 * -.146 * .079 
 (.794)  (.781)  (.788)  (.787)  (.770)   
Intangible Asset .105 .860 -.078 .894 .126 .831 .357 .551 .213 .023 .716 
 (.597)  (.589)  (.592)  (.597)  (.586) .  
Age .515 .366 .477 .393 .405 .475 .514 .359 .381 .041 .489 
 (.568)  (.558)  (.566)  (.560)  (.549)   
CSP Industry 2.282 *** .000 2.378 *** .000 2.427 *** .000 2.071 *** .000 2.286 *** .246 *** .000 
 (.563)  (.554)  (.564)  (.561)  (.552)   
Ownership Concentration 1.805 *** .001 2.003 *** .000 1.758 *** .002 1.931 *** .001 2.073 *** .223 *** .000 
 (.556)  (.550)  (.552)  (.550)  (.541)   
Independent Commissioner (IC) 1.642 *** .008 1.678 *** .006 1.854 *** .003 1.486 ** .016 1.707 *** .184 *** .005 
 (.615)  (.604)  (.619)  (.609)  (.603)   
Related Diversification   -1.621 *** .004     -1.490 *** -.160 *** .008 
   (.562)       (.554)   
Unrelated Diversification      1.156 ** .048    1.046 * .113 * .067 
      (.581)    (.568)   
International Diversification        1.431 .011 1.468 *** .158 *** .008 
        (.560)  (.547)    
Significance level: ***,**, and * is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard error in parentheses
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6.4.2 Moderating Effect of Corporate Governance on Relationship 
between Corporate Diversification and Corporate Social 
Performance  
 
The study employs nine multiple regression models (models 6-14) to 
investigate the moderating effect of the two CG indicators, independent 
commissioner and ownership concentration, on the corporate diversification-CSP 
relationship. The results are divided into three groups: the first covers the 
moderating effect of an independent commissioner (models 6-9); the second 
ownership concentration (models 10-13); and the third, develops model 14, the 
complete model, to investigate the effect of the two CG indicators on the 
corporate diversification-CSP relationship. The following sub-sections describe 
the regression results for each group.    
7.4.2.1 Moderating effect of independent commissioner on the relationship 
between corporate diversification and CSP 
 
There are four models in this group. The first, model 6, tests the 
interaction effect between an independent commissioner and related 
diversification on CSP. Models 7 and 8 investigate the interaction effect for 
unrelated and international diversification respectively. The last of these models, 
model 9, includes the interaction effects of an independent commissioner on all 
the corporate diversification variables.     
Table 6.11 summarises the results from models 6 to 9. The R square of 
model 6 is 39.8%. This is an increase over model 5 of 0.1%, although it is not 
significant (p>0.10). The R square of model 7 increases to 40.7%, a change of 
1%, which is significant at p<0.10. The R square of model 8 rises 1.2%, again 
significant (p<0.05) to 40.9%. In the last model, R square is 42.2%, an increase 
of 2.5% from model 5 and significant (p<0.05).  
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Table 6.11 The model summary for models 6 to 9 
     Change Statistics from Model 5 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjuste
d R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df
1 
df2 Sig. F 
Change 
6 .631 .398 .357 7.45611 .001 .459 1 189 .499 
7 .638 .407 .366 7.40053 .010 3.315 1 189 .070 
8 .639 .409 .368 7.38787 .012 3.975 1 189 .048 
9 .650 .422 .375 7.34545 .025 2.737 3 187 .045 
Source: Author 
Based on the adjusted R square values, the ability of models 6, 7, 8 and 9 
to explain the variance of CSP is respectively 35.7%, 36.6%, 36.8% and 37.5%. 
The R square decreases 0.1% in model 6 from model 5 (35.8%), but increases 
by 0.8% in model 7, 0.9% in model 8 and 1.7% in model 9. The F test values for 
models 6-9 based, shown in Table 6.12, are significant at p<0.01, denoting that 
all of these models are eligible to predict the variance of CSP. 
Table 6.12 The ANOVA for models 6 to 9 
Model Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
6 Regression 6945.184 13 534.245 9.610 .000b 
 Residual 10507.199 189 55.594     
 Total 17452.383 202       
7 Regression 7101.247 13 546.250 9.974 .000b 
 Residual 10351.136 189 54.768     
 Total 17452.383 202       
8 Regression 7136.634 13 548.972 10.058 .000b 
 Residual 10315.749 189 54.581     
 Total 17452.383 202       
9 Regression 7362.683 15 490.846 9.097 .000b 
 Residual 10089.700 187 53.956     
 Total 17452.383 202       
Source: Author 
The coefficient and the significance levels of the moderating effect of the 
independent commissioner on CSP are presented in Table 6.13. Model 6 
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explains that an independent commissioner has no significant moderating effect 
on the related diversification-CSP relationship (B=-.0392, p>0.1) (H3a). 
Alternatively, models 7 and 8 portray that an independent commissioner has a 
significant and positive moderating effect on the unrelated diversification-CSP 
and international-CSP relationships. An independent commissioner can 
strengthen the unrelated diversification-CSP relationship (B=1.048, p<0.1) (H3b) 
and the international diversification-CSP relationship (B=1.114, p<0.5 (H3c). 
These results are relatively similar for model 9, where the moderating effect of an 
independent commissioner on the related diversification-CSP relationship is not 
significant (-.557, p>0.1) (H3a). However, the moderating effect on the unrelated 
diversification-CSP relationship is positive and significant (B=.1.020, p<0.1) 
(H3b), and on the international diversification-CSP relationship is also positive 
and significant (B=1.182, p<0.5) (H3c).  
These results indicate that hypothesis 3 is partially supported.   
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Table 6.13 Coefficient and Significance for models 6 to 9  
 CSP 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
B    p B    p B p B p 
(Constant) 20.416 *** .000 20.443 *** .000 20.231 *** .000 20.359 *** .000 
 (.528)  (.521)  (.523)  (.525)  
Size 2.145 *** .001 2.162 *** .001 2.211 *** .001 2.248 *** .000 
 (.639)  (.635)  (.635)  (.631)  
Profitability .573 .377 .610 .344 .592 .357 .644 .314 
 (.647)  (.643)  (.641)  (.638)  
Liquidity -2.214 *** .002 -2.058 *** .005 -2.266 *** .002 -2.092 *** .004 
 (.716)  (.717)  (.710)  (.712)  
Financial Leverage -1.344 * .083 -1.116 * .152 -1.411 * .066 -1.153 * .137 
 (.771)  (.777)  (.764)  (.772)  
Intangible Asset .187 .751 .247 .671 .258 .658 .257 .658 
 (.588)  (.582)  (.581)  (.580)  
Age .327 .556 .398 .467 .459 .401 .405 .461 
 (.555)  (.545)  (.546)  (.548)  
CSP Industry 2.286 *** .000 2.314 *** .000 2.237 *** .000 2.262 *** .000 
 (.553)  (.549)  (.548)  (.545)  
Ownership Concentration 2.123 *** .000 2.067 *** .000 2.028 *** .000 2.090 *** .000 
 (.547)  (.538)  (.538)  (.539)  
Independent Commissioner (IC) 1.686 *** .006 1.822 *** .003 1.770 *** .004 1.855 *** .002 
 (.604)  (.602)  (.599)  (.599)  
Related Diversification -1.401 ** .015 -1.471 ** .008 -1.531 ** .006 -1.389 ** .014 
 (.570)  (.551)  (.550)  (.562)  
Unrelated Diversification 1.036 * .070 1.113 * .050 .952 * .094 .999 * .078 
 (.569)  (.566)  (.565)  (.564)  
International Diversification 1.476 *** .008 1.390 *** .012 1.314 *** .017 1.241 *** .024 
 (.548)  (.545)  (.548)  (.546)  
Independent Commissioner (IC) * Related Diversification  -.392 .499     -.557 .336 
 (.579)      (.578)  
Independent Commissioner (IC) * Unrelated Diversification    1.048 .070    1.020 .076 
   (.576)     (.572)  
Independent Commissioner (IC) * International Diversification       1.114 .048 1.182 .037 
      (.559)  (.562)  
Significance level: ***,**, and * is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard error in parentheses
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7.4.2.2 Moderating effect of Ownership Concentration  
 
This group consists of four models (models 10-13). These models 
investigate the moderating effect of ownership concentration on the relationship 
between corporate diversification and CSP, respectively, with related, unrelated 
and international diversification. Model 10 includes the interaction effect between 
ownership concentration and unrelated diversification on CSP, whilst, model 11 
employs interaction effect between ownership concentration and unrelated 
diversification on CSP. Subsequently, model 12 uses the interaction effect 
between ownership concentration and international diversification on CSP. 
Finally, the last model, model 13 includes every interaction effect regarding 
ownership concentration on corporate diversification variables. Table 6.14 
summarises these four models. R square of model 10 is 40.8 %, an increase of 
1.1% over model 5, although it is significantly weak (p<0.10). Alternatively, the R 
square of models 11 and 12 are similar to model 5 and there is no R square 
change in these two models. Finally, the R square of the full model (model 13) for 
the moderating effect of ownership concentration is 10.4%; it increases 1.2%; 
nonetheless, this is not significant (p<0.10).  
Table 6.14 Summary for models 10 to 13 
     Change Statistics from Model 5 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjuste
d R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df
1 
df2 Sig. F 
Change 
10 .639 .408 .367 7.39522 .011 3.592 1 189 .060 
11 .630 .397 .355 7.46235 .000 .142 1 189 .706 
12 .630 .396 .355 7.46515 .000 .000 1 189 .990 
13 .639 .408 .361 7.43230 .012 1.225 3 187 .302 
Source: Author 
 
253 
 
Based on the adjusted R square values shown in Table 6.14, the ability of 
models 10, 11, 12 and 13 to explain the variance of CSP is respectively 36.7%, 
35.5%, 35.5% and 36.1%. The R square increases by 0.9% in model 10 over 
model 5 (35.8%), but decreases 0.3% in models 11 and 12. In model 13, the 
increase of the adjusted R square is 0.3%. The F test values of models 10-13, 
revealed in Table 6.15 are significant at p<0.01. This implies that all these 
models could be used to predict the variance of CSP.  
Table 6.15 The ANOVA for models 10 to 13 
Model Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
10 Regression 7116.123 13 547.394 10.009 .000
b 
 Residual 10336.260 189 54.689     
 Total 17452.383 202       
11 Regression 6927.615 13 532.893 9.570 .000b 
 Residual 10524.768 189 55.687     
 Total 17452.383 202       
12 Regression 6919.700 13 532.285 9.551 .000b 
 Residual 10532.683 189 55.728     
 Total 17452.383 202       
13 Regression 7122.666 15 474.844 8.596 .000b 
 Residual 10329.717 187 55.239     
 Total 17452.383 202       
Source: Author 
The coefficient and significance levels of the moderating effects of 
ownership concentration on the corporate diversification-CSP relationships are 
presented in Table 6.16. Model 10 indicates that ownership concentration can 
strengthen the related diversification-CSP relationship (B=0.876, p<0.1) (H4a), 
while models 11 and 12 reveal that it has no moderating effect on either the 
unrelated diversification-CSP relationship (H4b) or the international 
diversification-CSP relationship (H4c). These results are consistent in model 13, 
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where the moderating effect of ownership concentration on related diversification-
CSP is positive and significant (B=0.875, p<0.1) (H4a), although there is no 
significant moderating effect on the unrelated diversification-CSP (B=0.173, 
p>0.1) (H4b) and international diversification-CSP relationships (B=-.061, p>0.1) 
(H4c).  
These results indicate that hypothesis 4 is only partially supported. 
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Table 6.16 Coefficient and Significance for models 10 to 13 
 CSP 
Dependent Variable: Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
 B p B p B p B p 
(Constant) 20.230 *** .000 20.360 *** .000 20.369 *** .000 20.219 *** .000 
 (.524)   (.524 )  (.524 )  (.528 )  
Size 2.087 *** .001 2.126 *** .001 2.139 *** .001 2.085 *** .001 
 (.635)   (.641 )  (.644 )  (.643 )  
Profitability .572 .374 .571 ) .380 .567 .383 .575 .374 
 (.642)   .648 )  (.648 )  (.645 )  
Liquidity -2.266 *** .002 -2.232 *** .002 -2.224 *** .002 -2.267 *** .002 
 (.711)   (.717 )  (.718 )  (.715 )  
Financial Leverage -1.460 * .058 -1.390 * .075 -1.360 * .080 -1.478 * .058 
 (.766)   (.775 )  (.774 )  (.776 )  
Intangible Asset .068 .908 .201 .733 .214 .717 .065 .913 
 (.587)   (.588 )  (.590 )  (.593 )  
Age .308 .573 .374 .498 .381 .490 .304 .581 
 (.546)   (.550 )  (.550 )  (.549 )  
CSP Industry 2.176 *** .000 2.286 *** .000 2.285 *** .000 2.173 *** .000 
 (.551)   (.553 )  (.554 )  (.555 )  
Ownership Concentration 1.876 *** .001 2.088 *** .000 2.074 *** .000 1.898 *** .001 
 (.548)   (.544 )  (.549 )  (.557 )  
Independent Commissioner (IC) 1.672 *** .006 1.713 *** .005 1.707 *** .005 1.676 *** .006 
 (.599)   (.604 )  (.604 )  (.602 )  
Related Diversification -1.738 *** .002 -1.495 *** .008 -1.490 *** .008 -1.740 *** .003 
 (.566)   (.556 )  (.556 )  (.569 )  
Unrelated Diversification 1.026 * .071 1.035 * .071 1.045 * .069 1.011 * .078 
 (.564)   (.570 )  (.571 )  (.570 )  
International Diversification 1.429 *** .009 1.479 *** .008 1.467 *** .009 1.429 *** .011 
 (.543)   (.549 )  (.555 )  (.554 )  
Ownership Concentration * Related Diversification  .876 * .060      .875 * .062 
 (.462)       (.466 )  
Ownership Concentration * Unrelated Diversification   .208 .706    .173 .754 
   (.551 )     (.550 )  
Ownership Concentration * International Diversification       -.006 .990 -.061 .905 
      (.510 )  (.510 )  
Significance level: ***,**, and * is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard error in parentheses 
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7.4.2.3 Moderating effect of independent commissioner and ownership 
concentration  
 
This group consists of a single model, 14, which is the full model in 
investigating the moderating effect of both CG indicators on the corporate 
diversification-CSP relationship. Table 6.17 provides information pertaining to R 
square, adjusted R square and R square change, complete with their 
significance.  
Table 6.17 Model Summary 
     Change Statistics from Model 5 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
14 .661 .437 .382 7.30638 .041 2.217 6 184 .043 
Source: Author 
Model 14 could explain 43.7% of the CSP variance. The R square value 
increases 4.1 % and is statistically significant (p<0.05). The adjusted R square is 
38.2%, an increase of 2.4% from model 5. The F test value of model 14 is 
significant at p<0.01 (Table 6.18). This means that the complete model 
concerning the moderating effect of CG on the corporate diversification-CSP 
relationship can be used to predict the variance of CSP. 
Table 6.18 The ANOVA for model 14 
Model Sum of 
Squares      df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
14 Regression 7629.883 18 423.882 7.940 .000
b 
 Residual 9822.500 184 53.383     
 Total 17452.383 202       
Source: Author 
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Based on Table 6.19, the results of the moderating effects of both 
independent commissioner and ownership concentration resemble those in 
models 9 and 13. The moderating effect of an independent commissioner on 
corporate diversification-CSP is only significant for unrelated diversification 
(B=.968, p<0.10) (H3b) and international diversification (B=1.225, p<0.05) (H3c). 
Conversely, the moderating effect of ownership concentration on the corporate 
diversification-CSP relationship is significant only in related diversification 
(B=1.046, p<0.05) (H4a).  
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Table 6.19 Coefficient and Significance for model 14 
 CSP 
 B  Sig. 
(Constant) 20.214 *** .000 
 (.527)   
Size 2.192 *** .001 
 (.633)   
Profitability .660  .300 
 (.635)   
Liquidity -2.143 *** .003 
 (.709)   
Financial Leverage -1.291 * .097 
 (.775)   
Intangible Asset .054  .927 
 (.587)   
Age .263  .632 
 (.549)   
CSP Industry 2.123 *** .000 
 (.547)   
Ownership Concentration 1.929 *** .001 
 (.549)   
Independent Commissioner (IC) 1.795 *** .003 
 (.597)   
Related Diversification -1.604 *** .005 
 (.567)   
Unrelated Diversification .939 * .098 
 (.565)   
International Diversification 1.201 ** .031 
 (.552)   
Independent Commissioner (IC) * Related Diversification -.939  .121 
 (.602.)   
Independent Commissioner (IC) * Unrelated Diversification  .968 * .091 
 (.571)   
Independent Commissioner (IC) * International Diversification 1.225 ** .031 
 (.564)   
Ownership concentration * Related Diversification 1.046 ** .030 
 (.480)   
Ownership concentration * Unrelated Diversification  .218  .688 
 (.543)   
Ownership concentration * International Diversification -.081  .873 
 (.505)   
Significance level: ***,**, and * is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
Standard error in parentheses 
 
6.4.3 Summary of Multiple Regression Results 
 
The results of the regression analyses, including without and with the 
moderating effect of CG, are shown in Table 6.20. The results of the hypothesis 
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testing (supported/not supported) are reported in Table 6.21. The robustness test 
of the results is discussed in the following section. 
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Table 6.20 Corporate Diversification, Corporate Governance and CSP 
        CSP       
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
(Constant) 20.370*** 20.370*** 20.370*** 20.370*** 20.370*** 20.416*** 20.443*** 20.231*** 20.359*** 20.230*** 20.360*** 20.369*** 20.219*** 20.214*** 
Size: 2.190*** 2.533*** 1.862*** 2.122*** 2.139*** 2.145*** 2.162*** 2.211*** 2.248*** 2.087*** 2.126*** 2.139*** 2.085*** 2.192*** 
Profitability .657 .765 .493 .616 .567 .573 .610 .592 .644 .572 .571 .567 .575 .660 
Liquidity: Current Ratio -2.351*** -2.222*** -2.243*** -2.438*** -2.224*** -2.214*** -2.058*** -2.266*** -2.092*** -2.266*** -2.232*** -2.224*** -2.267*** -2.143*** 
Financial Leverage -1.340* -1.175 -1.288 -1.554** -1.361* -1.344* -1.116 -1.411* -1.153 -1.460* -1.390* -1.360* -1.478* -1.291* 
Intangible Asset .105   -.078 .126 .357 .213 .187 .247 .258 .257 .068 .201 .214 .065 .054 
Age .515 .477 .405 .514 .381 .327 .398 .459 .405 .308 .374 .381 .304 .263 
CSP Industry 2.282*** 2.378*** 2.427*** 2.071*** 2.286*** 2.286*** 2.314*** 2.237*** 2.262*** 2.176*** 2.286*** 2.285*** 2.173*** 2.123*** 
Ownership Concentration 1.805*** 2.003*** 1.758*** 1.931*** 2.073*** 2.123*** 2.067*** 2.028*** 2.090*** 1.876*** 2.088*** 2.074*** 1.898*** 1.929*** 
Independent Commissioner 1.642*** 1.678*** 1.854*** 1.486*** 1.707*** 1.686*** 1.822*** 1.770*** 1.855*** 1.672*** 1.713*** 1.707*** 1.676*** 1.795*** 
Related Diversification  -1.621***   -1.490*** -1.401** -1.471** -1.531*** -1.389** -1.738*** -1.495*** -1.490*** -1.740*** -1.604*** 
Unrelated Diversification   1.156**   1.046* 1.036* 1.113* .952* .999* 1.026* 1.035* 1.045* 1.011* .939* 
International Diversification    1.431*** 1.468*** 1.476** 1.390** 1.314** 1.241** 1.429*** 1.479*** 1.467*** 1.429** 1.201** 
Independent Commissioner * 
Related Diversification 
     
-.392   -.557       -.939 
Independent Commissioner * 
Unrelated Diversification 
      
1.048* 
 
1.020* 
   
    .968* 
Independent Commissioner * 
International Diversification 
      
 1.114** 1.182** 
   
 1.225** 
Ownership Concentration * 
Related Diversification 
         
.876* 
  
.875* 1.046** 
Ownership Concentration * 
Unrelated Diversification 
          
.208 
 
.173 .218 
Ownership Concentration * 
International Diversification 
          
 -.006 -.061 -.081 
               
N Company 203              
Adjusted R-square .306 .331 .316 .325 .358 .357 .366 .368 .375 .367 .355 .355 .361 .382 
F Test 10.885*** 11.000*** 10.342*** 10.730*** 10.402*** 9.610*** 9.974*** 10.058*** 9.097*** 10.009*** 9.570*** 9.551*** 8.596*** 7.940*** 
Significance level: ***,**, and * is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
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Table 6.21  Summary of results   
 
Research question Hypothesis Model 
regression 
Result 
What is the 
relationship between 
product diversification 
and CSP 
H1a: There is a 
significant relationship 
between related 
diversification and 
corporate social 
performance 
Model 2 
Model 5 
supported 
 H1b: There is a 
significant relationship 
between related 
diversification and 
corporate social 
performance 
Model 3 
Model 5 
supported 
 H1c: The relationship 
between unrelated 
diversification and 
CSP is more positive 
than the relationship 
between related 
diversification and 
CSP 
Model 5 supported 
What is the 
relationship between 
international 
diversification and 
CSP 
H2: The relationship 
between international 
diversification and 
corporate social 
performance is 
positive 
Model 4 
Model 5 
supported 
What is the 
relationship between 
corporate 
diversification and 
CSP through 
independent 
commissioner as a 
moderating variable 
H3a: The relationship 
between related 
diversification and 
CSP is moderated by 
independent 
commissioner 
 
 
 
Model 6 
Model 9 
Model 14 
Not 
supported 
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Research question Hypothesis Model 
regression 
Result 
 H3b: The relationship 
between unrelated 
diversification and 
CSP is moderated by 
independent 
commissioner 
Model 6 
Model 9 
Model 14 
supported 
 H3c: The relationship 
between international 
diversification and 
CSP is moderated by 
independent 
commissioner 
Model 6 
Model 9 
Model 14 
supported 
What is the 
relationship between 
corporate 
diversification and 
CSP through 
ownership 
concentration as a 
moderating variable 
H4a: The relationship 
between related 
diversification and 
CSP is moderated by 
ownership 
concentration 
Model 10 
Model 13 
Model 14 
supported 
 H4b: The relationship 
between unrelated 
diversification and 
CSP is moderated by 
ownership 
concentration 
Model 11 
Model 13 
Model 14 
Not 
supported 
 H4c: The relationship 
between international 
diversification and 
CSP is moderated by 
ownership 
concentration 
Model 12 
Model 13 
Model 14 
Not 
supported 
Source: Author 
 
6.4.4 Additional analyses 
 
Three additional analyses were performed to confirm the robustness of 
the multiple regression results, specifically on models 5 and 14. The first 
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replicates the CSP measurement using a quantitative and qualitative disclosure 
index based on the quality of disclosure. Hence, of the 79 indicators, 67 scored 2, 
if disclosed quantitatively and scored 1 if disclosed qualitatively. The second 
additional analysis applies an alternative measurement concerning ownership 
concentration: largest ownership. Previous studies, such as Ducassy and 
Montandrau (2015); Dam and Scholtens (2013) used largest ownership as a 
measurement of ownership concentration. The final additional analysis introduces 
institutional ownership as an additional control variable, used by several 
researchers as explanatory variables, such as Ducassy and Montandrau (2015); 
Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013); Dam and Scholtens (2012); Walls et al. (2012); 
Brammer et al. (2006). The results of the additional analyses are presented in 
Table 6.22. The sign and magnitude of the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables are not much different from those in the principal analysis. Therefore, 
these coefficients are robust.     
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Table 6.22 Additional analysis 
 
  Model 5   Model 14  
Variable 1 2 3 1 2 3 
(Constant) 14.508*** 20.370*** 20.370*** 14.463*** 20.266*** 20.219*** 
Size: 1.650***    2.445*** 2.113*** 1.660*** 2.600*** 2.153*** 
Profitability 0.326    0.750 0.577 0.388 0.961 0.669 
Liquidity: Current Ratio -1.450*** -2.211*** -2.238*** -1.391*** -2.029*** -2.165*** 
Financial Leverage -1.023*   -1.446* -1.355* -0.973*  -1.067 -1.303* 
Intangible Asset 0.028    0.156 0.235   -0.105   0.197 0.059 
Age 0.257    0.291 0.344 0.137   0.254 0.223 
CSP Industry 1.591***  2.310*** 2.280*** 1.505*** 2.182*** 2.123*** 
Ownership Concentration 1.574***  -1.433**   1.590** 1.514*** -1.691***  1.495** 
Independent Commissioner   1.134** 1.844*** 1.683*** 1.177*** 1.958*** 1.773*** 
Related Diversification -1.108***  -1.319** -1.413** -1.119***  -1.374** -1.537*** 
Unrelated Diversification    0.911**    1.051*  1.015* 0.860** 0.900 0.918 
International Diversification 1.125*** 1.322**   1.426** 1.003**  1.030*   1.186** 
Independent Commissioner * 
Related Diversification 
   
-0.819* -0.203   -0.946 
Independent Commissioner * 
Unrelated Diversification 
   
0.643 0.962 0.951* 
Independent Commissioner * 
International Diversification 
   
0.603 1.248** 1.183** 
Ownership Concentration * 
Related Diversification 
   
0.641* -0.974 1.051** 
Ownership Concentration * 
Unrelated Diversification 
   
0.219 0.390 0.268 
Ownership Concentration * 
International Diversification 
  
 0.042 0.360 -0.008 
Institutional Ownership   -0.724   -0.641 
N Company 203 203 203 203 203 203 
Adjusted R-square 0.353 0.331 0.358 0.366 0.356 0.381 
F Test 10.203*** 9.337*** 9.683*** 7.472*** 7.206*** 7.557*** 
Source: Author
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6.5   Discussion 
 
This study investigates the relationship between Corporate Diversification 
and CSP. There are two research aims: first, to investigate the relationship 
between corporate diversification and CSP; and second, to examine the role of 
CG on the relationship between corporate diversification and CSP. Each primary 
research aim has several hypotheses. The results of the research aims and their 
hypotheses are discussed below.  
6.5.1 The Relationship between Corporate Diversification and Corporate 
Social Performance 
 
The first aim of this research is to investigate the relationship between 
corporate diversification and CSP. This aim is followed by two research 
questions; what is the relationship between product diversification and CSP; and 
what is the relationship between international diversification and CSP? Corporate 
diversification in this study consists of product diversification (i.e., related and 
unrelated diversification) and international diversification. Therefore, the first 
principal research aim is reflected in four hypotheses: H1a, H1b, H1c and H2.  
First, H1a predicted a significant relationship between related 
diversification and CSP. The related diversification was found to have a negative 
relationship with CSP, thus supported H1a. This finding is not in line with 
stakeholder theory, which suggests that as diversification increases, so do the 
range of stakeholder demands and social issues, and the number and diversity of 
stakeholders that are pertinent to a company (Kang, 2013). The finding also fails 
to support Simerly (1997) and interpretation of his research, as he established a 
negative relationship between total corporate diversification (i.e. related and 
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unrelated) and CSP; this reflected a decreasing relatedness in industry 
diversification. Companies with a low level of diversification tend to apply a 
related diversification strategy, while those with high a level of diversification 
adopt an unrelated diversification strategy. He concludes that a negative 
relationship between corporate diversification and CSP reflects results from 
related diversified companies having a higher CSP by means of pursuing 
strategic assets specific to their activities and focusing on the industry that they 
serve in dealing with social and other issues.  
Nor does this finding support the study by Kang (2013), who found that 
related diversification has no significant relationship with CSP, based on 
stakeholder theory. However, he did explain that the relationship between the 
level of diversification and CSP does not necessarily have to be positive (Kang, 
2013). For example, when a diversified business attempts to disregard 
stakeholder demands and social issues, the level of diversification could be 
negatively related to CSP. This statement may also apply to related 
diversification. Related diversified companies focus on one industry; therefore, 
the diversity of their stakeholders is relatively low compared with unrelated 
diversified companies which operate in multiple industries. This suggests that the 
range of stakeholder demands and social issues is similar to those in 
undiversified companies. Hence, the pressure from stakeholders in these 
companies to increase CSP range is lower, consequently, these companies may 
tend to be better at avoiding the full extent of their social activities.  
Unlike CSR in the US and European countries, CSR in Indonesia is 
predominantly promoted by the government rather than the private sector (Park 
et al., 2014; Waagstein, 2011). Although CSR Indonesia Company Law no.40 of 
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2007, article 74(1) stated that social and environmental responsibility is obligatory 
for a company which has activities in and/or related to natural resources 
(Indonesia Company Law no.40 of 2007, article 74(1)), this law does not state 
specific programmes for the company‘s CSR. Therefore, if a related diversified 
company operates in a non-natural resources industry, it will not be motivated to 
implement CSR programmes or be encouraged to increase its CSP. 
Furthermore, institutional environmental pressures will be different in various 
industries (Chiu and Sharfman, 2011; Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). Related 
diversified companies which operate under low pressure from their institutional 
environment may not find it necessary to increase their social activities.      
Secondly, this study predicted a significant relationship between related 
diversification and CSP (H1b). The direction of the relationship depends on the 
ability of unrelated diversified companies to accommodate all their stakeholder 
demands and social issues. This study has ascertained that unrelated 
diversification has a positive relationship with CSP. This finding supports the 
study previously conducted by Kang (2013). He recognised that unrelated 
diversification has a positive significant relationship with CSP, as suggested by 
stakeholder theory. According to Kang, increasing CSP is affected by an 
increasing range of stakeholder demands and social issues related to the 
diversification strategy. Moreover, he contended that a diversified company 
responds to these demands and issues better than does a non-diversified 
company. It is because diversification strategy increases managerial risk aversion 
and reduces managerial employment risk. A diversified company also has the 
ability to distribute the relevant investment cost and benefit of CSP across its 
subsidiaries. However, the result of this study is not aligned with Simerly (1997), 
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who determined that increasing the level of unrelated diversification relates to 
decreasing CSP, because the unrelated diversification strategy is associated with 
maximisation of shareholder wealth. The result of this study supports stakeholder 
theory, which noted that unrelated diversification is not only associated with 
maximising shareholder wealth, nevertheless is also related to other 
stakeholders‘ interests (Kang, 2013). The increasing pressure of the substantial 
number and variety of salient stakeholders, including institutional environment 
pressure from several industries, encourages a company to be interested in 
stakeholders‘ demands and social issues. Furthermore, the result supports the 
proposal that unrelated diversification is effective in increasing managerial risk 
aversion and reducing managerial employment risk.            
Third, this study predicts the relationship between unrelated diversification 
and CSP is more positive than the relationship between related diversification 
and CSP (H1c). The result of the regression analysis confirms that the effect of 
unrelated diversification toward CSP is more positive and significant. This finding 
supports a previous study from Kang (2013), in which he argued that companies 
which adopt an unrelated diversification strategy have a presence across 
extensively different industries. These businesses deal with more diverging 
stakeholders‘ demands and social issues. Conversely, firms which adopt a 
related diversification strategy are dealing with much more coherent 
stakeholders‘ demands, and so remain focused on a relatively narrow range of 
social concerns (Kang, 2013). Therefore, the pressure from stakeholders toward 
companies‘ corporate social activities is higher in an unrelated diversified 
company than in a related diversified company. Furthermore, the effect of 
diversification is connected to managerial risk aversion, managerial employment 
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risk and the ability to distribute the cost and benefit of CSP, according to Kang 
(2013); Hoskisson and Hitt (1988). The increase in a manager‘s risk aversion will 
be higher in unrelated diversification than related diversification (Hoskisson and 
Hitt, 1988), although the managerial employment risk will be reduced (Kang, 
2013; Kacperczyk, 2009). The incentive of brand transfer and the insurance 
effect are also stronger in unrelated diversification (Kang, 2013). Therefore, 
unrelated diversified companies may have a higher CSP than related diversified 
companies.  
However, this finding differs from Dooley and Fryxell (1999), who reported 
that unrelated diversified companies have a lower CSP than related diversified 
companies. They argued that differences in financial control, the intention of 
spreading environmental risk, and concern with building reputational capital for 
environmental performance, could lead the board to spectrum diversification, 
including unrelated diversification, resulting in lower environmental performance 
than narrow spectrum diversification or related diversification. The result also 
disagrees with Simerly (1997), who argued that companies which adopt a 
diversification strategy far from their core business interest are motivated by 
traditional perspectives, or by the stakeholder perspective that only pursues 
financial objectives. Therefore, a company‘s CSP would be lower for unrelated 
diversification than for related diversification.  
Finally, this study predicts a positive relationship between international 
diversification and CSP in regard to intense pressure from various stakeholders 
and is motivated by managerial and economic incentives. The result of 
regression analysis demonstrates that international diversification has a positive 
and significant impact on CSP (H2). This finding is similar to those of Attig et al. 
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(2016); Ma et al. (2016); Aguilera-Caracuel et al. (2015); Kang (2013); Brammer 
et al. (2006); Strike et al. (2006); Christmann (2004). For example, Attig et al. 
(2016) found a positive relationship between internationalisation and CSR, 
offering recent evidence that multinational corporations which operate in 
countries which have well-functioning legal and political institutions have a higher 
CSP Index. Aguilera-Caracuel et al. (2015) noted that international cultural 
diversification was positively associated with CSP.    
Intense pressure from stakeholders is one of the reasons for a positive 
relationship between international diversification and CSP. International 
diversification increases the number and variety of stakeholder pressure, derived 
from the different legal, regulatory, economic, cultural and social attitudes of each 
country (Ma et al., 2016; Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2015; Park et al., 2014; Kang, 
2013; Brammer et al., 2006; Gardberg and Fombrun, 2006; Christmann, 2004; 
Sharfman et al., 2004). Stakeholders in diverse groups and countries have 
different priorities, while international diversified businesses have a greater 
opportunity for organisational learning (Ma et al., 2016; Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 
2015). By creating mutual understanding with their stakeholders and using these 
ideas and resources, companies can communicate effectively with different 
stakeholders vis-à-vis their expectations, manage complex regulations in different 
countries and negotiate with governments to influence regulations which in turn 
improve CSP (Ma et al., 2016; Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2015; Strike et al., 2006).  
According to Aguilera-Caracuel et al. (2015); Kang (2013), international 
diversification provides incentives to managers and firms to respond to 
stakeholder demand and socials issues. The managerial incentives emerge 
because international diversification can reduce managerial employment risk by 
271 
 
lessening the risk of bankruptcy and augmenting management entrenchment 
(Attig et al., 2016; Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2015; Kang, 2013; Montgomery, 
1994; Shleifer and Vinishny, 1989; Fatemi, 1984). Consequently, management in 
international diversified organisations will take notice of stakeholder demands 
and social issues. International diversification also provides economic incentives 
for a company to respond to stakeholder demand and social issues, seeing that 
the company can spread the cost and benefit of CSP investment among 
subsidiaries (Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2015; Kang, 2013; McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001).  
The findings refute the argument concerning the practice of social 
irresponsibility transferred from the home country to subsidiaries, although MNE) 
may select countries where stakeholder pressure is weak or minimal (Brammer et 
al., 2006), and transfer the irresponsible corporate social practice to their 
subsidiary companies in emerging countries (Surroca et al., 2013). However, 
nowadays, governments in emerging economies are insisting on CSR as part of 
the development objectives of MNEs (Reimann et al., 2012).  
Hence, with regard to intense pressure from various stakeholders and the 
motivation of managerial and economic incentives, this study supports the 
proposal that higher internationally diversified companies have higher CSP. 
6.5.2 The Relationship between Corporate Diversification and Corporate 
Social Performance with CG as a moderating variable 
 
The second research aim is investigate the role of corporate governance in 
corporate diversification-CSP relationship. This aims followed by two research 
questions, what is the relationship between corporate diversification and CSP 
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through independent commissioner and ownership concentration as a 
moderating variable. From the moderating effect of an independent 
commissioner, this study proposes three hypotheses, H3a, H3b and H3c . This 
study predicts the relationship between corporate diversification and CSP is 
moderated by independent commissioner as good CSP is required in a 
diversified company to achieve better CSP. The finding explains that the direct 
relationship between an independent commissioner and CSP is positive and 
significant in regression models 6, 7,8, 9 and 14. This finding also supports the 
results of a few prior studies (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Jizi et al., 2014; 
Khan et al., 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). For example, Khan et al. (2013) 
noted that board independence has a positive and significant impact on CSR 
disclosure. This finding supports agency theory, stakeholder theory and 
resources dependent theory, which suggest that the presence of a commissioner, 
independent of internal controlling and monitoring mechanisms, is expected to 
eliminate opportunistic managerial behaviour, represent the interest of all 
stakeholders in the board room, and improve the company‘s strategic decision 
making on diversification, via their knowledge and use of networks to obtain 
resources and create value for all stakeholders.   
However, the results for the moderating variables are mixed. For instance, 
there is no significant moderating impact of independent commissioner on the 
related diversification-CSP relationship (H3a). This contradicts the finding of 
Surroca and Tribó (2008), that managerial practice has a positive effect on CSP, 
and that the effect is stronger in companies with efficient CG mechanisms, such 
as independent commissioners. However, an independent commissioner did 
moderate the relationship between unrelated diversification and CSP in a positive 
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way (H3b) and with international diversification and CSP (H3c). The positive role 
of an independent commissioner on the corporate diversification-CSP 
relationship, both unrelated and international diversification, is congruent with the 
findings of Surroca and Tribó (2008). Conversely, it disagrees with Cuadrado-
Ballesteros et al. (2015) and Walls et al. (2012), who ascertained that the 
independence of independent directors could disappear for several reasons, 
such as in family businesses and short-term orientated investor firms.  
Not all the studies investigating the moderating effect of independent 
commissioners on CSP were conducted in diversified companies. However, with 
similar logic, the researcher argues that the presence of an independent 
commissioner is expected to eliminate managers' opportunistic behaviour, 
represent all stakeholder interests in the board room and contribute to the 
company‘s strategic decision making on diversification. The researcher also 
asserts that independent commissioners may use their own networks to bring 
valuable resources into the firm in order to create higher value for all 
stakeholders. Hence, in order to increase the effect of corporate diversification on 
CSP, the company must consider the number of independent commissioners on 
its board of directors. This relates to the capacity of the independent 
commissioner, who has no conflict of interest, in giving valuable suggestions to 
managers, for example when dealing with performance achievement such as 
CSP. Hence, to increase the effect of diversification strategy on CSP, companies 
have to pay more attention on their independent commissioners. 
The moderating effect of ownership concentration on the corporate 
diversification-CSP relationship also tested three hypotheses, H4a, H4b  and H4c 
. This study predicts the relationship between corporate diversification and CSP 
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is moderated by ownership concentration. First, this study determined the 
significant and negative moderating effect of ownership concentration on the 
relationship between related diversification and CSP (H4a) is in line with previous 
research that found a negative relationship between ownership concentration and 
CSR or CEP (Dam and Scholtens, 2013; Khan et al., 2013; Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013; Walls et al., 2012; Jo and Harjoto, 2011). For example, Dam 
and Scholtens (2013) discovered a negative relationship between ownership 
concentration, measured by block ownership and the CSR policy of European 
multinational companies. Khan et al. (2013) found that public ownership, which 
reflects ownership dispersion, contributes to an increase in the level of CSR 
disclosure in Bangladesh. Similarly, Walls et al. (2012) noticed that shareholder 
concentration measured by the percentage of shares held by the top five 
institutional investors in a company had a negative but not significant impact on 
CEP. 
Therefore, this finding supports agency theory which suggests that majority 
shareholders in concentrated ownership companies could expropriate minority 
shareholders‘ interests (Dam and Scholtens, 2013). In terms of CSP, Ducassy 
and Montandrau (2015) state that the greater a shareholder‘s share, the higher 
the ownership concentration. Thus, they are less likely to encourage CSR 
programmes that do not provide a clear return on investment, even if they are 
socially optimal. As they have both the incentives and the power to influence 
managers, majority shareholders may prevent them from investing in non-
shareholder value-maximising activities. Similarly, Brammer and Millington (2005) 
found that agency conflict plays a role, indicating that there is a significantly lower 
propensity to become involved in charitable giving programmes among 
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companies with a highly-concentrated ownership. Furthermore, ownership 
concentration also weakens the pressure on institutions to adopt CSR, given the 
limited and less powerful outside interests (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Khan et 
al. (2013) from the perspective of the stakeholder, argued that companies with 
ownership dispersion may increase pressure for voluntary disclosure including 
CSR activities under pressure from a large number of stakeholders.  
Although previous studies did not mention ownership concentration or 
ownership dispersion as a moderating variable on corporate diversification and 
CSP, the researcher argues that the impact of related corporate diversification on 
CSP will be lower when this relationship is moderated by ownership 
concentration. This is based on agency and stakeholder theories, that ownership 
concentration makes managers focus on central stakeholders, such as block 
shareholders, ignore other stakeholders who exert less institutional pressure. 
Therefore, ownership concentration appears to moderate corporate diversification 
and CSP in a negative way. In contrast, ownership dispersion will help managers 
to make better decisions for all stakeholders and, it may be argued, affect CSP in 
diversified companies in a positive way. However, the moderating effect of 
ownership concentration on the corporate diversification-CSP relationship is only 
supported partially; significant for the related diversification relationship (H4a), 
although not for the unrelated diversification (H4b) and international 
diversification (H4c) relationships. Ownership concentration, such as by majority 
shareholders, may or may not support social initiative, which is related to CSP, 
depending on whether the costs of those social activities are higher than the 
benefits received. Specifically, for unrelated and international diversification, 
these risks might be higher that the benefits. Accordingly, ownership 
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concentration may not be significantly related to the unrelated and international 
diversification-CSP relationships. 
6.6 Summary 
 
This chapter has analysed two principal research aims, the relationship 
between corporate diversification and CSP and the role of CG mechanisms on 
moderating this relationship. Related diversification has a negative relationship 
with CSP, while unrelated and international diversification have a positive impact 
on CSP. Moreover, the relationship between unrelated diversification and CSP is 
more positive and significant than the related diversification and CSP 
relationship. Furthermore, independent commissioner and ownership 
concentration as part of CG mechanisms only partially support the corporate 
diversification-CSP relationship. Independent commissioners strengthen the 
positive relationship between unrelated diversification and CSP and the 
international corporate diversification-CSP relationship. However, ownership 
concentration weakens the negative relationship between related diversification 
and CSP. Finally, in the context of an emerging country, ownership concentration 
may have a smaller effect on weakening the positive relationship between 
corporate diversification and CSP. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the key findings of the study, the research 
contributions; theoretical contributions and managerial implications, and indicates 
the limitations of the research and directions for future study.  
7.2 Summary of Findings 
The research questions or the objective of this study are to examine the 
relationship between corporate diversification and CSP and to investigate the 
moderating effect of CG on the relationship between corporate diversification and 
CSP. Data on 203 listed companies in Indonesia was analysed. There are 
several key findings which reflect the research questions. First, in answering the 
research question regarding the relationship between product diversification and 
CSP, it established that related diversification is significantly related to CSP (H1a) 
in a negative direction. Unrelated diversification is significantly related to CSP 
with alpha less than 0.10 (H1b) in a positive direction, whereas international 
diversification is significantly related to CSP (H2) in a positive direction. To 
answer the second and fourth research question, the study examined the 
moderating effect of CG on the relationship between corporate diversification and 
CSP. Of six hypotheses, only three are significant:  the moderating effect of 
independent commissioners in strengthening the positive relationship between 
unrelated diversification and CSP (H3b); the moderating effect of independent 
commissioners on strengthening the international diversification-CSP relationship 
(H3c); and the moderating effect of ownership concentration on weakening the 
negative relationship between related diversification and CSP (H4a). 
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7.3 Research Contribution 
 
The contributions are to both, theory practical and policy making. 
7.3.1 Theoretical Contributions 
There are four theoretical contributions in relation to this study.  
1. First, this study has explained the link between corporate diversification 
and CSP, both product diversification and international diversification. 
Based on the literature review of 45 previous studies on corporate 
diversification and corporate performance between 1995 and 2016, there 
are only nine empirical studies which investigated the relationship 
between corporate diversification and CSP as corporate performance 
including Attig et al. (2016); Ma et al. (2016); Aguilera-Caracuel et al. 
(2015); Kang (2013); Brammer et al. (2006); Strike et al. (2006); 
Christmann (2004); Dooley and Fryxell (1999); (Simerly, 1997). Whilst, 
others focused on financial performance from the accounting or market 
perspectives. Furthermore, most of the studies on the corporate 
diversification-CSP relationship focused on the relationship between 
international diversification and CSP. To the best of the researcher‘s 
knowledge, only Kang (2013); Dooley and Fryxell (1999); Simerly (1997) 
who have investigated the relationship between product diversification 
and CSP. However, Simerly (1997) did not differentiate between product 
diversification in related and unrelated diversification. Alternatively, Dooley 
and Fryxell (1999) used related and unrelated diversification to reflect 
specific types of industry diversification; however, they only used 
environmental performance as a CSP measurement and they employed a 
uni-dimensional indicator. Accordingly, only Kang (2013) who applied 
related and unrelated types of industry diversification and used multi-
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dimensional indicators to measure CSP. Therefore, it may be concluded 
that research on the relationship between corporate diversification and 
CSP remains limited, particularly on the link between product 
diversification and CSP, and this study have addressed this gap.   
2. Secondly, this study extends previous studies which addressed the 
relationship between corporate diversification and CSP by using corporate 
governance as the moderating variable. Previous studies only 
investigated the relationship between corporate diversification and CSP, 
such as Aguilera-Caracuel et al. (2015); Kang (2013); Brammer et al. 
(2006); Strike et al. (2006); Christmann (2004). Others investigated the 
relationship between CG and CSP (e.g.Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; 
Li, K. et al., 2015; Jizi et al., 2014; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013). However, they 
overlooked the role of CG on CSP in the context of diversified companies. 
Hence, this study offers new insight into the relationship between 
corporate diversification and CSP with CG mechanisms, such as 
independent commissioners and ownership concentration, as moderating 
variables. The findings reveal the role played by independent 
commissioners as an enhancing factor that encourages CSP in diversified 
firms, particularly in both related and unrelated product diversification. The 
findings also showed the role of ownership dispersion as alleviating 
factors in reducing the negative relationship between related 
diversification and CSP. 
3. This study has contributed to explain the relationship between corporate 
diversification, corporate governance and CSP in an emerging economy; 
Indonesia. Additionally, most of the studies, which addressed the 
relationship between corporate diversification and CSP, were primarily 
conducted in developed countries (Kang, 2013; Purkayastha et al., 2012). 
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This study affords new insight on the context of an emerging country, 
such as Indonesia. According to Reimann et al. (2015), every country has 
differences regarding local rules, regulations and governmental control, 
which lead to different CSR requirements. Most of the emerging countries 
suffer from these weak institutions (Ma et al., 2016), for example low local 
labour rights or poor working standards. These conditions lead to lower 
requirements for CSR in emerging economies than in developed 
economies (Reimann et al., 2015; Yang and Rivers, 2009). Therefore, the 
result of studies on the relationship between corporate diversification and 
CSP in developing economies could be different to developed economies. 
Furthermore, the unique characteristics of a company in emerging 
developing economies, such as family dominance, could result in the 
failure of corporate governance mechanisms to increase CSR (Khan et 
al., 2013). 
4. Thirdly, this study gives a unique perspective on CSP measurement, 
particularly the CSP indicator. This research applies content analysis 
based on GRI indicators to measure CSP. Most prior studies have 
employed ethical rating methods and indicators, such as KLD, EIRIS and 
IVA. However, there is no research on corporate diversification and CSP 
that use GRI guidelines to measure CSP indicators. While, according to 
Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015); Bouten et al. (2011), GRI guidelines 
could be an adequate standard for CSR achievement, which reflect the 
CSP, particularly the performance indicators of GRI. Accordingly, this 
study has contributed by introducing a CSP measurement based on GRI 
indicators, specifically by combining GRI versions 3 and 4, as research 
was conducted in a transition period. 
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7.3.2 Policy Implications 
This study also has policy implications, with the following contributions: 
1. These findings offer a new insight in encouraging managers to pay more 
attention to their companies‘ diversification strategies. Therefore, it will lead 
to performance developments, such as CSP. To increase CSP, a company 
must carefully consider decisions concerning diversification strategy, such 
as related/unrelated or international diversification strategies. For example, 
unrelated diversification has a positive and significant impact on CSP. Even 
though a related diversification strategy has a negative impact on CSP, it 
remains statistically significant. Hence, managers may prefer related 
diversification to maintain CSP. 
2. In order to maximise the impact of corporate diversification strategy on 
CSP, a manager has to think wisely, based on CG dimensions in the 
company, such as the number of independent commissioners and 
ownership concentration. This factor will affect the decision-making process 
in the company.  
3. This study provides input for the government to create programmes or 
regulations, which increase the company‘s willingness to deal with social 
responsibility issues.  
4. This study provides input for managers who run their businesses in 
emerging economies, which have several differences in contrast to 
developed economies, such as local rules, regulations and governmental 
control. 
7.4 Limitations, Future Research and Research Impact 
This study also has a few limitations. It was only conducted in one 
country, Indonesia, which limits the generalisability of its results, even to 
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emerging economies. Future research may attempt to validate and compare 
these results with other emerging countries, for example in Southeast Asia: 
Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, making them more generalisable. 
Moreover, the different regulations, cultural and institutional conditions between 
emerging countries may influence a company‘s response to stakeholder 
demands and social issues.    
Second, due to time and cost limitations, this was a cross-sectional 
study, portraying the phenomena at a single time and unable to reflect the long-
term effects of change. Future research might use a longitudinal study to 
describe the phenomena over the long term. Hence, it might be able to describe 
the association between corporate diversification and CSP with CG as moderator 
at contrasting times, checking the relationship‘s consistency or validity. A 
longitudinal study may also lead practitioners and academics to understand the 
causal relationship between corporate diversification and CSP. 
Third, it was not possible to obtain secondary data regarding the specific 
percentage of sales of international diversified businesses in individual countries 
because of different reporting methods; the ratio of foreign sales to total sales 
was therefore used as a proxy. However, this measurement may not capture 
relevant information regarding the number of countries in which a company 
operates, the relative importance of sales contributed by each country, and 
differences in regulations, cultural and institutional conditions that might affect the 
relationship between international diversification and CSP. Future research may 
consider other measurements of international diversification, for instance the 
entropy measure (Majocchi and Strange, 2012; Chang and Wang, 2007)   
Fourth, this study only addressed two indicators of CG: independent 
commissioners and ownership concentration. A future study might employ other 
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indicators of CG, such as type of ownership and managerial compensation as the 
moderating variable, which may contribute more valuable results. 
Finally, the study indicates the impact on policy making on the economy 
of Indonesia. In future, if the Indonesian government intends to develop better 
CSR programmes, it must introduce regulations suitable to the type of industry 
diversification and encouragement for listed companies to implement good CG. 
7.5 Summary 
In conclusion, the findings of this study have contributed to the theoretical and 
managerial implications of the relationship between corporate diversification and 
CSP, neglected in previous studies. They include an extended measurement of 
CSP by using a GRI indicator in the GRI 3 and GRI 4 transition period and 
addressing the moderating effect of CG on the corporate diversification-CSP 
relationship. The limitations (e.g. a cross-sectional study) outlined above are 
addressed by suggestions for future research. 
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diversification 
was measured 
by cultural 
entropy index 
based on 
region, not 
countries.   
- Relied on 
secondary 
data for CSP 
variable 
201
5 
Cuadrado
-
Ballester
os et al. 
(2015) 
To analyse CSR 
disclosure and the role 
of Independent director 
to CSR 
- CSR: GRI 
- Independent 
director 
- Control 
variables: 
board size, 
diversity of 
board (women 
and 
foreigners), etc. 
- Panel data set, 575 
non-financial listed 
companies in 
Europe, UK and 
US, 4025 
observations in 7 
years 
- Generalized 
Method of 
Moment 
(GMM) with 
STATA 11 
- Independent 
Director  + 
CSR 
disclosure 
- Independent 
director*Fam
ily firm - 
CSR  
disclosure 
- Need for other 
controls 
- Data is limited 
to several 
countries and 
years 
- GRI is more 
appropriate for 
the future 
study 
- Put audit 
committee as a 
control variable 
2015 Gao and 
Chou 
To investigate whether 
multinational firms are 
less or more efficient in 
- Innovative 
efficiency 
- Diversification: 
- secondary data use 
NBER patent 
database, 
- Tobit 
regression 
- OLS 
- Adj R2=0.154-
- ID  - 
Innovative 
efficiency  
- Only 
investigate in  
US companies 
316 
 
(2015) innovation activities 
and effect of  
innovation efficiency on 
firm value   
TD and ID 
- Performance: 
Excess value 
Compustat 
segment files, and 
Compustat 
industrial annual file 
- 15,010-17,363 
observation 
- Period 1980-2003 
0.303 - Innovative 
efficiency 
+corporate 
value in 
markets with 
better patent 
protection 
2015 Hashai 
(2015) 
To investigate the 
relationship between 
within industry 
diversification and firm 
performance  
- Firm 
performance: 
ROA and ROS 
- WID 
- Secondary data 
from Dolev and 
Abramovitz dataset, 
the Israel Ventura 
Capital dataset, 
LexisNexis 
Academic press 
announcement and 
archives of leading 
Israeli financial 
newspaper 
- Interview  
- 147 firms 
- Two stage 
least square 
- Centered  R
2
 = 
0.148-0.215 
- The 
relationship 
between  
within 
industry 
diversificatio
n and firm 
performance 
is S curve 
- Need to include 
the motivation 
of WID 
- Need to 
consider the 
simultaneously 
expanding 
across and 
within 
industries  
201
5 
Li, K. et 
al. (2015) 
To investigate the 
relationship between 
board independentce, 
ownership 
concentration and 
corporate performance 
- Board 
Independentce 
- Ownership 
concentration 
- Financial 
performance 
- Panel data from 
China stock market 
and Accounting 
research. 6823 
observations from 
1241 companies 
(2003-2008) 
- Multiple 
regression 
- Fixed effects 
- Adj R
2
=-0.303, 
0.305, 0.567, 
0.567 
- Board 
independent
ce  CFP 
- Ownership 
concentratio
n  CFP 
- Need more in-
depth analysis 
2015 Oh et al. 
(2015) 
Investigate the effect of 
regional diversification 
on firm‘s performance 
and moderating effect 
of product 
- Firm 
performance: 
ROS, ROA 
- ID: intra and 
- Panel data from 65 
leading retail firm 
period of year 
1997-2010 
- Panel data 
General 
Methods of 
Moment 
- S curve 
relationship : 
Inter regional 
diversificatio
n Firm 
- Only focus on 
retail industry 
- Only used 
geographical 
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diversification on this 
relationship. 
inter region 
-  Product TD, 
Diversification: 
RD and UD 
- Control 
variable such 
as firm size, 
firm growth, 
year 
(GMM) with 
one year 
lagged 
dependent 
variable 
performance 
- Moderating 
impact of RD 
and UD on 
inter region 
diversificatio
n and 
performance 
relationship 
dimension of 
international 
diversification. 
Future 
research need 
to consider 
other 
dimension 
such as 
cultural and 
institutional. 
2015 Su and 
Tsang 
(2015) 
To investigate the 
moderating effect of 
secondary stakeholder 
on the relationship 
between product 
diversification and 
financial performance 
- Financial 
performance: 
ROA 
- Product 
Diversification: 
TD, RD and 
UD 
- secondary 
stakeholder 
(SS) 
- Control 
variable such 
as firm‘s size,  
firm‘s financial 
slack, 
outside/Indepe
ndent director  
- Panel data by using 
secondary data 
from Compustat 
database 
- Public firms on 
fortune 500 list 
between 1996 and 
2003. 
- 391 firms and 2,364 
observation for first 
stage model 
- 197 firms and 990 
observation for 
second stage 
model 
- Probit 
regression 
- Fix effect 
regression 
- One year 
Lagged 
regression 
- R
2
 = 0.836 to 
0.839 
- TD -Firm 
performance 
- UD -Firm 
performance 
- Moderating 
impact of SS 
on TD –Firm 
performance 
is + 
- Moderating 
impact of SS 
on UD –Firm 
performance 
is + 
- Relates with 
secondary 
stakeholder 
measurement 
201
4 
Jizi et al. 
(2014) 
To examine the 
relationship between 
corporate governance 
and CSR 
- CSR 
disclosure 
- Corporate 
governance: 
- Secondary data 
from 193 listed 
bank in US in2009-
2011 
- Tobit 
regression 
model 
- R square =  
0.17, 0.22 
- Board size 
 CSR 
- Board 
Independent 
- Should be 
done in much 
wider range of 
industries 
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Board 
Independentce, 
Board size, 
CEO duality 
- Control 
variables: audit 
committee, 
profitability, etc.  
- Wald chi 
square = 
56.45, 76.33 
 CSR 
2014 Mason and 
Simmons 
(2014) 
To investigate the gap 
on the link between CG 
and CSR in stakeholder 
systems approach 
- CSR 
- CG 
- Stakeholder 
system 
Literature review - Descriptive A holistic 
approach on 
the link 
between CG 
and CSR 
- Still on 
conceptual 
model 
201
4 
Park et 
al. (2014) 
To examine how 
specific stakeholder 
groups influence 
MNE‘s CSR 
- CSR 
- Consumers 
- Internal 
managers and 
employees 
- Business 
collaborator 
- Governments 
- Media 
- Local 
community 
- Survey 
- 312 responses 
(response rate 
20.38% 
- South Korea 
- OLS 
regression 
analysis 
- Adj R
2
=0.20, 
0.35 
- Internal 
managers 
and 
employees 
 CSR 
- Only focus on 
one 
geographical 
area 
2014 Peng and 
Yang 
(2014) 
To investigate the 
impact of ownership 
concentration on the 
link between CSP and 
CFP 
- Ownership 
concentration 
- CSP 
- CFP 
- Control variables 
Panel data from 84 firm-
year Taiwan SEI, 316 
firms-years observation 
- Factor 
analysis,  
- OLS 
- Adj R
2
=0.23, 
0.31 
Ownership 
concentration*
CSP  CFP 
- Need for in-
depth study on 
ownership 
concentration-
CSP 
relationship 
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2014 Young and 
Thyil 
(2014) 
To explore the 
relationship between 
corporate governance 
and CSR 
- CSR 
- CG 
Semi structure Interview  
to 2 key informants in 
UK, India and Australia 
- Qualitative 
analysis with 
NVIVO 
CG  CSR - Generalization 
- Need for larger 
quantitative 
analysis 
201
3 
Choi et 
al. (2013) 
To investigate the link 
between corporate 
governance and  
manager intention to 
CSR  
- CSR:KEJI 
- Earning 
management 
- CG: 
Institutional 
ownership, 
largest block 
holders, foreign 
ownership, 
ownership 
concentration 
- Panel data from 
2042 non-financial 
firms-years in 
KLCA  Korea 
- OLS 
regression 
- Adj R
2
=-0.47, 
0.50, 0.47, 
0.48 
 
Largest 
(ownership 
concentratio
n)*earning 
management 
 - CSR 
- Only in Korean 
companies 
- Need to do 
more in other 
countries to 
give a 
generalization 
2013 Dam and 
Scholtens 
(2013) 
To investigate 
association between 
ownership 
concentration and CSR 
- CSR: EIRis 
- Ownership 
concentration: 
% of block 
holder 
(5%,10%,20%) 
and  
Shareholder 
concentration 
index 
- Control 
variable such 
as leverage, 
ROA, liquidity 
ratio 
- Secondary data 
from 691 European 
companies in 2005 
from EIRiS 
Database  
- OLS 
- Cross 
sectional 
analysis 
- R
2
=-0.387-
0.394 
OC - CSR - Only use cross 
sectional 
analysis  
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201
3 
Hafsi and 
Turgut 
(2013) 
To investigate what 
does boardroom 
diversity stand for in 
strategic management 
and examine the 
relationship between 
boardroom diversity 
and CSP 
- CSP:KLD 
- Diversity of 
boards 
- Diversity in 
boards 
- Control 
variables: type 
of industry, 
CFP 
- Cross sectional 
secondary data 
from 100 listed 
companies in the 
S&P500 index 
DJSE US 
- OLS 
regression 
- Adj R
2
=-0.03, 
0.00, 0.02, -
0.03, 0.15, 
0.11 
- Board size 
 (no) 
CSP 
- Outside 
director  
(no) CSP 
- Age (-) 
CSP 
- Sample size 
could be larger 
- Measurement 
improvement 
2013 Kang 
(2013) 
To investigate the 
relationship between 
corporate diversification 
and corporate social 
performance 
- CSP:KLD 
- Related 
diversification 
- Unrelated 
diversification 
- International 
diversification 
- Firm focus on 
short term profit 
Secondary data from 
3044 companies and 
years based on 155 
companies  from 1993-
2006 in three different 
database; Kinder, 
Lydenderg, Domini ( 
KLD) Social Rating data 
base, Compustat‘s North 
America database,  and 
Compustat‘s Executive 
Compensation 
(Execucom)  
 
- Multiple 
regression 
with: 
contemporan
eous lag 
structure and 
one year lag 
model 
- Fixed-effects 
 
 
 
 
Unrelated 
diversification 
 + CSP 
 
Unrelated 
diversification 
  CSP 
> + 
related 
diversification 
 CSP 
 
International 
diversification 
 + CSP 
 
 
201
3 
Khan et 
al. (2013) 
To examine the 
relationship between 
corporate governance 
and CSR disclosures 
- CSR 
disclosures 
index 
- Corporate 
governance:  
managerial 
ownership, 
public 
- Secondary data 
from 135 
manufacturing 
companies in 
Dhaka Stock 
Exchange. 580 
firm-years 
observations 
- Multiple 
regression 
- Adj R
2
= 0.383-
0.562 
- Independent
ce board of 
director  + 
CSR 
- Focus on 
disclosure in 
annual report 
- Adopt 
legitimacy 
theory 
- Future 
research 
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ownership, 
foreign 
ownership, 
independence 
director, audit 
committee, 
CEO duality 
- Control 
variables: firm 
size, age, 
leverage and 
ROA 
should be in 
agency theory 
201
3 
Lien and 
Li (2013) 
Examines how 
corporate governance 
factors specific to 
emerging economies 
determine the extent of 
diversification and 
moderate firm 
performance. 
- Firm 
performance: 
Tobin‘s Q 
- Diversification 
- Controlling 
family 
ownership 
- Bank 
ownership 
- Control 
variables 
including 
economic 
condition, 
industry, capital 
and firms‘ age 
- Panel data set; 205 
publicly listed firms 
from 1999-2003 
- Tobit 
regression 
model 
- McFadden 
pseudo R
2
= 
0.503; 0.562; 
0.664 
- Random effect 
regression  
 
- Total of 
diversificatio
n + Firm 
performance 
- Total of 
diversificatio
n
2
 - Firm 
performance 
 
- Need to 
divided 
differentiates 
between 
related and 
unrelated 
diversification 
- Only focus on 
ownership 
structure, need 
to considers 
other 
governance 
factors such as 
board 
composition  
- Need to 
investigates 
relationship 
between other 
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governance 
factors and 
firm 
diversification 
201
3 
Ntim and 
Soobaroye
n (2013) 
To Investigate the 
relationship between 
corporate governance, 
financial performance 
and corporate social 
responsibility 
- CSR:BEE 
- CFP 
- CG 
- Control 
variables: firm 
size, risk, sales 
growth, industry 
etc. 
- Panel data 
- 291 listed non-
financial firm in 
Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange 2002-2009 
- 600 data set 
- Multiple 
regression 
analysis 
- Fixed effects 
- Adj R
2
=0.38-
0.54 
CG + CSR 
 
CSR   CFP 
 
CSR*CG  
CFP 
 
 
- Survivorships 
sample 
selection 
criteria 
- Limitation in 
explaining why 
and how the 
link between 
CSR and CFP 
- Only in South 
Africa and 
needs to be 
replicate in 
other countries 
201
3 
Park and 
Jang 
(2013a) 
To investigate the inter-
relationship among 
capital structure, free 
cash flow, 
diversification and firm 
performance 
- Firm 
performance: 
Tobin‘s Q 
- Capital 
Structure: debt 
leverage 
- RD 
- UD 
- Free cash Flow 
(FCF) 
 
- 308 restaurant 
companies from 
1995-2008 
- 2829 firm-year 
observation 
- Compustat 
segment  database 
- OLS, 2SLS, 
3SLS 
- RMSE 0.516; 
1.165; 1.1752 
 
- RD+ Firm 
performance 
- UD- Firm 
performance 
- Firm 
performance
+ RD 
- Firm 
performance
- UD 
- Only use 
restaurant 
industry 
- Need to 
incorporate the 
characteristic 
of diversifying  
target industry 
- Need to 
investigate 
within industry 
diversification 
or vertical 
integration 
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201
3 
Park and 
Jang 
(2013b) 
To investigate the 
effect of within-industry 
diversification and 
unrelated 
diversification on short 
and long performance 
in the restaurant 
industry. 
- Firm 
performance: 
ROA, sale 
- Within Industry 
Diversification 
(WID) 
- RD 
- UD 
- Secondary data  
from compustat 
database 
- 288 restaurant 
companies, 2514 
observation 
- Autoregressive 
distributed lag 
model 
equivalent to 
Error 
Correction 
Mechanism 
(ECM) 
- Dynamic Panel 
– GMM 
 
- RD +Firm 
performance 
- Moderating 
impact of RD 
on WID- 
ROA 
relationship 
is + 
- Moderating 
impact of RD 
on WID- sale 
relationship 
is - 
- Focus on 
restaurant 
industry, the 
result cannot 
generalized 
-  need to 
investigate in 
others 
industries 
- Need to used 
time series 
approach 
201
2 
Chen and 
Yu (2012) 
Investigate inter 
relationship among 
managerial ownership, 
diversification and firm 
performance. 
- TD 
- RD 
- UD 
- Firm 
performance: 
ROA 
- Managerial 
ownership 
- Control 
variable such 
as Firm size, 
age, Intangible 
asset, 
leverage, past 
performance, 
industry, 
economic cycle 
- Secondary data 
- 98 listed firm on the 
TSE from 1996-
2001 
- Multiple 
regression 
- Adj R
2
 = 0.331-
0.419 
- TD +Firm 
performance 
- UD +Firm 
performance 
 
- Focus on 
Taiwan, need 
to investigate 
in others 
emerging 
economies 
- Lack of data 
availability 
- Uses others 
control 
variables 
201
2 
Ho and 
Wang 
To examine the impact 
of national culture, 
- CSP: IVA 
- Geographical 
- Secondary data, 
with 3680 
- Anova 
- 2Stage Least 
- Geographica
l 
- Sample limited 
to public 
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(2012) geographical 
environments on CSP 
environment 
(dummy) 
- Power 
Distance Index 
(PDI) 
- Masculinity 
- Individualism 
- UAI 
- Control 
variables 
observations from 
49 developed and 
developing 
countries from 
North America, 
Europe, Asia (Post 
et al., 2011)Pacific 
Square 
- R
2
 = 0.012, 
0.086, 0.092, 
0.093, 0.092, 
0.094 
environment 
 CSP 
companies 
- Find other 
influenced 
factors of CSP 
2012 Kang and 
Moon 
(2012) 
To examine the link 
between CG and CSR 
- Corporate 
governance 
- CSR 
Literature review - Descriptive CSR 
complements 
CG systems 
- Need to study 
in emerging 
countries 
2012 Park and 
Jang 
(2012) 
Investigates the effect 
of diversification on 
firm performance 
- Firm 
performance: 
ROA and ROS; 
and 
variance of ROA 
and ROS 
- RD 
- UD 
- Total 
Diversification 
- Control 
variables such 
as size, 
leverage, FCF 
- 308 restaurant 
companies from 
1995-2008 
- 2829 firm-year 
observation 
- Compustat 
segment  database 
- Fixed- effect 
multiple 
regression 
- RD-ROA 
and ROS 
- RD
2+ROA 
and ROS 
- UD+ROA 
and ROS 
- UD
2- ROA 
and ROS 
- RD+ 
variance 
ROA and 
ROS 
- RD
2- 
variance 
ROA and 
ROS 
- UD- 
variance 
ROA and 
- Needs to 
investigate the 
other factors 
that influence 
the 
diversification 
performance 
relationship 
- Only use 
restaurant 
industry, the 
result cannot 
generalized to 
other industry 
- Need to 
incorporate the 
private 
information 
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ROS 
- UD
2+ 
variance 
ROA and 
ROS 
about firm level 
segment 
profitability 
- Need to 
investigate the 
perspective of 
investor on 
corporate 
diversification 
2012 Purkayasth
a et al. 
(2012) 
To synthesize the 
relationship between 
diversification and firm 
performance in the 
context of developed 
economies to more 
recent work in 
emerging economies 
by comparing and 
contrasting the past 
cumulative empirical 
research evidence.   
- Corporate 
diversification 
- Firm 
performance 
- Literature review 
from 124 articles, 
87 in the context of 
developed markets 
and 37 in the 
context of emerging 
market 
- Descriptive - Diversificatio
nperforma
nce 
- UDperform
ance more 
than RD in 
emerging 
economies 
- RDperform
ance more 
than UD in 
developed 
economies 
- Research in 
emerging 
countries is 
limited to 
china, Korean 
and east 
European 
countries and 
thus 
broadening is 
required. 
2012 Schmid 
and Walter 
(2012) 
To investigates 
whether geographic 
diversification is value-
enhancing or value 
destroying in the 
financial services 
sector 
- Excess value 
- ID 
- Control 
variable such 
as leverage, 
asset and ROA 
- Secondary data 
use Compustate 
database  
- 620 company with 
3579 observations 
over the period 
from 1985 to 2004 
 
- Descriptive 
analysis 
- Multivariate 
regression 
analysis 
- Fixed effect 
- R2 within 
=0.028-0.104 
- ID -firm 
value in 
securities 
firms  
- ID +firm in 
credit 
intermediarie
s and 
insurance 
companies 
- Only intended 
to be 
generalized to 
a single 
industry 
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201
2 
Walls et 
al. (2012) 
To explore the link 
between corporate 
governance and 
environmental 
performance 
- CEP: KLD 
- CG: Board of 
directors 
independence, 
size, diversity  
- Control 
variables: CEO 
duality, Mgr 
control, CEO 
bonus, CEO 
salary, ROA, 
Size, leverage, 
etc. 
- Secondary data 
- Panel data from 
313 S&P 500 
companies in US 
from 1997-2005, 
2,002 observations 
in 29 industries 
- OLS 
- R square = 
0.495, 0.496, 
0.531, 0.497, 
0.534 
- Ownership 
concentratio
n 
 (no) CSR 
strength and 
(-) CSR 
concern 
- Independenc
e director 
 (no) CSR 
strength  and 
(+) CSR 
concern 
 
- A stakeholder 
theory maybe 
useful for the 
future study 
201
1 
Jo and 
Harjoto 
(2011) 
To investigate the 
effect of internal and 
external corporate 
governance 
mechanism on CSR 
engagement and the 
value of the firm 
engaging in CSR 
activities 
- CSR: total, 
strength, 
concern 
- Corporate 
governance: 
governance 
index, 
institutional 
ownership, 
number of 
analysis, board 
characteristic 
- Control variables 
including size, 
leverage, 
diversification   
- Secondary data 
from KLD, risk 
metric database, 
compustat 
database and 
Centre for research 
security prices data 
- Sample: 1175-1777 
firms and 5639-
7750 observations 
-  Two stage 
regression 
- Pseudo R
2
 
0.1464-0.5539 
-  
- Internal 
corporate 
governance 
mechanism 
+ CSR 
- Ownership 
concentratio
n  - CSR  
- Outside 
independent 
BoD + 
CSR 
- CSR + 
performance 
- TD + CSR 
- KLD database 
has some 
limitation such 
as subject to 
use binary 
respond, 
selection 
sample bias 
and qualitative 
nature 
2011 Post et al. To evaluate the 
relationship between 
- ECSR 
- Board of 
- Secondary data from 
annual report, KLD 
- Multiple 
regression 
- BoD 
composition
- Fail to measure 
the process 
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(2011) boards of directors‘ 
composition and 
environmental 
corporate social 
responsibility (ECSR) 
Director 
composition: 
outside director, 
women director, 
board age, 
education 
- Control variable: 
such as industry, 
slack resources, 
CEO duality.    
and fortune database  
- 78 companies in 
electronic and 
chemical industry 
 
- R
2
 0.10-0.30  CSR 
- Outside BoD 
+ CSR 
- Female BoD 
no CSR 
that underlie 
the relationship 
- Lack of 
standardized 
ECSR  
- Electronic and 
chemical 
industry are 
very different 
industry  
2011 Kang et al. 
(2011) 
To investigate the 
impact of degree 
product diversification 
on financial market and 
accounting based 
performance and 
complementarities 
between products 
- Performance: 
Tobin‘s Q and 
ROA 
- Product 
Diversification: 
TD 
- Complementar
ities: gaming, 
hotel and F&B 
- Control 
variable: Size. 
Leverage, 
dividend 
- Panel data 1 from 15 
casino firm, with 104 
observation in period 
2001-2008 
- Panel data 2 from 13 
casino firm, with 83 
observation in period 
2004-2007 
- Data collected from 
annual report 
 
- Multiple 
regression 
- Adjusted R
2
 = 
0.198-0.633 
- TD  
performance 
is U shape 
- Generalizability 
due to sample 
only consist of 
publicly trade 
US casino 
- Secondary 
data may not 
comprehensive
ly reflect 
qualitative 
aspects of 
variables 
2010 Bobillo et 
al. (2010) 
To examined the 
relationship between 
institutional framework 
and firm‘s competitive 
advantage, and role of 
firm‘s competitive 
advantage on the 
relationship between 
international 
- Financial 
market 
development 
- ID: foreign 
sales to total 
sales 
- Performance: 
ROA 
- Control 
- Secondary data 
collected from 
worldscope 
database, BACH 
database 
- Panel data from five 
EU countries, more 
than 1500 
manufacturing 
- Canonical 
correlation 
analysis 
- Multiple 
regression 
analysis: 
quadratic and 
cubic 
regression 
- ID  
performance 
is S shape 
 
- Limited to 
developed 
country only, 
need explore 
area in 
emerging and 
less developed 
country 
-  Firm level 
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diversification and firm 
performance. 
variable: firm 
size, 
ownership 
structure 
companies and 
16,588 observation in 
period 1991-2001 
 
models  
- Adjusted R
2
 = 
0.032-0.279 
analysis would 
be interest 
- Need to 
combine data 
base and 
interview 
201
0 
Jamali 
(2010) 
To examine the CSR 
orientation in MNCs 
CSR Qualitative Study with 
depth interview and semi 
structure interview to 10 
MNCs managers in 
Lebanon 
Qualitative 
analysis 
Main CSR 
themes and 
activities 
- This study did 
not give an 
attention on 
organisation 
design issue 
for MNCs 
which relates to 
international 
diversification. 
 
201
0 
Qian et al. 
(2010) 
To investigate how is 
performance impacted 
by the level of intra and 
inter regional 
diversification versus 
the total level of 
geographic 
diversification. 
- Performance : 
ROA 
- ID: total, intra, 
and inter 
geographical 
diversification 
- control 
variables: such 
as frim size, 
research and 
development 
intensity, 
advertising 
intensity, firm 
leverage, 
product 
scope/product 
diversification, 
- Secondary data 
collected from the 
firms‘ 10-K filling, 
Moody‘s Industrial 
Manuals, Mergent 
Online and The 
annual world bank‘s 
world development 
report. 
- 123 us manufacturing 
company with 861 
observations over the 
period from 1999 to 
2005 
 
- OLS 
- Adjusted R 
square = 
0.229-0.441 
- Intra ID + 
performance 
- Total ID  
performance 
is inverted U 
shape 
- Generalisation 
due to conduct 
only in US 
- Cannot capture 
the different 
type of MNE 
investment 
- Need to 
examined the 
effect of 
national versus 
international 
strategy 
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regional 
macro-
economic 
indicator and 
industry    
200
9 
Gaur and 
Kumar 
(2009) 
To investigate the 
impact of business 
group affiliation on the 
relationship between 
international 
diversification and firm 
performance 
- Firm 
performance: 
ROS and ROA 
- ID: foreign 
sales to total 
sales 
- Group 
affiliation: 
dummy 
- Control 
variable: size, 
age, industry. 
- Secondary data 
collected ISI 
emerging markets 
database. 
- 240 Indian 
manufacturing and 
service company with 
861 observations 
over the period from 
1997 to 2001 
 
- General Linear 
Square (GLS) 
random effect 
model  
- Adjusted R 
square = 0.18-
0.22 
- Intra ID + 
performance 
 
- Generalisation 
issue due to 
conduct only in 
India 
- Only use 
accounting 
based 
performance. 
Need to use 
other market 
performance. 
- Future study 
need to 
consider other 
context- 
specific factor 
in international 
diversification 
and 
performance 
relationship  
200
9 
Yang and 
Rivers 
(2009) 
To investigate 
antecedents of CSR in 
MNCs 
- CSR 
- Stakeholder 
demands 
- Social context 
- Organisationa
l context 
Literature review Descriptive Parent firm 
relation  
CSR 
(proposition) 
 
- Investigate 
institutional 
environment 
 CSR 
 
2008 Chiao et To explore - Performance - Archival data of an - Logit 
Regression 
- ID +Firm - Future 
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al. (2008) subsidiaries‘ 
diversification strategy 
and to examine the 
relationship between 
subsidiary size, 
internationalization, 
product diversification 
and performance 
- ID: import 
ratio and 
export ratio 
- RD 
- UD 
- Control 
variable such 
as industry, 
ownership 
structure. 
officially conducted 
survey 
- 920 Taiwanese 
subsidiary in china 
- OLS 
- Cox and Snell 
R
2
=0.098 
performance 
- RD +Firm 
performance 
than UD 
research 
should 
examine larger 
firms with 
numerous 
foreign 
subsidiaries in 
developed 
countries 
2008 Jamali et 
al. (2008) 
To investigate the 
interrelationship 
between corporate 
governance and CSR 
- Corporate 
governance 
- CSR 
In-depth interview to 
8 companies in 
Lebanon 
- Qualitative 
analysis 
Proposition; 
that CG  
CSR  
- Single country 
investigation. 
 
2008 Surroca 
and Tribó 
(2008) 
To investigate the 
relationships amongst 
managerial 
entrenchment practice 
and financial 
performance and the 
role of corporate 
governance mechanism 
in moderate this 
relationship 
- CSP: SiRi 
- Financial 
performance 
(ROA, Tobin‘s 
Q, and 
abnormal 
return) 
- Internal 
corporate 
governance 
mechanism, 
(including: 
committee, 
board 
independence, 
- Secondary data from 
SiRi PRO, Osiris and 
Bloomberg‘s MSCI 
word index  
- 358 companies in 22 
countries from 2002-
2005-2005, 448 
observations in 
industrial industries 
- Fixed effect 
Multiple 
regression:  
Panel data 
technique  
- R
2
=0.0487- 
0.4964 
The positive 
relationship of 
Mangerial 
entrenchment 
 + CSP are 
moderated by 
internal 
corporate 
governance 
mechanism  
- Board 
independenc
e* 
Managerial 
- Future 
research need 
to consider 
long term 
relationship 
and the 
different 
institutional 
context.  
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ownership 
concentration) 
- Control 
variable: 
including  
financial 
structure, 
dividends, size, 
firm‘s age, and 
investment     
entrenchmen
t (no) 
- Non dual 
CEO* 
Managerial 
entrenchmen
t (+) 
- Ownership 
concentratio
n* 
managerial 
entrenchmen
t (no) 
 
2007 Chakrabart
i et al. 
(2007) 
To investigate the 
impact of diversification 
on performance for 
firms operating in 
different institutional 
environment during a 
relative stable period 
and during a major 
economic wide shock. 
- TD 
- Performance: 
ROA 
- Institutional 
environment 
- Economy wide 
shock 
- Business 
group 
- Control 
variable 
including size, 
current ratio, 
leverage and 
period 
- Secondary data 
from Osiris 
database, E 
- Panel design 1988-
2003 
- Final sample 3,117 
firms in 19 
manufacturing 
industries on East 
Asia Countries 
including Indonesia, 
Japan, Thailand, 
Singapore, 
Malaysia, South 
Korea 
- 34,938 observation 
 
- OLS:  per 
countries and 
pooled sample  
- Adj R
2
 =0.010-
0.231 
- TD +Firm 
performance 
in the most 
developed 
institutional 
context 
- TD -Firm 
performance 
in the  more 
developed 
environment 
 
- Empirically 
validated 
measured of 
institutional 
environment 
needed 
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2007 Chang 
and 
Wang 
(2007) 
To investigate the 
differential impacts of 
product diversification 
strategies on 
international 
diversification and firm 
performance 
relationship 
- Performance: 
Tobin‘s Q 
- Product 
Diversification: 
Total, RD, UD 
- ID 
- Control 
variable for 
example firm 
size, leverage, 
R&D intensity, 
country, and 
industry  
- Secondary data 
from compustat 
database 
- 2,402 firms with 
annual sales 
greater than $10 
million, period 
1996-2002. 
- Panel data 8047 
observation from 
S&P compustat 
database 
- Multiple 
regression: 
- R
2
=0.13-0.15 
- ID +Firm 
performance 
- RD -Firm 
performance 
- Moderating 
impact of RD 
is + 
- Moderating 
impact of UD 
is – 
 
- Investigate the 
diversification 
impact on  
Independently  
- Assume each 
diversification 
contribute 
equally 
- Use resource 
based 
approach in 
measure 
relatedness of 
product 
- The model 
cannot capture 
the shift and 
change in 
relationship 
across time 
- Use four region 
not country on 
International 
diversification 
measurement  
2007 Singh et al. 
(2007) 
To analyse relationship 
between corporate 
diversification and 
performance 
- Performance: 
ROA, profit 
margin, cost 
efficiency 
- Diversification: 
Dummy and 
entropy 
- Secondary data 
from WorldScope 
database from 
1998-2000 
- 846 firms 
- Logistic model 
- OLS for year 
by year and 
pooled 
regression 
- ID -Firm 
performance 
 
- Only focus on 
Indian firms 
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- Control 
variable such 
as size, growth 
opportunity and 
tangibility 
200
6 
Brammer 
et al. 
(2006) 
To investigate the 
relationship between 
CSP and geographical 
diversification 
- CSP:Eiris 
- Geographical 
Diversification 
- Control 
variables; firm 
size, business 
activities, 
profitability, etc. 
- Secondary data 
from 420 listed 
companies in 
London Stock 
Exchange (LSX),  
- OLS 
regression 
- Adj R
2
= 0.18-
0.45 
 
- Geographica
l 
diversificatio
n  CSP 
- Cross sectional 
analysis 
- Only in LSX 
- Need to do in 
other countries 
2006 Doukas 
and Kan 
(2006) 
To examine the 
sources behind the 
global diversification 
value loss in a 
contingent claims 
framework 
- Firm 
performance: 
Excess value 
- RD 
- UD 
- TD 
- Secondary data 
use US 
Acquisitions 
Overseas roster of 
Securities Data 
Corporation‘s 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A) 
Journal and 
Compustat 
- 612 cross-border 
acquisitions made 
by US bidders 
between 1 January 
1992 and 31 
December 1997 
- Univariate: 
Anova 
- Multivariate: 
Regression 
- Adj R2=0.033-
0.156 
- ID +bond 
holder 
wealth  
Value 
- ID 
+shareholder 
wealth  
Value 
 
- Only intended 
to be 
generalized in 
Canada 
2006 Miller 
(2006) 
To investigate the 
impact of related 
diversification in term 
- Performance: 
Tobin‘s Q 
- RD: 
- Secondary data 
using Compustat 
database 
- Weighted least 
square 
regression 
- Adj R
2
 =0.889-
- RD +Firm 
performance 
- Future 
research can 
use various 
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of technology diversity 
on firm performance 
technology - 747 firms in 1990 0.905 setting and 
time period 
200
6 
Strike et 
al. (2006) 
To investigate the link 
between international 
diversification and CSR 
- International 
Diversification 
- CSR: KLD 
- Control 
variables: firm 
size, industry 
effects, etc.  
- Secondary data 
- 222 US listed firms 
- GLS analysis 
with STATA 
 
- ID  CSR - Limitation of 
KLD data in 
representing 
CSR 
- Need to define 
the CSR 
construct for 
the future 
research 
200
5 
Tongli et 
al. (2005) 
This study investigate 
the impact of product 
diversification and 
international 
diversification on firm 
performance 
- RD 
- ID 
- Performance: 
ROA, share 
Price and 
Tobin‘s Q  
- Secondary data by 
using Worlscope, 
Datastream, etc  
- 626 observation in 
period 1995-1999 
- GLS  
- MANOVA 
- Adj R
2
 =0.143-
0.216 
- RD - FP 
- ID  + FP 
- Only in one 
country, 
Singapore 
- Use short time 
period 
200
4 
Christma
nn (2004) 
To analyse the 
determinants of global 
standardization of 
MNCs‘ environment 
policies 
- Global 
environmental 
performance 
- Stakeholder 
pressures 
- MNC‘s 
characteristics 
- Survey: mail 
questionnaire  
- 98 out of 512 
business units in 
US 
- OLS 
Regression 
- Adj R
2
=0.18, 
0.45, 0.25 
- MNC 
characteristi
c  Global 
environment
al 
standardizati
on. 
- External 
stakeholder 
pressures  
Global 
environment
al 
standardizati
- Only in focal 
industry, more 
industries are 
needed. 
- Only use US 
MNC‘s 
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on 
2004 Fauver et 
al. (2004) 
To examine the impact 
of industry and 
international 
diversification on firm 
performance 
- Firm 
performance: 
Excess value 
- TD 
- ID 
- Control 
variable 
including 
ownership 
concentration 
- Secondary data 
using WolrdScope 
database for more 
than 3000 firms 
from German, UK, 
US company in 
period time 1991-
1995 
- Cross sectional 
regression for 
each countries 
- Adj R
2
 =0.08-
0.14 
- For US 
company: 
Value of 
Multi 
industry*Mult
ination firm <  
Value of 
multi 
industry* 
domestic 
firm   
- Future 
research 
needs to 
investigate the 
differences 
result between 
countries.  
2004 Li and 
Greenwoo
d (2004) 
To investigate the 
effect of within industry 
diversification on firm 
performance 
- Firm 
performance: 
ROA 
- TD 
- WID: 
relatedness 
weighted 
diversification 
- Secondary data 
use Trac insurance 
services Ltd  
- 276 insurance 
companies and 822 
observations in 
Canada from 1993 
to 1998. 
- Panel data with 
random effect 
GLS 
- R2 
- WID +Firm 
Value 
 
- Only intended 
to be 
generalized to 
a single 
industry 
2004 Sharfman 
et al. 
(2004) 
To offer a propositional 
model about global 
competitive or 
institutional pressures 
and their effects on 
CEP 
- Environmental 
performance 
- Industry 
diversification: 
TD 
- International 
diversification 
- Theoretical 
conceptualization  
-  Proposition: 
- TD +  CEP 
- ID +  CEP 
- Only offer 
propositions 
based on 
theoretical 
explanation. 
2003 Capar and 
Kotabe 
(2003) 
To investigate the 
relationship between 
international 
diversification and 
- ID: foreign 
sales to total 
sales 
- Performance: 
- Secondary data from 
Die welt annual 
survey, directories 
and annual report 
- Regression: 
linear and 
curvilinear 
model 
- Adjusted R
2
: 
- ID   FP is 
U shape 
- International 
diversification 
measurement 
- Generalizability 
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performance in service 
industry   
ROS and ROA 
- Control 
variables: Firm 
size, industry 
- 81 major service 
firms in period 1997-
1999 
0.279-0.345 the result do to 
conduct in 
Germany only 
200
3 
Ibrahim 
et al. 
(2003) 
To investigate the 
relationship between 
board of director and 
CSR in service industry 
- Legal 
- Economic 
- Ethical 
- Discretionary 
- Survey to 307 boar 
of director of S&P 
register of 
corporations- US 
- MANOVA - Difference 
between 
insider and 
outsider 
board of 
director is 
significant in 
economic 
and 
philanthropic 
variables 
- Outsider 
director will be 
more engage 
with CSR 
2003 Wan and 
Hoskisson 
(2003) 
To investigate the 
relationship between 
corporate 
diversification strategy 
and firm performance 
- Environmental 
munificent 
- Product 
diversification: 
weighted 
measure 
- ID: outbound 
and inbound 
- Performance: 
ROA, EBITOA 
- Control 
variable: size, 
leverage, sales 
growth, block 
holder  
- Secondary data 
using World 
competitive report 
and worldscope 
database 
- Sample consist of 
722 companies from 
16 western 
European countries 
 
- OLS 
- R
2
 =0.20-0.29 
- TD + 
performance 
in less 
munificent 
environment 
- TD - 
performance 
in more 
munificent 
environment 
- Outbound 
ID+ 
performance 
in more 
munificent 
environment 
- Future 
research could 
use additional 
classification of 
countries 
environment 
- Future 
research may 
investigate 
international 
corporate 
governance 
structure   
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2002 Denis et al. 
(2002) 
To document trends in 
diversification among 
US corporation, to 
investigate the 
relationship between 
global and industrial 
diversification, and to 
investigate the 
valuation effect of 
diversification 
- Product/industr
ial 
Diversification: 
fraction of firm- 
years industrial 
diversified, 
number of 
segment, 
Herfindahl 
Index 
- ID:   fraction of 
firm- years 
globally 
diversified and 
fraction of 
foreign sales 
- Control such 
as capital 
expenditure, 
R&D, leverage 
- Secondary data 
using Compustat 
database 
- 7520 firms, 44,288 
observation in period 
1984-1997 
- Univariate: t 
test 
- Multivariate 
regression 
analysis 
- Adj R
2
 =0.267-
0.291 
- ID  -  
excess value  
- UD  -  
excess value 
- Only conduct 
in US 
2002 Graham et 
al. (2002) 
To investigate the 
effect of corporate 
diversification on firm 
value in merger and 
acquisition firm 
- Diversification: 
RD and UD 
dummy, 
increasing 
number of 
segment 
- Firm value: 
excess value 
, Abnormal 
return 
- Secondary data using 
Compustat database 
- Sample consist of 356 
acquisition in period 
1980-1995 
- Event study 
with one year 
windows 
period 
- Regression 
- Adj R
2
 
=0.1516-
0.2637 
- RD and UR 
 -  excess 
value 
Negative 
relationship 
can explain 
by 
characteristi
c of the 
acquired unit 
 
- cannot 
explicitly value 
the acquired 
units 
- Only conduct in 
US 
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2002 Lins and 
Servaes 
(2002) 
To investigate the 
value of diversification 
in emerging market 
- Performance: 
Excess 
profitability and 
excess value 
- TD 
- GD 
-  Management 
group 
ownership 
concentration 
 
- Secondary data 
using WolrdScope 
database for 1195 
firms from 7 
emerging countries 
in Asia including 
Indonesia in 1995 
- Univariate 
- Multiple 
regression 
- Adj R
2
 =0.01-
0.11 
- TD +Firm 
Value 
- Management 
group 
ownership 
concentratio
n  
diversificatio
n discount 
-  
2001 Alesón and 
Escuer 
(2001) 
investigate the 
relationship between 
international 
diversification and firm 
performance in 
Spanish firms 
- ID: TID, RID, 
UID 
- Performance: 
ROA, Tobin‘s 
Q, and 
standard 
deviation 
- Secondary data 
from annual 
auditors‘ report 
- 103 firms in period 
1991-1995 
- General Least 
squares  
- Adj R
2
=0.053-
0.172 
- ID   + 
Tobin‘s Q 
- Selection 
sample bias 
- Category 
measured is 
not a 
consolidate 
one 
2000 Chen and 
Ho (2000) 
To investigate the 
relationship between 
level of corporate 
diversification and 
corporate value 
- Corporate 
value: Tobin‘s 
Q 
- TD 
- Insider 
ownership 
- Secondary data 
from the Stock 
Exchange of 
Singapore (SES) 
- 145 companies in 
1995 
- Cross sectional 
regression 
- Adj R2=0.082-
0.189 
- TD   - 
corporate 
value 
- Only 
investigate in  
Singapore‘s 
companies 
2000 Palich, 
Carini, et 
al. (2000) 
To investigate the 
effect of diversification-
performance 
relationship and the 
role of 
internationalization 
- Firm 
performance: 
ROA  
- Product 
diversification: 
TD, RD, and 
UD 
- ID 
- Secondary data 
using compustat 
database for 70 
companies 
- Anova and 
Mancova 
- Related 
diversificatio
n perform 
better than 
unrelated 
diversificatio
n 
- Performance 
- Not control 
industry 
- Reliability of 
SIC code 
- Firm 
performance 
only use ROA 
and ROS  
339 
 
of Related 
and 
unrelated 
diversificatio
n did not 
differ 
significantly 
when control 
international 
diversificatio
n  
- Not include a 
lag period for 
performance 
1999 Dooley 
and Fryxell 
(1999) 
To investigate the 
relationship between 
corporate 
diversification strategy 
and the pollution 
activity of business 
subsidiary within the 
US chemical industry 
- Diversification: 
categorical 
measured 
- Environmental 
performance: 
Direct release  
of Toxic 
- Secondary data from 
TRI database 
- 555 diversified parent 
companies operating 
2952 facilities in US 
- One way and 
two way 
ANOVA 
- Environment
al 
performance  
of UD < RD 
- Varian of 
Environment
al 
performance  
of UD > RD 
- Generalizability 
of result to 
other industries 
and other 
countries 
- Scheme for 
determining 
relative level of 
toxic not 
available in 
database 
- Lack of control 
for production 
processes and 
product across 
firm   
1999 Delios and 
Beamish 
(1999) 
To investigate the 
relationship between 
geographic scope, 
product diversification 
- Performance: 
ROA, ROE, 
ROS 
- Diversification: 
entropy 
- Secondary data from 
Directory of 
Japanese Firm‘s 
overseas operation 
- 399 firm of Japan 
- PLS 
 
- Geographic 
scope   + 
performance 
in high 
product 
- Generalizability 
due to Sample 
was limited to 
Japan MNEs 
company 
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and performance   measure 
- Geographic 
scope: number 
of FDI and 
number of 
country  
- Control such 
as industry, 
leverage 
MNEs  diversificatio
n 
- PLS cannot 
capture the 
nonlinear 
relationship  
1998 Wan 
(1998) 
To investigate the 
relationship between 
international 
diversification, 
industrial diversification 
and firm performance 
- ID: entropy 
measure 
- Industry 
Diversification: 
Total 
Diversification 
with entropy 
- Performance, 
ROE, Sales 
growth 
- Control 
variable such 
as industry and 
firm size 
- Secondary data from 
annual report and the 
Pacific-Basin Capital 
Market Database 
(PACAP)  
- 81 MNC in Hong 
Kong period 1990-
991 
 
- T test 
- Hierarchical 
regression 
- Adj R2=0.10-
26 
- Industrial 
diversificatio
n   -
performance  
- Generalizability 
due to Sample 
was limited to 
Hong Kong  
MNEs 
company 
- Short time 
horizon  
1997 Simerly 
(1997) 
To examine the 
relationship between 
product diversification 
and CSP  
- CSP: weighted 
index from KLD 
indicators  
- Industry 
Diversification: 
Herfindahl 
Index 
- Control 
variable such 
- Secondary data from 
KLD database 
- Regression 
- Adj  R2=0.249 
- Product 
diversificatio
n   -CSP 
- Need to 
investigate 
geographical 
diversification 
- Need to 
investigate the 
role of 
institutional 
investor 
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as size, 
economic 
performance, 
risk 
 
1996 Servaes 
(1996) 
To examine the value 
of corporate 
diversification 
- Diversification: 
categorical, 
single and 
multi-segment 
- Firm value: 
book value of 
total asset and 
Q ratio (raw 
and adjusted) 
for the firm 
primary 
industry and 
adjusted for the 
equally 
weighted  
- Secondary data from 
Compustat and Dun 
& Bradstreet‘s Million 
Dollar Directory (DB) 
- Sample consist of 
266 companies in 
period 1961, 353 in 
1964, 397 in 1967, 
445 in 1970, 514 in 
1973 and 518 in 
1976  
- T test 
- Regression 
 
- Diversificati
on discount 
in 1960s 
 
- Need to 
investigate he 
reason behind 
the change of 
diversification 
value over time  
- Need to 
investigate why 
the result of 
diversification 
are different for 
different firm 
199
5 
Ibrahim 
and 
Angelidis 
(1995) 
To investigate the 
differences and 
similarities  between 
inside and outside 
board members to 
CSR 
- Legal 
- Economic 
- Ethical 
- Philanthropic 
- 429 respondents in 
US companies 
- MANOVA, one 
way ANOVA 
- Difference 
between 
insider and 
outsider 
board of 
director is 
significant in 
economic 
and 
philanthropic 
variables 
- Outsider 
director will be 
more engage 
with CSR 
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Appendix 3  Outlier Checking 
1. The beginning Descriptive Statistic in original Value and Z score value 
Variables N 
Original Score Z Score 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
CSP 234 3.750 95.000 -1.375 5.803 
Related Diversification 234 0.000 0.807 -0.467 3.658 
Unrelated Diversification 234 0.000 1.070 -0.765 2.686 
International Diversification 234 0.000 100.000 -0.633 2.900 
Size 234 0.693 13.445 -3.305 3.432 
Profitability 234 -173.830 72.917 -9.205 3.386 
Liquidity 234 0.022 1004.823 -0.146 12.224 
Financial Leverage 234 0.033 8.250 -0.874 12.204 
Intangible Asset 234 -33.320 47.270 -6.815 8.569 
Age 234 0.000 4.710 -4.847 2.200 
CSP Industry 234 12.500 40.000 -1.439 3.094 
Ownership Concentration 234 1.000 89.000 -1.469 3.603 
Independent Commissioner 234 1.000 4.000 -0.856 2.922 
Valid N (listwise) 234         
 
 
2. Descriptive Statistic in original Value and Z score value after exclude 
outlier in the first stage 
Variables N 
Original Score Z Score 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
CSP 225 3.750 63.750 -1.664 4.362 
Related Diversification 225 0.000 0.807 -0.459 3.650 
Unrelated Diversification 225 0.000 1.070 -0.775 2.645 
International Diversification 225 0.000 100.000 -0.645 2.892 
Size 225 0.693 11.221 -3.482 2.430 
Profitability 225 -36.384 72.917 -3.401 5.094 
Liquidity 225 0.203 68.103 -0.419 10.740 
Financial Leverage 225 0.033 2.979 -1.382 6.578 
Intangible Asset 225 -9.020 19.730 -4.128 6.461 
Age 225 1.099 4.710 -3.372 2.320 
CSP Industry 225 12.500 40.000 -1.459 3.240 
Ownership Concentration 225 1.000 83.460 -1.485 3.340 
Independent Commissioner 225 1.000 4.000 -0.848 3.046 
Valid N (listwise) 225         
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3. Descriptive Statistic in original Value and Z score value in after exclude 
outlier in the second stage 
Variables N 
Original Score Z Score 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
CSP 213 3.750 58.750 -1.746 4.004 
Related Diversification 213 0.000 0.807 -0.453 3.689 
Unrelated Diversification 213 0.000 1.070 -0.779 2.630 
International Diversification 213 0.000 100.000 -0.636 2.966 
Size 213 2.398 11.221 -2.667 2.516 
Profitability 213 -36.384 57.143 -3.744 4.281 
Liquidity 213 0.234 11.263 -1.075 5.230 
Financial Leverage 213 0.040 1.969 -1.874 5.753 
Intangible Asset 213 -3.160 10.480 -2.618 4.153 
Age 213 1.099 4.710 -3.331 2.314 
CSP Industry 213 12.500 40.000 -1.452 3.227 
Ownership Concentration 213 1.000 83.460 -1.479 3.365 
Independent Commissioner 213 1.000 4.000 -0.839 3.018 
Valid N (listwise) 213         
 
 
4. Descriptive Statistic in original Value and Z score value in after exclude 
outlier in the third stage 
Variables N 
Original Score Z Score 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
CSP 205 3.750 53.750 -1.777 3.602 
Related Diversification 205 0.000 0.807 -0.444 3.701 
Unrelated Diversification 205 0.000 1.070 -0.801 2.580 
International Diversification 205 0.000 100.000 -0.650 2.908 
Size 205 2.485 11.221 -2.646 2.528 
Profitability 205 -36.384 45.550 -4.022 3.611 
Liquidity 205 0.234 8.077 -1.200 4.055 
Financial Leverage 205 0.040 1.321 -2.126 3.741 
Intangible Asset 205 -3.160 9.650 -2.698 3.891 
Age 205 1.099 4.710 -3.319 2.310 
CSP Industry 205 12.500 40.000 -1.471 3.311 
Ownership Concentration 205 1.000 83.460 -1.473 3.345 
Independent Commissioner 205 1.000 4.000 -0.837 3.032 
Valid N (listwise) 205         
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5. Final Descriptive Statistic in original Value and Z score value in after 
exclude outlier in the fourth stage 
Variables N 
Original Zscore 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
CSP 203 3.750 53.750 -1.767 3.597 
Related Diversification 203 0.000 0.807 -0.439 3.733 
Unrelated Diversification 203 0.000 1.070 -0.799 2.585 
International Diversification 203 0.000 100.000 -0.650 2.971 
Size 203 2.485 11.221 -2.634 2.520 
Profitability 203 -25.380 45.550 -3.128 3.726 
Liquidity 203 0.234 7.727 -1.234 3.992 
Financial Leverage 203 0.040 1.321 -2.144 3.769 
Intangible Asset 203 -3.160 9.650 -2.685 3.875 
Age 203 1.099 4.710 -3.355 2.318 
CSP Industry 203 12.500 40.000 -1.469 3.355 
Ownership Concentration 203 1.000 83.460 -1.463 3.350 
Independent Commissioner 203 1.000 4.000 -0.836 3.049 
Valid N (listwise) 203         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
345 
 
Appendix 4  Normality Test 
Model 1-4 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
    Unstandardized Residual 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
N 203 203 203 203 
Normal 
Parameters
a,b
 
Mean .0000000 .0000000 .0000000 .0000000 
Std. 
Deviation 
7.57028451 7.41141896 7.49351623 7.44477307 
Most 
Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .035 .046 .041 .044 
Positive .035 .033 .041 .033 
Negative -.034 -.046 -.039 -.044 
Test Statistic .035 .046 .041 .044 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .200
c,d
 .200
c,d
 .200
c,d
 .200
c,d
 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
   b. Calculated from data. 
   c. Lilliefors Significance Correction. 
   d. This is a lower bound of the true 
significance. 
    
Model 5-8 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
    Unstandardized Residual 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
N 203 203 203 203 
Normal 
Parameters
a,b
 
Mean .0000000 .0000000 .0000000 .0000000 
Std. 
Deviation 
7.22094440 7.21220062 7.15843902 7.14619228 
Most 
Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .052 .052 .044 .036 
Positive .023 .025 .026 .025 
Negative -.052 -.052 -.044 -.036 
Test Statistic .052 .052 .044 .036 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .200
c,d
 .200
c,d
 .200
c,d
 .200
c,d
 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
   b. Calculated from data. 
   c. Lilliefors Significance Correction. 
   d. This is a lower bound of the true 
significance. 
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Model 9-12 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
    Unstandardized Residual 
  Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
N 203 203 203 203 
Normal 
Parameters
a,b
 
Mean .0000000 .0000000 .0000000 .0000000 
Std. 
Deviation 
7.06746147 7.15329324 7.21822772 7.22094131 
Most 
Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .027 .045 .048 .052 
Positive .025 .030 .029 .023 
Negative -.027 -.045 -.048 -.052 
Test Statistic .027 .045 .048 .052 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .200
c,d
 .200
c,d
 .200
c,d
 .200
c,d
 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
   b. Calculated from data. 
   c. Lilliefors Significance Correction. 
   d. This is a lower bound of the true 
significance. 
    
 
Model 13-14 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
    Unstandardized Residual 
  Model 13 Model 14 
N 203 203 
Normal 
Parameters
a,b
 
Mean .0000000 .0000000 
Std. 
Deviation 
7.15102874 6.97325156 
Most 
Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .048 .037 
Positive .029 .024 
Negative -.048 -.037 
Test Statistic .048 .037 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .200
c,d
 .200
c,d
 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
 b. Calculated from data. 
 c. Lilliefors Significance Correction. 
 d. This is a lower bound of the true 
significance. 
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Appendix 5. Heteroscedasticity Test by Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM)  
Model 1 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 57.027 6.088   9.368 .000 
Zscore: Size -1.289 7.012 -.015 -.184 .854 
Zscore: Profitability 8.130 7.448 .094 1.092 .276 
Zscore: Liquidity .461 8.287 .005 .056 .956 
Zscore: Financial Leverage 2.442 8.890 .028 .275 .784 
Zscore: Intangible Asset -3.497 6.684 -.040 -.523 .601 
Zscore: Age -6.198 6.360 -.072 -.974 .331 
Zscore: CSP Industry 7.128 6.307 .082 1.130 .260 
Zscore: Public Ownership -7.943 6.224 -.092 -1.276 .203 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 11.929 6.885 .138 1.732 .085 
a. Dependent Variable: Q2_Res1 
 
Model 2 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 54.659 5.743   9.518 .000 
Zscore: Size -3.176 6.738 -.039 -.471 .638 
Zscore: Profitability 7.537 7.038 .093 1.071 .286 
Zscore: Liquidity -1.727 7.833 -.021 -.221 .826 
Zscore: Financial Leverage .105 8.409 .001 .012 .990 
Zscore: Intangible Asset -2.013 6.343 -.025 -.317 .751 
Zscore: Age -1.810 6.001 -.022 -.302 .763 
Zscore: CSP Industry 7.644 5.960 .094 1.282 .201 
Zscore: Public Ownership -4.701 5.918 -.058 -.794 .428 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 10.645 6.497 .131 1.638 .103 
Zscore: Related Diversification -1.935 6.047 -.024 -.320 .749 
a. Dependent Variable: Q2_Res2 
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Model 3 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 55.876 6.072   9.202 .000 
Zscore: Size -.567 7.237 -.007 -.078 .938 
Zscore: Profitability 10.288 7.486 .119 1.374 .171 
Zscore: Liquidity 1.446 8.289 .017 .174 .862 
Zscore: Financial Leverage 4.740 8.872 .055 .534 .594 
Zscore: Intangible Asset -3.841 6.668 -.045 -.576 .565 
Zscore: Age -4.492 6.374 -.052 -.705 .482 
Zscore: CSP Industry 7.499 6.344 .087 1.182 .239 
Zscore: Public Ownership -7.442 6.214 -.086 -1.198 .233 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 8.727 6.972 .101 1.252 .212 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification -7.189 6.544 -.083 -1.098 .273 
a. Dependent Variable: Q2_Res3 
 
 
Model 4 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 55.152 5.833   9.456 .000 
Zscore: Size -1.605 6.725 -.019 -.239 .812 
Zscore: Profitability 5.929 7.138 .072 .831 .407 
Zscore: Liquidity -6.551 7.949 -.079 -.824 .411 
Zscore: Financial Leverage -4.646 8.566 -.056 -.542 .588 
Zscore: Intangible Asset -2.758 6.493 -.033 -.425 .672 
Zscore: Age -5.144 6.094 -.062 -.844 .400 
Zscore: CSP Industry 5.028 6.109 .061 .823 .411 
Zscore: Public Ownership -6.426 5.988 -.078 -1.073 .285 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 9.609 6.631 .116 1.449 .149 
Zscore: International Diversification 2.249 6.096 .027 .369 .713 
a. Dependent Variable: Q2_Res4 
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Model 5 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 51.885 5.479   9.470 .000 
Zscore: Size -1.624 6.694 -.021 -.243 .809 
Zscore: Profitability 8.057 6.775 .104 1.189 .236 
Zscore: Liquidity -7.034 7.496 -.091 -.938 .349 
Zscore: Financial Leverage -3.808 8.070 -.049 -.472 .638 
Zscore: Intangible Asset -2.505 6.139 -.032 -.408 .684 
Zscore: Age .642 5.752 .008 .112 .911 
Zscore: CSP Industry 6.106 5.787 .079 1.055 .293 
Zscore: Public Ownership -3.760 5.676 -.049 -.662 .509 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 5.250 6.317 .068 .831 .407 
Zscore: Related Diversification -.332 5.810 -.004 -.057 .955 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification -8.792 5.953 -.114 -1.477 .141 
Zscore: International Diversification -1.083 5.733 -.014 -.189 .850 
a. Dependent Variable: Q2_Res5 
 
Model 6 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 51.429 5.464   9.412 .000 
Zscore: Size -1.736 6.621 -.023 -.262 .793 
Zscore: Profitability 7.601 6.702 .100 1.134 .258 
Zscore: Liquidity -6.936 7.416 -.091 -.935 .351 
Zscore: Financial Leverage -3.200 7.986 -.042 -.401 .689 
Zscore: Intangible Asset -1.999 6.086 -.026 -.328 .743 
Zscore: Age 1.740 5.747 .023 .303 .762 
Zscore: CSP Industry 6.369 5.724 .084 1.113 .267 
Zscore: Public Ownership -3.010 5.665 -.039 -.531 .596 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 5.749 6.256 .075 .919 .359 
Zscore: Related Diversification -2.161 5.906 -.028 -.366 .715 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification -8.545 5.889 -.112 -1.451 .148 
Zscore: International Diversification -1.236 5.671 -.016 -.218 .828 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 
* Zscore: Related Diversification 2.822 6.000 .036 .470 .639 
a. Dependent Variable: Q2_Res6 
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Model 7 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 51.110 5.433   9.407 .000 
Zscore: Size -2.067 6.620 -.027 -.312 .755 
Zscore: Profitability 8.883 6.704 .116 1.325 .187 
Zscore: Liquidity -5.651 7.473 -.074 -.756 .450 
Zscore: Financial Leverage -1.600 8.101 -.021 -.198 .844 
Zscore: Intangible Asset -2.217 6.074 -.029 -.365 .715 
Zscore: Age 1.999 5.688 .026 .352 .726 
Zscore: CSP Industry 8.163 5.725 .107 1.426 .156 
Zscore: Public Ownership -2.994 5.612 -.039 -.533 .594 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 3.622 6.281 .047 .577 .565 
Zscore: Related Diversification -1.260 5.746 -.017 -.219 .827 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification -9.061 5.898 -.119 -1.536 .126 
Zscore: International Diversification -1.170 5.686 -.015 -.206 .837 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 
* Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 1.703 6.006 .021 .284 .777 
a. Dependent Variable: Q2_Res7 
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Model 8 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 51.863 5.415   9.577 .000 
Zscore: Size -4.358 6.568 -.058 -.664 .508 
Zscore: Profitability 7.117 6.639 .094 1.072 .285 
Zscore: Liquidity -6.066 7.347 -.080 -.826 .410 
Zscore: Financial Leverage -3.364 7.910 -.044 -.425 .671 
Zscore: Intangible Asset -3.075 6.019 -.041 -.511 .610 
Zscore: Age 2.067 5.649 .027 .366 .715 
Zscore: CSP Industry 4.964 5.675 .066 .875 .383 
Zscore: Public Ownership -3.689 5.565 -.049 -.663 .508 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 4.432 6.197 .059 .715 .475 
Zscore: Related Diversification 1.109 5.696 .015 .195 .846 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification -6.793 5.851 -.090 -1.161 .247 
Zscore: International Diversification -.810 5.672 -.011 -.143 .887 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * 
Zscore: International Diversification -8.405 5.783 -.106 -1.454 .148 
a. Dependent Variable: Q2_Res8 
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Model 9 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 50.598 5.325   9.503 .000 
Zscore: Size -5.054 6.405 -.069 -.789 .431 
Zscore: Profitability 7.399 6.475 .101 1.143 .255 
Zscore: Liquidity -4.237 7.220 -.058 -.587 .558 
Zscore: Financial Leverage -.115 7.830 -.002 -.015 .988 
Zscore: Intangible Asset -2.063 5.880 -.028 -.351 .726 
Zscore: Age 4.944 5.556 .067 .890 .375 
Zscore: CSP Industry 7.096 5.533 .097 1.282 .201 
Zscore: Public Ownership -2.512 5.470 -.034 -.459 .647 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 3.647 6.079 .050 .600 .549 
Zscore: Related Diversification -2.058 5.702 -.028 -.361 .718 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification -6.543 5.720 -.089 -1.144 .254 
Zscore: International Diversification -1.183 5.544 -.016 -.213 .831 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * 
Zscore: Related Diversification 2.763 5.862 .036 .471 .638 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 3.956 5.802 .050 .682 .496 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * 
Zscore: International Diversification -7.577 5.703 -.098 -1.329 .186 
a. Dependent Variable: Q2_Res9 
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Model 10 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 51.646 5.548   9.309 .000 
Zscore: Size -.503 6.718 -.006 -.075 .940 
Zscore: Profitability 10.235 6.793 .132 1.507 .134 
Zscore: Liquidity -5.824 7.520 -.075 -.774 .440 
Zscore: Financial Leverage -1.305 8.110 -.017 -.161 .872 
Zscore: Intangible Asset -.814 6.209 -.010 -.131 .896 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish 1.707 5.781 .022 .295 .768 
Zscore: CSP Industry 7.257 5.835 .094 1.244 .215 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration -3.968 5.797 -.051 -.685 .494 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 3.051 6.337 .039 .482 .631 
Zscore: Related Diversification -.572 5.988 -.007 -.096 .924 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification -9.678 5.969 -.125 -1.621 .107 
Zscore: International Diversification -1.528 5.752 -.020 -.266 .791 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * 
Zscore: Related Diversification -4.580 4.891 -.072 -.936 .350 
a. Dependent Variable: Q2_Res10 
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Model 11 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 51.485 5.483   9.390 .000 
Zscore: Size -1.696 6.700 -.022 -.253 .800 
Zscore: Profitability 8.650 6.773 .112 1.277 .203 
Zscore: Liquidity -7.368 7.495 -.095 -.983 .327 
Zscore: Financial Leverage -4.567 8.107 -.059 -.563 .574 
Zscore: Intangible Asset -3.133 6.145 -.040 -.510 .611 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .254 5.752 .003 .044 .965 
Zscore: CSP Industry 6.346 5.784 .082 1.097 .274 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration -3.559 5.687 -.046 -.626 .532 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 5.343 6.316 .069 .846 .399 
Zscore: Related Diversification -.661 5.808 -.009 -.114 .910 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification -9.435 5.957 -.122 -1.584 .115 
Zscore: International Diversification -.462 5.739 -.006 -.080 .936 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 7.374 5.757 .093 1.281 .202 
a. Dependent Variable: Q2_Res11 
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Model 12 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 51.837 5.498   9.428 .000 
Zscore: Size -1.476 6.752 -.019 -.219 .827 
Zscore: Profitability 8.051 6.793 .104 1.185 .237 
Zscore: Liquidity -6.949 7.528 -.090 -.923 .357 
Zscore: Financial Leverage -3.686 8.110 -.048 -.454 .650 
Zscore: Intangible Asset -2.378 6.183 -.031 -.385 .701 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .664 5.768 .009 .115 .909 
Zscore: CSP Industry 6.046 5.812 .078 1.040 .300 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration -3.584 5.753 -.046 -.623 .534 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 5.226 6.335 .068 .825 .410 
Zscore: Related Diversification -.302 5.826 -.004 -.052 .959 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification -8.904 5.991 -.115 -1.486 .139 
Zscore: International Diversification -1.269 5.816 -.016 -.218 .828 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * 
Zscore: International Diversification -1.121 5.351 -.016 -.210 .834 
a. Dependent Variable: Q2_Res12 
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Model 13 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 51.340 5.583   9.196 .000 
Zscore: Size -.545 6.795 -.007 -.080 .936 
Zscore: Profitability 10.669 6.821 .137 1.564 .120 
Zscore: Liquidity -6.108 7.565 -.078 -.807 .420 
Zscore: Financial Leverage -1.892 8.203 -.024 -.231 .818 
Zscore: Intangible Asset -1.238 6.266 -.016 -.198 .844 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish 1.355 5.808 .017 .233 .816 
Zscore: CSP Industry 7.601 5.871 .098 1.295 .197 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration -3.655 5.885 -.047 -.621 .535 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 3.200 6.367 .041 .503 .616 
Zscore: Related Diversification -.764 6.012 -.010 -.127 .899 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification -10.282 6.024 -.132 -1.707 .090 
Zscore: International Diversification -1.069 5.859 -.014 -.182 .855 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * 
Zscore: Related Diversification -4.955 4.925 -.078 -1.006 .316 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 6.499 5.814 .081 1.118 .265 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * 
Zscore: International Diversification -.365 5.396 -.005 -.068 .946 
a. Dependent Variable: Q2_Res13 
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Model 14 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 49.680 5.393   9.213 .000 
Zscore: Size -3.361 6.475 -.046 -.519 .604 
Zscore: Profitability 10.471 6.493 .142 1.613 .109 
Zscore: Liquidity -2.704 7.253 -.037 -.373 .710 
Zscore: Financial Leverage 3.335 7.924 .045 .421 .674 
Zscore: Intangible Asset -1.148 6.000 -.016 -.191 .848 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish 4.551 5.611 .062 .811 .418 
Zscore: CSP Industry 8.415 5.596 .114 1.504 .134 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration -2.975 5.611 -.040 -.530 .597 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 1.402 6.108 .019 .230 .819 
Zscore: Related Diversification -3.813 5.800 -.052 -.657 .512 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification -8.108 5.775 -.110 -1.404 .162 
Zscore: International Diversification -1.843 5.644 -.025 -.327 .744 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * 
Zscore: Related Diversification -1.610 4.905 -.027 -.328 .743 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 3.506 5.556 .046 .631 .529 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * 
Zscore: International Diversification -.577 5.162 -.008 -.112 .911 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 
* Zscore: Related Diversification -.290 6.155 -.004 -.047 .963 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 
* Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 4.668 5.834 .059 .800 .425 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 
* Zscore: International 
Diversification 
-7.019 5.764 -.091 -1.218 .225 
a. Dependent Variable: Q2_Res14 
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Appendix 6 Linearity Test with Residual Plot 
 
Model 1    Model 2 
 
Model 3    Model 4 
 
Model 5    Model 6 
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Model 7     Model 8 
 
Model 9    Model 10 
 
 
Model 11    Model 12 
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Model 13    Model 14 
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Appendix 7  Model Summary 
Model 1 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .580
a
 .337 .306 7.74478 1.900 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity: 
Current Ratio, Zscore: Public Ownership, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, 
Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value, Zscore: 
Profitability: ROA, Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee, Zscore: Financial 
Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
b. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
Model 2 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .604
a
 .364 .331 7.60197 1.863 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity: Current 
Ratio, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Public 
Ownership, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market 
To Book Value, Zscore: Profitability: ROA, Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee, 
Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
b. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
Model 3 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .592
a
 .350 .316 7.68618 1.950 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: Financial 
Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio, Zscore: Public Ownership, Zscore: Independent 
Commissioner, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value, Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee, 
Zscore: Profitability: ROA, Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio 
b. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 4 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .599
a
 .358 .325 7.63619 1.889 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Public 
Ownership, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Profitability: ROA, 
Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity: 
Current Ratio, Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value, Zscore: Size: Ln 
Number of Employee, Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
b. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
Model 5 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 
.630
a
 .396 .358 7.44548 1.896 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related 
Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Public Ownership, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: 
independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset: 
Market To Book Value, Zscore: Profitability: ROA, Zscore: Size: Ln Number of 
Employee, Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
b. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
Model 6 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .631
a
 .398 .357 7.45611 1.904 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: independent Commissioner * Zscore: Related 
Diversification, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Profitability: ROA, Zscore: Age: Ln 
Age from Establish, Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: independent 
Commissioner, Zscore: Public Ownership, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value, Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee, 
Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
b. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 7 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .638
a
 .407 .366 7.40053 1.881 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: independent Commissioner * Zscore: 
Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Profitability: ROA, 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Public Ownership, Zscore: 
International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity: Current 
Ratio, Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value, Zscore: Size: Ln Number 
of Employee, Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
b. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
Model 8 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .639
a
 .409 .368 7.38787 1.945 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: independent Commissioner * Zscore: 
International Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio, Zscore: Related 
Diversification, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value, Zscore: Public Ownership, Zscore: 
Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: 
independent Commissioner, Zscore: Profitability: ROA, Zscore: Size: Ln Number 
of Employee, Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
b. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
Model 9 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .650
a
 .422 .375 7.34545 1.947 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: independent Commissioner * Zscore: 
International Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio, Zscore: Related 
Diversification, Zscore: independent Commissioner * Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, 
Zscore: Public Ownership, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: 
International Diversification, Zscore: independent Commissioner, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value, Zscore: independent Commissioner * 
Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Profitability: ROA, Zscore: Size: Ln 
Number of Employee, Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
b. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 10 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .639
a
 .408 .367 7.39522 1.878 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Related 
Diversification, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: 
International Diversification, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Age: Ln 
Age from Establish, Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: CSP Industry, 
Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, 
Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
Model 11 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .630
a
 .397 .355 7.46235 1.894 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: 
Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: 
International Diversification, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: 
Related Diversification, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: 
Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
Model 12 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .630
a
 .396 .355 7.46515 1.896 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: 
International Diversification, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from 
Establish, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: 
Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: 
International Diversification, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, 
Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 13 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .639
a
 .408 .361 7.43230 1.875 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: International 
Diversification, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: 
CSP Industry, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Independent 
Commissioner, Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: International 
Diversification, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: 
Ownership concentration * Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Intangible 
Asset, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
Model 14 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .661
a
 .437 .382 7.30638 1.928 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: 
International Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Related Diversification, 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: 
CSP Industry, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: International 
Diversification, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Ownership 
Concentration, Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Intangible Asset, 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: 
Ownership concentration * Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Profitability, 
Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
366 
 
Appendix 8 Anova 
Model 1 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5875.923 9 652.880 10.885 .000
b
 
Residual 11576.460 193 59.982     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independen Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity: 
Current Ratio, Zscore: Public Ownership, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, 
Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value, Zscore: 
Profitability: ROA, Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee, Zscore: Financial 
Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
 
Model 2 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6356.699 10 635.670 11.000 .000
b
 
Residual 11095.684 192 57.790     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity: Current 
Ratio, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Public 
Ownership, Zscore: Independen Commissioner, Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market 
To Book Value, Zscore: Profitability: ROA, Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee, 
Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
 
Model 3 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6109.520 10 610.952 10.342 .000
b
 
Residual 11342.863 192 59.077     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: Financial 
Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio, Zscore: Public Ownership, Zscore: Independen 
Commissioner, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value, Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee, 
Zscore: Profitability: ROA, Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio 
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Model 4 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6256.605 10 625.660 10.730 .000
b
 
Residual 11195.779 192 58.311     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Public 
Ownership, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Profitability: ROA, 
Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Independen Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity: 
Current Ratio, Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value, Zscore: Size: Ln 
Number of Employee, Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
 
Model 5 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 
6919.691 12 576.641 10.402 .000
b
 
Residual 10532.692 190 55.435     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related 
Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Public Ownership, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: 
Independen Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset: 
Market To Book Value, Zscore: Profitability: ROA, Zscore: Size: Ln Number of 
Employee, Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
 
Model 6 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6945.184 13 534.245 9.610 .000
b
 
Residual 10507.199 189 55.594     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independen Commissioner * Zscore: Related 
Diversification, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Profitability: ROA, Zscore: Age: Ln 
Age from Establish, Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Independen 
Commissioner, Zscore: Public Ownership, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio, Zscore: Intangible 
Asset: Market To Book Value, Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee, Zscore: 
Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
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Model 7 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 7101.247 13 546.250 9.974 .000
b
 
Residual 10351.136 189 54.768     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independen Commissioner * Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Profitability: ROA, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from 
Establish, Zscore: Public Ownership, Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related 
Diversification, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: Independen Commissioner, 
Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio, Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value, Zscore: 
Size: Ln Number of Employee, Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
 
Model 8 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 7136.634 13 548.972 10.058 .000
b
 
Residual 10315.749 189 54.581     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independen Commissioner * Zscore: International 
Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: 
Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book 
Value, Zscore: Public Ownership, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: International 
Diversification, Zscore: Independen Commissioner, Zscore: Profitability: ROA, Zscore: Size: 
Ln Number of Employee, Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
 
Model 9 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 7362.683 15 490.846 9.097 .000
b
 
Residual 10089.700 187 53.956     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independen Commissioner * Zscore: International 
Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: 
Independen Commissioner * Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: CSP Industry, 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Public Ownership, Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Independen Commissioner, 
Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value, Zscore: Independen Commissioner * 
Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Profitability: ROA, Zscore: Size: Ln Number of 
Employee, Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio 
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Model 10 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 7116.123 13 547.394 10.009 .000
b
 
Residual 10336.260 189 54.689     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Related 
Diversification, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: International 
Diversification, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Related Diversification, 
Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
 
Model 11 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6927.615 13 532.893 9.570 .000
b
 
Residual 10524.768 189 55.687     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Ownership 
Concentration, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: International Diversification, 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: CSP Industry, 
Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
 
Model 12 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6919.700 13 532.285 9.551 .000
b
 
Residual 10532.683 189 55.728     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: International 
Diversification, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: CSP 
Industry, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: 
Ownership Concentration, Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial 
Leverage 
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Model 13 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 7122.666 15 474.844 8.596 .000
b
 
Residual 10329.717 187 55.239     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: International 
Diversification, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: 
CSP Industry, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Independent 
Commissioner, Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: International 
Diversification, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: 
Ownership concentration * Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Intangible 
Asset, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
 
 
Model 14 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 7629.883 18 423.882 7.940 .000
b
 
Residual 9822.500 184 53.383     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: 
International Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Related Diversification, 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: 
CSP Industry, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: International 
Diversification, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Ownership 
Concentration, Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Intangible Asset, 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: 
Ownership concentration * Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Profitability, 
Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
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Appendix 9 Coefficients of Regression 
Model 1 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 20.370 .544   37.473 .000     
Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee 2.190 .626 .236 3.497 .001 .757 1.320 
Zscore: Profitability: ROA .657 .665 .071 .988 .325 .671 1.489 
Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio -2.351 .740 -.253 -3.176 .002 .542 1.844 
Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio -1.340 .794 -.144 -1.688 .093 .471 2.122 
Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value .105 .597 .011 .177 .860 .834 1.200 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .515 .568 .055 .907 .366 .921 1.086 
Zscore: CSP Industry 2.282 .563 .246 4.052 .000 .936 1.068 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration: Public Ownership 1.805 .556 .194 3.248 .001 .961 1.040 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 1.642 .615 .177 2.671 .008 .786 1.273 
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 2 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 20.370 .534   38.177 .000     
Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee 2.533 .626 .272 4.046 .000 .730 1.370 
Zscore: Profitability: ROA .765 .654 .082 1.170 .243 .669 1.494 
Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio -2.222 .728 -.239 -3.053 .003 .540 1.851 
Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio -1.175 .781 -.126 -1.503 .134 .469 2.134 
Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value -.078 .589 -.008 -.133 .894 .824 1.214 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .477 .558 .051 .856 .393 .920 1.087 
Zscore: CSP Industry 2.378 .554 .256 4.294 .000 .933 1.072 
Zscore: Public Ownership 2.003 .550 .215 3.642 .000 .946 1.057 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 1.678 .604 .181 2.781 .006 .785 1.274 
Zscore: Related Diversification -1.621 .562 -.174 -2.884 .004 .906 1.103 
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 3 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 20.370 .539   37.759 .000     
Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee 1.862 .643 .200 2.896 .004 .708 1.413 
Zscore: Profitability: ROA .493 .665 .053 .742 .459 .661 1.512 
Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio -2.243 .736 -.241 -3.047 .003 .539 1.854 
Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio -1.288 .788 -.139 -1.634 .104 .471 2.124 
Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value .126 .592 .014 .213 .831 .833 1.200 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .405 .566 .044 .716 .475 .912 1.096 
Zscore: CSP Industry 2.427 .564 .261 4.307 .000 .921 1.086 
Zscore: Public Ownership 1.758 .552 .189 3.185 .002 .960 1.042 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 1.854 .619 .199 2.993 .003 .762 1.312 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 1.156 .581 .124 1.988 .048 .865 1.156 
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 4 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 20.370 .536   38.006 .000     
Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee 2.122 .618 .228 3.434 .001 .756 1.323 
Zscore: Profitability: ROA .616 .656 .066 .939 .349 .671 1.490 
Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio -2.438 .730 -.262 -3.337 .001 .541 1.848 
Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio -1.554 .787 -.167 -1.974 .050 .466 2.146 
Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value .357 .597 .038 .598 .551 .811 1.233 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .514 .560 .055 .919 .359 .921 1.086 
Zscore: CSP Industry 2.071 .561 .223 3.690 .000 .916 1.091 
Zscore: Public Ownership 1.931 .550 .208 3.510 .001 .954 1.049 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 1.486 .609 .160 2.438 .016 .778 1.286 
Zscore: International Diversification 1.431 .560 .154 2.555 .011 .920 1.087 
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 5 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 20.370 .523   38.980 .000     
Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee 2.139 .638 .230 3.349 .001 .673 1.485 
Zscore: Profitability: ROA .567 .646 .061 .877 .382 .657 1.522 
Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio -2.224 .715 -.239 -3.111 .002 .537 1.863 
Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio -1.361 .770 -.146 -1.768 .079 .463 2.159 
Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value .213 .586 .023 .364 .716 .800 1.249 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .381 .549 .041 .694 .489 .912 1.097 
Zscore: CSP Industry 2.286 .552 .246 4.141 .000 .901 1.110 
Zscore: Public Ownership 2.073 .541 .223 3.830 .000 .936 1.068 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 1.707 .603 .184 2.833 .005 .756 1.323 
Zscore: Related Diversification -1.490 .554 -.160 -2.689 .008 .894 1.119 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 1.046 .568 .113 1.842 .067 .851 1.175 
Zscore: International Diversification 1.468 .547 .158 2.684 .008 .918 1.089 
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 6 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 20.416 .528   38.688 .000     
Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee 2.145 .639 .231 3.355 .001 .673 1.486 
Zscore: Profitability: ROA .573 .647 .062 .886 .377 .657 1.522 
Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio -2.214 .716 -.238 -3.091 .002 .537 1.864 
Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio -1.344 .771 -.145 -1.742 .083 .463 2.161 
Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value .187 .588 .020 .318 .751 .797 1.255 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .327 .555 .035 .590 .556 .894 1.119 
Zscore: CSP Industry 2.286 .553 .246 4.135 .000 .901 1.110 
Zscore: Public Ownership 2.123 .547 .228 3.881 .000 .919 1.088 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 1.686 .604 .181 2.790 .006 .754 1.326 
Zscore: Related Diversification -1.401 .570 -.151 -2.457 .015 .846 1.182 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 1.036 .569 .111 1.822 .070 .851 1.175 
Zscore: International Diversification 1.476 .548 .159 2.695 .008 .917 1.090 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Related Diversification 
-.392 .579 -.041 -.677 .499 .888 1.127 
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 7 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 20.443 .521   39.240 .000     
Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee 2.162 .635 .233 3.406 .001 .673 1.486 
Zscore: Profitability: ROA .610 .643 .066 .948 .344 .656 1.524 
Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio -2.058 .717 -.221 -2.872 .005 .528 1.894 
Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio -1.116 .777 -.120 -1.437 .152 .449 2.225 
Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value .247 .582 .027 .425 .671 .799 1.251 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .398 .545 .043 .729 .467 .912 1.097 
Zscore: CSP Industry 2.314 .549 .249 4.216 .000 .900 1.111 
Zscore: Public Ownership 2.067 .538 .222 3.842 .000 .936 1.068 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 1.822 .602 .196 3.025 .003 .748 1.338 
Zscore: Related Diversification -1.471 .551 -.158 -2.670 .008 .893 1.120 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 1.113 .566 .120 1.969 .050 .848 1.180 
Zscore: International Diversification 1.390 .545 .150 2.550 .012 .912 1.096 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 
1.048 .576 .105 1.821 .070 .936 1.068 
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 8 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 20.231 .523   38.670 .000     
Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee 2.211 .635 .238 3.484 .001 .671 1.490 
Zscore: Profitability: ROA .592 .641 .064 .923 .357 .657 1.522 
Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio -2.266 .710 -.244 -3.193 .002 .536 1.864 
Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio -1.411 .764 -.152 -1.846 .066 .463 2.161 
Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value .258 .581 .028 .444 .658 .799 1.251 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .459 .546 .049 .841 .401 .907 1.102 
Zscore: CSP Industry 2.237 .548 .241 4.081 .000 .899 1.112 
Zscore: Public Ownership 2.028 .538 .218 3.771 .000 .935 1.070 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 1.770 .599 .190 2.957 .004 .754 1.327 
Zscore: Related Diversification -1.531 .550 -.165 -2.783 .006 .892 1.121 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification .952 .565 .102 1.685 .094 .845 1.183 
Zscore: International Diversification 1.314 .548 .141 2.397 .017 .900 1.111 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: International Diversification 
1.114 .559 .114 1.994 .048 .953 1.050 
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 9 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 20.359 .525   38.795 .000     
Zscore: Size: Ln Number of Employee 2.248 .631 .242 3.561 .000 .670 1.492 
Zscore: Profitability: ROA .644 .638 .069 1.010 .314 .656 1.525 
Zscore: Liquidity: Current Ratio -2.092 .712 -.225 -2.940 .004 .527 1.896 
Zscore: Financial Leverage: Debt Asset Ratio -1.153 .772 -.124 -1.494 .137 .449 2.229 
Zscore: Intangible Asset: Market To Book Value .257 .580 .028 .443 .658 .795 1.257 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .405 .548 .044 .739 .461 .891 1.122 
Zscore: CSP Industry 2.262 .545 .243 4.147 .000 .898 1.113 
Zscore: Public Ownership 2.090 .539 .225 3.877 .000 .919 1.088 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 1.855 .599 .200 3.097 .002 .744 1.344 
Zscore: Related Diversification -1.389 .562 -.149 -2.472 .014 .846 1.182 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification .999 .564 .107 1.772 .078 .840 1.190 
Zscore: International Diversification 1.241 .546 .134 2.271 .024 .895 1.118 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Related Diversification -.557 .578 -.058 -.965 .336 .867 1.154 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 1.020 .572 .103 1.783 .076 .936 1.069 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: International Diversification 
1.182 .562 .121 2.103 .037 .930 1.075 
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 10 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 20.230 .524   38.591 .000     
Zscore: Size 2.087 .635 .225 3.288 .001 .672 1.488 
Zscore: Profitability .572 .642 .062 .891 .374 .657 1.522 
Zscore: Liquidity -2.266 .711 -.244 -3.189 .002 .536 1.865 
Zscore: Financial Leverage -1.460 .766 -.157 -1.905 .058 .461 2.169 
Zscore: Intangible Asset .068 .587 .007 .116 .908 .787 1.271 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .308 .546 .033 .564 .573 .907 1.102 
Zscore: CSP Industry 2.176 .551 .234 3.947 .000 .891 1.123 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration 1.876 .548 .202 3.424 .001 .903 1.108 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 1.672 .599 .180 2.793 .006 .755 1.324 
Zscore: Related Diversification -1.738 .566 -.187 -3.072 .002 .846 1.182 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 1.026 .564 .110 1.819 .071 .851 1.175 
Zscore: International Diversification 1.429 .543 .154 2.630 .009 .917 1.091 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Related Diversification 
.876 .462 .115 1.895 .060 .848 1.180 
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 11 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 20.360 .524   38.821 .000     
Zscore: Size 2.126 .641 .229 3.317 .001 .671 1.490 
Zscore: Profitability .571 .648 .061 .881 .380 .657 1.522 
Zscore: Liquidity -2.232 .717 -.240 -3.114 .002 .536 1.864 
Zscore: Financial Leverage -1.390 .775 -.150 -1.793 .075 .458 2.181 
Zscore: Intangible Asset .201 .588 .022 .342 .733 .798 1.253 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .374 .550 .040 .679 .498 .911 1.098 
Zscore: CSP Industry 2.286 .553 .246 4.132 .000 .901 1.110 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration 2.088 .544 .225 3.839 .000 .932 1.073 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 1.713 .604 .184 2.836 .005 .755 1.324 
Zscore: Related Diversification -1.495 .556 -.161 -2.690 .008 .893 1.120 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 1.035 .570 .111 1.816 .071 .849 1.178 
Zscore: International Diversification 1.479 .549 .159 2.695 .008 .915 1.093 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Unrelated Diversification .208 .551 .022 .377 .706 .963 1.039 
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 12 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 20.369 .524   38.842 .000     
Zscore: Size 2.139 .644 .230 3.322 .001 .665 1.503 
Zscore: Profitability .567 .648 .061 .875 .383 .657 1.522 
Zscore: Liquidity -2.224 .718 -.239 -3.097 .002 .535 1.869 
Zscore: Financial Leverage -1.360 .774 -.146 -1.758 .080 .461 2.169 
Zscore: Intangible Asset .214 .590 .023 .363 .717 .793 1.261 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .381 .550 .041 .692 .490 .911 1.097 
Zscore: CSP Industry 2.285 .554 .246 4.123 .000 .898 1.114 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration 2.074 .549 .223 3.780 .000 .916 1.092 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 1.707 .604 .184 2.824 .005 .756 1.324 
Zscore: Related Diversification -1.490 .556 -.160 -2.681 .008 .893 1.120 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 1.045 .571 .112 1.829 .069 .845 1.184 
Zscore: International Diversification 1.467 .555 .158 2.644 .009 .896 1.115 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: International Diversification 
-.006 .510 -.001 -.013 .990 .919 1.088 
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 13 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 20.219 .528   38.291 .000     
Zscore: Size 2.085 .643 .224 3.243 .001 .662 1.511 
Zscore: Profitability .575 .645 .062 .891 .374 .657 1.522 
Zscore: Liquidity -2.267 .715 -.244 -3.169 .002 .534 1.872 
Zscore: Financial Leverage -1.478 .776 -.159 -1.905 .058 .454 2.201 
Zscore: Intangible Asset .065 .593 .007 .109 .913 .779 1.284 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .304 .549 .033 .553 .581 .906 1.104 
Zscore: CSP Industry 2.173 .555 .234 3.913 .000 .887 1.127 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration 1.898 .557 .204 3.409 .001 .883 1.133 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 1.676 .602 .180 2.783 .006 .754 1.326 
Zscore: Related Diversification -1.740 .569 -.187 -3.060 .003 .846 1.182 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 1.011 .570 .109 1.774 .078 .843 1.187 
Zscore: International Diversification 1.429 .554 .154 2.578 .011 .890 1.123 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Related Diversification 
.875 .466 .115 1.879 .062 .843 1.186 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Unrelated Diversification .173 .550 .018 .314 .754 .958 1.044 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: International Diversification 
-.061 .510 -.007 -.119 .905 .911 1.098 
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 14 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 20.214 .527   38.334 .000     
Zscore: Size 2.192 .633 .236 3.462 .001 .659 1.517 
Zscore: Profitability .660 .635 .071 1.039 .300 .656 1.525 
Zscore: Liquidity -2.143 .709 -.231 -3.022 .003 .525 1.904 
Zscore: Financial Leverage -1.291 .775 -.139 -1.667 .097 .440 2.272 
Zscore: Intangible Asset .054 .587 .006 .091 .927 .768 1.302 
Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish .263 .549 .028 .480 .632 .878 1.139 
Zscore: CSP Industry 2.123 .547 .228 3.879 .000 .883 1.133 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration 1.929 .549 .208 3.516 .001 .878 1.139 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner 1.795 .597 .193 3.005 .003 .741 1.350 
Zscore: Related Diversification -1.604 .567 -.173 -2.828 .005 .822 1.217 
Zscore: Unrelated Diversification .939 .565 .101 1.663 .098 .829 1.207 
Zscore: International Diversification 1.201 .552 .129 2.175 .031 .868 1.153 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Related Diversification 1.046 .480 .138 2.181 .030 .768 1.301 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Unrelated Diversification .218 .543 .023 .402 .688 .948 1.055 
Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: International Diversification -.081 .505 -.009 -.160 .873 .900 1.111 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Related Diversification -.939 .602 -.097 -1.560 .121 .790 1.266 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Unrelated Diversification .968 .571 .097 1.697 .091 .930 1.075 
Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: International Diversification 1.225 .564 .126 2.173 .031 .915 1.092 
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Appendix 10 Model Summary and Anova for Hierarchical Regression 
Model 1 and Model 2 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .580
a
 .337 .306 7.74478 .337 10.885 9 193 .000   
2 .604
b
 .364 .331 7.60197 .028 8.319 1 192 .004 1.863 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from 
Establish, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from 
Establish, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage, Zscore: Related 
Diversification 
c. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5875.923 9 652.880 10.885 .000
b
 
Residual 11576.460 193 59.982     
Total 17452.383 202       
2 Regression 6356.699 10 635.670 11.000 .000
c
 
Residual 11095.684 192 57.790     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 1 and Model 3 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .580
a
 .337 .306 7.74478 .337 10.885 9 193 .000   
3 .592
b
 .350 .316 7.68618 .013 3.954 1 192 .048 1.950 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from 
Establish, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from 
Establish, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage, Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification 
c. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 
5875.923 9 652.880 10.885 .000
b
 
Residual 11576.460 193 59.982     
Total 17452.383 202       
3 Regression 6109.520 10 610.952 10.342 .000
c
 
Residual 11342.863 192 59.077     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 1 and Model 4 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .580
a
 .337 .306 7.74478 .337 10.885 9 193 .000   
4 .599
b
 .358 .325 7.63619 .022 6.528 1 192 .011 1.889 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from 
Establish, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from 
Establish, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage, Zscore: International 
Diversification 
c. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 
5875.923 9 652.880 10.885 .000
b
 
Residual 11576.460 193 59.982     
Total 17452.383 202       
4 Regression 6256.605 10 625.660 10.730 .000
c
 
Residual 11195.779 192 58.311     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
388 
 
Model 1 and Model 5  
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .580
a
 .337 .306 7.74478 .337 10.885 9 193 .000   
5 .630
b
 .396 .358 7.44548 .060 6.276 3 190 .000 1.896 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from 
Establish, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from 
Establish, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage, Zscore: International 
Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 
c. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5875.923 9 652.880 10.885 .000
b
 
Residual 11576.460 193 59.982     
Total 17452.383 202       
5 Regression 6919.691 12 576.641 10.402 .000
c
 
Residual 10532.692 190 55.435     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 5 and Model 6 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
5 
.630
a
 .396 .358 7.44548 .396 10.402 12 190 .000   
6 .631
b
 .398 .357 7.45611 .001 .459 1 189 .499 1.904 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage, Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Related 
Diversification 
c. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
5 Regression 6919.691 12 576.641 10.402 .000
b
 
Residual 10532.692 190 55.435     
Total 17452.383 202       
6 Regression 6945.184 13 534.245 9.610 .000
c
 
Residual 10507.199 189 55.594     
Total 17452.383 202       
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Model 5 and Model 7 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
5 
.630
a
 .396 .358 7.44548 .396 10.402 12 190 .000   
7 .638
b
 .407 .366 7.40053 .010 3.315 1 189 .070 1.881 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage, Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification 
c. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
5 Regression 6919.691 12 576.641 10.402 .000
b
 
Residual 10532.692 190 55.435     
Total 17452.383 202       
7 Regression 7101.247 13 546.250 9.974 .000
c
 
Residual 10351.136 189 54.768     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 5 and Model 8 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
5 
.630
a
 .396 .358 7.44548 .396 10.402 12 190 .000   
8 .639
b
 .409 .368 7.38787 .012 3.975 1 189 .048 1.945 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage, Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: International 
Diversification 
c. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
5 Regression 6919.691 12 576.641 10.402 .000
b
 
Residual 10532.692 190 55.435     
Total 17452.383 202       
8 Regression 7136.634 13 548.972 10.058 .000
c
 
Residual 10315.749 189 54.581     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 5 and Model 9 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
5 .630
a
 .396 .358 7.44548 .396 10.402 12 190 .000   
9 .650
b
 .422 .375 7.34545 .025 2.737 3 187 .045 1.947 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage, Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: International 
Diversification, Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Related 
Diversification 
c. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
5 Regression 6919.691 12 576.641 10.402 .000
b
 
Residual 10532.692 190 55.435     
Total 17452.383 202       
9 Regression 7362.683 15 490.846 9.097 .000
c
 
Residual 10089.700 187 53.956     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
393 
 
Model 5 and Model 10 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
5 .630
a
 .396 .358 7.44548 .396 10.402 12 190 .000   
10 .639
b
 .408 .367 7.39522 .011 3.592 1 189 .060 1.878 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Related Diversification 
c. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
5 Regression 6919.691 12 576.641 10.402 .000
b
 
Residual 10532.692 190 55.435     
Total 17452.383 202       
10 Regression 7116.123 13 547.394 10.009 .000
c
 
Residual 10336.260 189 54.689     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 5 and Model 11 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
5 .630
a
 .396 .358 7.44548 .396 10.402 12 190 .000   
11 .630
b
 .397 .355 7.46235 .000 .142 1 189 .706 1.894 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 
c. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
5 Regression 6919.691 12 576.641 10.402 .000
b
 
Residual 10532.692 190 55.435     
Total 17452.383 202       
11 Regression 6927.615 13 532.893 9.570 .000
c
 
Residual 10524.768 189 55.687     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 5 and Model 12 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
5 .630
a
 .396 .358 7.44548 .396 10.402 12 190 .000   
12 .630
b
 .396 .355 7.46515 .000 .000 1 189 .990 1.896 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: International 
Diversification 
c. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
5 Regression 6919.691 12 576.641 10.402 .000
b
 
Residual 10532.692 190 55.435     
Total 17452.383 202       
12 Regression 6919.700 13 532.285 9.551 .000
c
 
Residual 10532.683 189 55.728     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 5 and Model 13 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
5 .630
a
 .396 .358 7.44548 .396 10.402 12 190 .000   
13 .639
b
 .408 .361 7.43230 .012 1.225 3 187 .302 1.875 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Related 
Diversification 
c. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
5 Regression 6919.691 12 576.641 10.402 .000b 
Residual 10532.692 190 55.435     
Total 17452.383 202       
13 Regression 7122.666 15 474.844 8.596 .000c 
Residual 10329.717 187 55.239     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 5 and Model 14 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
5 .630
a
 .396 .358 7.44548 .396 10.402 12 190 .000   
14 .661
b
 .437 .382 7.30638 .041 2.217 6 184 .043 1.928 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, 
Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln Age from Establish, Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: 
Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Unrelated 
Diversification, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Related 
Diversification, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: Related Diversification 
c. Dependent Variable: CSP 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
5 Regression 6919.691 12 576.641 10.402 .000
b
 
Residual 10532.692 190 55.435     
Total 17452.383 202       
14 Regression 7629.883 18 423.882 7.940 .000
c
 
Residual 9822.500 184 53.383     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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Model 1, Model 5 and Model 14 
Model Summary
d
 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .580
a
 .337 .306 7.74478 .337 10.885 9 193 .000   
2 .630
b
 .396 .358 7.44548 .060 6.276 3 190 .000   
3 .661
c
 .437 .382 7.30638 .041 2.217 6 184 .043 1.928 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln 
Age from Establish, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln 
Age from Establish, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage, 
Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Independent Commissioner, Zscore: Liquidity, Zscore: Ownership Concentration, Zscore: Age: Ln 
Age from Establish, Zscore: CSP Industry, Zscore: Intangible Asset, Zscore: Profitability, Zscore: Size, Zscore: Financial Leverage, 
Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: Ownership 
concentration * Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: International Diversification, Zscore: 
Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Unrelated Diversification, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: International 
Diversification, Zscore: Independent Commissioner * Zscore: Related Diversification, Zscore: Ownership concentration * Zscore: 
Related Diversification 
d. Dependent Variable: CSP 
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ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5875.923 9 652.880 10.885 .000
b
 
Residual 11576.460 193 59.982     
Total 17452.383 202       
2 Regression 6919.691 12 576.641 10.402 .000
c
 
Residual 10532.692 190 55.435     
Total 17452.383 202       
3 Regression 7629.883 18 423.882 7.940 .000
d
 
Residual 9822.500 184 53.383     
Total 17452.383 202       
a. Dependent Variable: CSP 
